Development assistance and industrialization : why are there differing views? by Lynch, Mary Margaret
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION:
WHY ARE THERE DIFFERING VIEWS?
by
MARY MARGARET LYNCH
B.A., Political Science
State University of New York at Albany
(1972)
Masters of Urban Planning
University of Illinois
(1974)
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements of the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
October 1989
@ Mary Margaret Lynch 1989
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author_ .--
Departme t"of Urb JnStudies and Planning
October 19, 1989
Certified by
Lance Taylor
Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Langley Keyes
Chair, Ph.D. Committee
JUN 1) 1990
nth
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION:
WHY ARE THERE DIFFERING VIEWS?
By
MARY MARGARET LYNCH
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning on October 19, 1989
in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements of the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on the issue of why donors differ
in how they define industrial issues and programs in
developing countries. The shift towards industrial programs
in the late 1970s represents a break from the traditional
approach to industrial development and one more phase in a
continuing cycle of donor policy formulation. A model is
presented which outlines the factors which triggered the
shift, the theoretical approaches which flowed out of this
process, and the implications for programs within developing
countries.
By systematically tracking the evolution of the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) industrial program in
the Philippines, insights are provided into how programs are
formulated within a donor agency, how they differ between
donors and what influences play the greatest role in program
evolution. It is not sufficient, as some donor reviews
contend, to say that bilateral agencies are motivated merely
by commercial and political interests and multilaterals by
developmental concerns. Each donor is subjected to a wide
range of pressures which fluctuate over time and take on
increased or decreased significance within the organization.
Four levels of policy development are seen in this process:
uncertainty triggering a decision to change; policy
formulation to resolve this uncertainty; organizational
adaptation; and program development within a specific country.
Policy development is cyclical with changes being made at
various junctures in response to a number of stimuli.
The implications of this process are important for
developing countries. Donors many times present their
analyses as objective assessments of the situation within
developing countries--above politics and bureaucratic
concerns. They focus on developing rational solutions which
they believe should be implemented within the developing
country. This is clearly seen in many of the industrial
programs and projects put forward by donors in the last ten
years. The developing countries often contend, however, that
the analyses are attempts to impose a donor perspective of
appropriate development.
The conclusion here is that the process of policy
formulation drives the development model which is followed and
prescribed by donors. Donors do not have a new solution to
industrial development problems. Each has chosen a model of
industrial development which fits the needs and perspectives
of the organization. They are presenting options based on
their attempts to develop effective programming in an ever
changing environment. By more clearly understanding how
donors develop their theory of industrialization and how it
gets translated at the country level, developing countries can
increase their negotiating and bargaining position in adapting
the programs to fit their needs.
Thesis Supervisor: Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics
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I. INTRODUCTION
The central question which prompted this dissertation was:
why do donors differ in terms of how they define industrial
issues and programming within a recipient country? Previous
analyses of donors provided some insights into this issue.1
Political and commercial agendas have often been cited as the
reason why bilateral donors tackle certain issues.2  The need
to disburse funds has been a driving force behind changes such
as the shift in the World Bank toward program loans in the
late 1970s. The debt problem within recipient countries has
limited opportunities for traditional aid projects such as
infrastructure which require matching funds from the
developing country.
Seeing policy formulation from within a donor organization,
however, it became apparent to me that these answers were
incomplete. While they provided parts of the puzzle, the
picture remained blurry. My sense was that the development of
specific programs resulted from a more complex interaction of
variables within the organization. The industrial programs
represented a new cycle of solutions being put forward by
donors in response to unrelenting problems within developing
1 See for example Tendler (1975), Strachan (1978), Cassen
and Associates (1985) and Cohen et al. (1985).
2 This is one of the primary rationales given for
channelling larger amounts of assistance through multilaterals
which are supposed to be apolitical. See for example,
Development Committee (1986).
countries. The factors which triggered the donor entry into
industrial programming and the development of divergent
programs were to be found in the decision making process of
each donor.
Specifically four levels of decision making appeared to be
in operation: the decision by the organization to change its
current course; the overall policy formulation by the donor
which determined which issues would be addressed and how the
donor would approach them; the organizational pressures which
shaped how the policies became translated through the system;
and the issues formulation process undertaken within a
recipient country which was a translation of this overall
framework into specific terms.
To understand these levels of decision making required
identification of the influences which were important at
various decision making levels and how they combined to shape
programming within a particular country. By systematically
tracking this process inside the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), the key variables in each of these
areas became clearer.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide insight into
how these four levels of decision making determine programming
within a recipient country. Specifically, I look at why
industrial issues are defined differently within a country by
donors, how these definitions are the result of the overall
environment within which a donor operates, and what
implications this has for program design. By undertaking a
more complete tracking of policies through the donor maze,
the influence of variables such as pressure groups,
theoretical biases, economic environment, donor relations and
organizational characteristics are able to be investigated.
The Issues
Industrial programming provides an excellent vehicle for
looking at differences in approach by donors. Unlike other
programs such as basic human needs or housing, most donors had
a very similar practical and theoretical approach to
industrial projects during the 1950s to 1970s. 3 This approach
was grounded in a very specific definition of what was
appropriate for aid programs. Industrial projects were
primarily seen to be "private sector" matters. While donors
and recipient governments could provide support in terms of
infrastructure, direct involvement by these two groups in
industrial programs was considered inappropriate by donors.
Few projects were undertaken directly; those that were
undertaken followed strict economic criteria.
The shocks to the global system in the late 1970s, changed
this situation. The traditional projects were no longer in
demand at the recipient government level since they required
resources for counterpart funds and ongoing maintenance.
Donor agencies were facing increasing pressures on the
3 See Wood (1986) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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political, economic and administrative front to change their
programs and disburse funds. The theoretical approach to
development was also shifting with an increasing emphasis on
the private sector as the "engine of growth". These, and
other factors, triggered changes in how donors approached the
issue of industrial development with donors increasingly
turning to industrial programming as part of their aid
package.
In this transition, donors developed a wide range of
industrial programs. The World Bank moved into structural
adjustment lending with a clear focus on changing the policy
environment within which firms were operating. Direct support
to private enterprises became a program element within both
multilaterals such as the World Bank and bilaterals such as
CIDA and US Agency for International Development (US AID).
Private sector to private sector programs began to replace
traditional bilateral government to government support.
While donors developed a spectrum of new programs, they also
developed a range of views on how industrial issues should be
addressed within a country--breaking away from their
traditional definitions of industrial development. Some
agencies such as the World Bank and US AID turned toward a
model of "getting the prices right" within a country; others
such as CIDA saw price as being only one element in supporting
industrial efforts. The development of programs within each
donor agency reflected the theoretical approach which the
donor adopted.
Why these changes were manifested in different ways is the
focus of this work. The model which is presented here is one
which portrays a complex interaction of variables at different
levels within the donor agency. While previous work has
focused on the political or administrative motivations for
policy changes, the emphasis here is on a more dynamic
interaction which combines political and administrative with
economic, organizational and development theory.
Policy development is cyclical with changes being made at
various junctures in response to a wide range of stimuli.
Four levels of policy development are seen in this process:
uncertainty triggering a decision to change; policy
formulation to resolve the uncertainty; organizational
adaptation; and program development within a specific country.
Within each of these levels a different set of factors play a
role in shaping the policies and programs. These variables
also fluctuate over time with certain factors taking on
increased or decreased importance within the organization.
The contention of this dissertation is that a donor's
definition of industrial issues to be addressed within a
country starts long before the arrival of the first mission.
Each donor--regardless of whether it is bilateral or
multilateral--has its own policy framework which dictates how
sectoral issues are addressed.4 These differing frameworks
result from pressures from a number of different directions:
the demand for funding from recipient countries; the need to
find a niche in the overall aid giving framework; the demands
and pressures of internal constituencies 5; the pressures from
the developed country community as a whole; the requirements
of donor coordination; and the state of the art in development
theory.
Much of the work to date has had an implicit assumption that
certain of these variables are dominant over time with various
donor agencies. Bilateral donors are seen to care less about
developmental objectives and more about domestic concerns of
their internal constituencies. CIDA has continually been
criticized for succumbing to commercial pressures as
demonstrated in the degree of tied aid still exercised.6 US
Agency for International Development continues to be portrayed
as using development assistance as a vehicle for political and
4 Cohen et al. (1985) call this the policy space which is
the "area within which it is possible -- economically,
politically, ideologically, administratively, culturally--for a
[donor] to make effective decisions."
5 For Bilateral donors these are the domestic groups which
pressure for policy changes within the country; for
multilaterals they are the member countries on the donors'
boards which pressure for changes.
6 See for example the recent aid reviews such as Canada
(1987).
foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, multilaterals such
as the World Bank are seen to be primarily motivated by a
development model and not impacted by political or economic
pressures. 8
While policy formulation in these agencies may be influenced
by these factors, other variables also play a role which
fluctuates over time. Certain factors take on increased or
decreased importance within an organization depending on the
circumstances. The pressure to dramatically change
programming within a donor agency is often triggered by
growing uncertainty in the development environment. Global
economic shifts, a lack of demand for funding within the
recipient countries, the ineffectiveness of the current donor
programs, and pressure from constituencies converge to make
the current programming unsustainable. The donor is forced to
search for a new program niche within the aid framework.
This growing uncertainty forces a redefinition of the
donor's programs. How this redefinition takes shape is
strongly influenced by the parameters set by the various
pressure groups impacting both the multilateral and bilateral
agencies, the opportunities for programs within developing
See for example Sewell, Feinberg, and Kallab, eds (1985)
which makes the clear case that the US is moving increasingly in
this direction.
8 The objectivity of the Bank and its focus on development
issues as a first priority underlies many of the recent aid
reviews such as Cassen and Associates (1986).
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countries, the push within the donor community for increased
coordination and acceptable theories of development. The
confluence of these pressures, which varies by donor, dictates
the policy framework for the donor.
This framework, in essence, sets the parameters of how
issues will be addressed. The organization adapts the
framework and from this flows the theoretical approach which
the donor will take to issues, the internal and administrative
setup required to translate these policies into the field and
the inherent impact which this translation has on the
respective roles of donor and recipient. All of these
relations, theories and administrative guidelines have been
established before a donor goes into the field and set the
bounds for policy and program formulation.
The movement of donors into industrial programming
illustrates how some of these factors work through the system.
For example, the global economic changes in the late 1970s
changed the development possibilities within many developing
countries. To deal with balance of payments problems, many
countries were forced to reorient programs. While the demand
for aid to assist this process increased, the type of aid
needed changed. The donor's previous reliance on project
funding, particularly in areas such as rural development, was
becoming less viable as recipient countries were undergoing
severe adjustments. These factors placed many donors into a
state of flux as they attempted to develop programs which
responded to the changing climate.
In their search for new solutions, a number of donors,
including CIDA, turned toward direct industrial programming.
The shift at the developing country level toward a greater
focus on the private sector as the engine of growth meant that
the theoretical bias of the donors regarding the appropriate
public/private split of responsibilities was no longer an
issue. Donors could now target the private sector. As well,
the demand from recipient countries grew suddenly at the end
of the 1970s as private funds were no longer available for
many enterprises to adjust. This meant that donor programs
would face increased demand in these areas.
How the donors formulated their strategy relied on their
assessment of the role they wanted to take in the development
process, the pressures from internal constituencies, and the
demands of the donor community as a whole. CIDA chose a
route of providing support to micro, small and medium
enterprises in areas such as credit, marketing and technical
assistance. These smaller enterprises posed a limited threat
of competition to Canadian firms. In fact, commercial
interests played little role in the program decision.
The program emphasis instead resulted from CIDA's assessment
of its comparative advantage vis a vis other donors, the
demands of Canadian groups who were concerned about employment
in developing countries, and the opportunities at the
recipient country level. Other donors undertook a similar
process of program definition and developed a spectrum of
industrial interventions from sectoral program lending to
microenterprise support.
Once the policy framework was established, the
organizational relations within the agency dictated the
application this theory or approach would take within the
field. In essence, the organization translated the external
pressures for change into programming which fit its
organizational environment. Two factors were particularly
important in formalizing the theory of industrialization which
would underlie the actual programs. The first related to the
organization's traditional theoretical approach to
development. In essence, the value set of the donor came into
play in formalizing the theoretical model to be used in
evaluating issues at the country level. The second factor
related to organizational and administrative setup in terms of
relation between technical and project staff, ability to
disburse funds, and structure of administration.
The issues formulation process within the recipient
countries then became a way of translating the principles of
the donor into the field. Independent assessments were
undertaken to ensure that this translation occurred. The
result was differing assessments by donors of the problems
facing a country.
By understanding how the policy framework of the donor gets
formulated, how this is translated into sectoral concerns and
how these set the parameters for the analysis which is
undertaken within the developing country, the process of donor
funding becomes more transparent. This transparency is rare.
People outside of the system see donor programs established
which, many times, appear to be the result of quick decisions
or based on preconceived notions about how the recipient
country should be developing. While the developing countries
are supposed to be partners in the process, they have often
felt like victims of it.
This was evident in much of the literature during the 1970s
on reorganization of the international order during the NIEO
debates. More recently, developing countries have been
objecting to many of the policy conditions being imposed by
both multilateral and bilateral organizations which appear to
be a set agenda that all countries must follow. The movement
by developing countries to strengthen their analytical and
negotiating capabilities and thereby increase their strength
within the aid process is essential for increasing their
control.
Ironically, many times individuals within a donor
organization find the process just as perplexing as those
outside. While they may understand program objectives or
administrative criteria, they often can not anticipate how
changes will work through the system and impact their
programming process.
A better understanding of the process is critical, however,
particularly from the recipient country point of view. To
better impact the donor policy and program formulation
process, it is important that recipients continue to improve
their understanding of how procedures, policies and pressures
actually get worked through the donor system.
This inside view of how industrial programming is formulated
within a donor agency provides one example of how issues are
addressed and programs designed. How are issues within a
specific country assessed by the agency? Why are certain
aspects of this assessment taken up and others dropped? In
what ways does the process undermine the achievement of
program objectives? How can recipient countries impact the
process?
CIDA, in formulating its industrial programming in the
Philippines, has attempted to be fairly open. Both the
Government of the Philippines and private individuals have
been involved in the process to date--discussing issues,
commenting on CIDA's assessment of problem areas and
suggesting where interventions might be most useful. In fact,
CIDA's attempts at making the entire aid process more
interactive have been praised within the country.
Despite these attempts, forces continually intervene to
change the nature of the program and the interventions which
are possible as a result of these changes. Changes within the
policy framework of CIDA have shifted the parameters for
program formulation. These have filtered through the system
resulting in both a difference in approach to industrial
programs as well as a reformulation of relations within the
organization. The result is a fluid decision making process
which is difficult to understand even from within the
organization.
CIDA's involvement in the Philippines provides an ideal case
for investigating the development of industrial programming
for a number of reasons. First, the Philippines is an example
of a "near NIC" which achieved high growth in the 1970s.
While it followed many of the industrial policies now
considered "appropriate" for a country, it still was not able
to capitalize on opportunities. The result is an industrial
structure which has high potential but faces major obstacles.
A number of donors, including Canada, feel they can have a
positive impact on the industrial sector by helping to
alleviate some of the obstacles to development.
Second, the Philippines is currently reliant on donor
resources in the short run for its discretionary funding in
the industrial area. The current balance of payments crisis
has cut off, at least temporarily, opportunities for private
financing, yet the country is still targeting growth in the
industrial sector as a vehicle to transform the economy. This
increased reliance on donors in the short run is typical of a
group of countries which have achieved substantial levels of
industrialization but are currently blocked by limited access
to private capital markets.9 The Government of the Philippines
views external donors as a primary source for filling its
current gap in financing. As a result, donor influence is
potentially high.
Third, Canada only began its aid program in 1986 after the
election of President Aquino. Since 1986, industrial
programming has been undertaken to devise a suitable program
to be implemented in 1989-90. My continuous involvement in
this process from 1986 onward as a consultant to the CIDA
Industrial Services Section (ISS) provided an opportunity for
researching the entire process of industrial program
formulation. 1
Fourth, at the same time as the ISS was undertaking its
programming, the policy framework within CIDA was being
changed. The entire aid program within Canada came under
review and a new agenda for CIDA was set by the Government.
9 See OECD (1988a) for an explanation of this phenomenon.
In terms of financial resources, developing countries now break
into three groups: those currently reliant on donor funds for
their primary source of capital (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa); those
currently reliant in the short run on donor funds to allow them
to undertake industrial programming (i.e. Philippines, to some
extent Brazil and Mexico); and those who currently have access
to private capital markets and receive little donor funding
(i.e. Korea and Taiwan).
10 The specifics of this process and the research
undertaken are discussed in the methodology section and detailed
in a technical appendix referred to throughout as Appendix A.
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This dramatically changed the policy framework within the
organization and the administrative structure to support it.
The timing of the ISS programming in the Philippines, allowed
changes in the policy level to be more clearly traced through
the system to see their impact on the industrial programs
which could be implemented.
Throughout the research one question reoccurred: was the
formulation of industrial programs unique or did it have
applicability to donor operations in general? Aid programs
appear to be broken into three types. The first, which covers
areas such as famine relief and humanitarian assistance, is
clearly different than industrial assistance. The
motivations, the decision making process and program
formulation are of a fundamentally different nature.
The second groups of programs are those which are put in
place to serve a specific purpose or client group. These
include programs such as: the military aid of the US; the
industrial cooperation programs of Canada, Britain, Sweden,
Germany and others; and the programs which complement the
activities of non-governmental organizations, universities or
other groups. All of these programs are clearly driven by
strategic, commercial or other interest group interests.
Their development is easy to trace and their purposes fairly
straightforward.
The industrial programs described here fall into a separate
category of aid programs which are supposed to be aimed at the
developmental needs of the recipient country.1 For CIDA,
these would be the bilateral programs aimed during the 1950s
and 1960s at infrastructure and training and during the 1970s
at social programs and basic human needs. These programs
flowed out of a decision making process which had many of the
same elements as the industrial example. However, the
importance of variables, how they were manifested and how the
program uncertainty was resolved was different in these cases.
Methodology12
One of the primary obstacles to researching how policies are
formulated within a donor agency lies in the inability to
trace variables through the system.13 Information must be
obtained on a systematic basis from inside the organization to
answer questions such as: Why does a donor change programming
emphasis? What role do organizational factors play in program
resolution? How are programs applied in a specific country?
Even after this information is gathered, the uniqueness of
the specific case must be assessed. Does gathering information
1 It should be noted that the rationales for the other two
groups of programs are usually placed in a developmental context
as well.
12 This section is supplemented by a technical appendix
(Appendix A) which outlines the field trips taken, the
interviews conducted and the confidential reports reviewed.
13 Cohen et al. (1985) see this as the critical problem
which has prevented analysis to date. To overcome this problem
they even recommend that developing countries establish units
within donor offices to track the policy making framework.
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from inside one donor agency provide any means to generalize
about donor behaviour and policy formulation? Or is the case
so unique that more general conclusions are impossible to
reach?
To adequately deal with both sets of issues required a
detailed and multifaceted methodology. My participation in
CIDA's programming for the Philippines from its inception
allowed the accumulation and synthesis of detailed information
on how policies were being formulated and translated through
the system. My direct involvement in four missions aimed at
formulating the issues assessment in the Philippines, the
overall programming document for the Philippines, and the
translation of the policy changes into the Philippines
program, provided the sequence of activities, dynamics within
the organization and the flow of decisions which was needed to
understand the policy and program framework.
While this participation was critical in providing a unique
portion of my research, it also had limitations. The first was
the ability to analyze a process of which you are a part. How
does one objectively review a process when one is involved in
it? The second problem was how to assess whether the situation
with CIDA in the Philippines had relevance to CIDA as a whole,
other donors, or other countries? While the CIDA example
showed the mechanics of the process, it did not provide the
theoretical framework for assessing the process on a broader
scale.
To overcome these obstacles, I undertook extensive research
in a number of areas. Interviews were undertaken within the
Philippines to understand the industrial issues and obtain a
spectrum of views on how donors should assist in this area.14
Firms were interviewed to gain insights into the blockages
facing further development. Policy analysts, research
institutions and academics provided views on where the
critical problems were in the economy, in relations within the
country and in terms of policy formulation. Government
officials discussed future plans, past problems and the role
of donors within the country. Community groups provided vivid
insights into the issues of poverty, social relations and
equity concerns. The extreme biases within the Philippines
industrial structure became evident from these interviews and
a review of Philippine literature. They also allowed a
clearer assessment of how donors have related to the
Philippines in the past.
Research into industrial planning in other developing
countries (specifically Costa Rica, Malaysia, Korea and the
Ivory Coast) brought into clearer focus the diversity of
experience between countries. This research and discussions
with developing country representatives highlighted which
14 For a partial list of the organizations interviewed
refer to Appendix A.
1s This included a questionnaire which I designed and which
was administered by a team of Philippine researchers to 96 firms
within the Philippines in seven subsectors.
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portions of the Philippine experience were typical or
atypical. They also helped in determining whether the
approach to industrial development and to donors being taken
by the Philippines was evident in any other countries. From
this flowed a better understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Philippines economy.
Interviews were also undertaken with CIDA personnel on both
a formal and informal basis. These interviews were intended
to gain insights into the workings of the organization, the
impact of the CIDA policy review, the problems the staff saw
with industrial programming, and the relationships between the
various sections. Discussions with other Bilateral desks
provided information on whether the Philippines program
development was unique. Other divisions within CIDA gave
different perspectives on the opportunities and problems
caused by the aid review and the change in policy framework.
These CIDA interviews provided a clearer framework within
which to assess the Philippines example. While portions of
the Philippine case were unique, it also represented one of
the most dynamic examples of both industrial programming and
the impact of changing policies within the organization.
Different CIDA staff provided pieces of the puzzle enabling me
to put together a broader picture of change.
Before my work on the CIDA Philippines program even began, I
had started trying to understand how donors were relating to
industrial issues being formulated at the country level.
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Interviews in Washington and New York provided valuable
information on the shifts in donor approach, their definition
of the issues and the roles which various groups were taking.
All of the field work and interviews were supplemented by an
extensive review of literature on industrial theory,
organizational theory, experiences within developing
countries, development assistance and donor agencies. This
literature provided a vehicle for organizing my ideas,
interpreting parts of the research, and gaining an
understanding of the complexity of industrial programming.
Throughout this process, I was also assessing how the CIDA
experience fit with other donor agencies--both bilateral and
multilateral. Were the elements of policy formulation and
implementation unique to CIDA? Did they explain why CIDA's
industrial programming differed from US AID or the World Bank?
Was the Philippines case unusual in terms of understanding the
approach of donor agencies or the response of developing
countries?
Answers to these questions were the motivating force
behind much of the interviewing and analysis done of other
donors during this research project. Two levels of analysis
were undertaken. The general approach of a variety of donors
was looked at by interviewing staff members and reviewing
donor documents. Interviews were conducted with both
bilateral and multilateral agencies (including US AID, German,
Netherlands, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank).
This work was done in parallel with the CIDA research and
provided a basis for comparing the uniqueness or similarity of
CIDA with other donors. Examples of other donors mentioned
throughout the document are based on this work.
As well, the World Bank is used as a comparative case in
more detail. The use of the World Bank's industrial policy
evolution for comparative purposes grew out of research which
I conducted over the last three years. Starting with a series
of interviews with Bank staff in 1986, I began to piece
together the "Bank's approach" to industrial issues. While
the literature which was emanating from the Bank stressed the
"get the prices right" approach to industrial theory, I wanted
to see why this developed within the organization, how it was
being translated into programming and the kind of staff
support it received. The answers to these questions were in
some cases surprising and are presented throughout this work.
The analysis undertaken of the World Bank's approach was
particularly useful in assessing the differences in approach
and pressures faced by a bilateral versus a multilateral
agencies. Through my interviews and my work in the Philippines
I was able to collect and review numerous internal documents
and communications dealing with both the Philippines and
industrial policy in general. These documents along with an
extensive review of other Bank documents and reports on this
subject provided me with insights into how the Bank operated.
Acting as a benchmark, they also provided a way to evaluate
the information I was gathering on CIDA's approach and draw
some general conclusions.
organization of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides the policy framework for understanding
CIDA's approach to industrialization by focusing on the cycles
of change which donors have gone through since the 1950s. The
factors triggering the cycles and the theoretical approach to
industrialization which results are reviewed. As well,
specifics are provided on the elements within the CIDA policy
formulation process which played the greatest role in policy
development at various periods.
The movement by CIDA at the end of the 1970s into direct
industrial projects was a break from its traditional approach.
The move was triggered by changes outside and within Canada.
It was partly a response to balance of payments crises within
developing countries, the shift in developing country policy
toward a more private sector driven industrial model, and the
need for CIDA to find a role to play in the aid process.
The organization was in a state of flux, reacting to these
changes without a structured approach. The growing
uncertainty forced a shift in policy. The policy framework
which resulted was based on ad hoc programming in response to
needs identified in the field. The decision to move into
industrial programs was made at the policy level but the
implementation of the programming was handed to a small
technical group within CIDA--the Industrial Services Section.
This group designed a theoretical approach for industrial
programs based on a more structuralist approach to
development.
Chapter 3 provides some background information about the
Philippines which is needed to understand CIDA's assessment of
issues. By using a typology of development experiences, the
approach of the Philippines to industrial development is
assessed. From this analysis it is clear that the Philippines
has taken a relatively conservative approach to industrial
policies which conforms with many of the biases of donors
towards the appropriate development model. Some key policies
followed during the 1960s and 1970s have put in place a highly
distorted industrial structure, however. Why the Philippines
was not able to reach its potential relates to many of these
distortions and is discussed in detail.
Chapter 4 then deals with the issues identification process
of CIDA. The internal organizational setup of CIDA played a
critical role in how the industrial programs were adapted.
The fact that the ISS was in control of programming meant that
its approach could be directly translated into the field. The
group set up a methodology for defining issues in the
Philippines which relied heavily on its theoretical
foundations and a rational decision making process.
Two key assumptions were made after undertaking an
independent assessment within the Philippines. The first was
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that biases within the industrial structure were so entrenched
that policy changes would not eliminate them. The second was
that improved equity was a prerequisite of sustained
development, not vice versa. These two assumptions differed
from the conclusions of the largest donors in the Philippines
such as the World Bank and clearly illustrate the differing
theoretical approaches being pursued by donors.
In Chapter 5, the effects of a shift in policy formulation
by CIDA are traced through the organization to identify the
impact which they had on how industrial programs could be
formulated. Program design was influenced by a series of
events which fundamentally changed the programming
possibilities. Parts of the analysis had to be dropped while
others were taken up.
The changes which occurred were at the overall policy
framework level. CIDA's desire to stop its ad hoc approach to
programming triggered an aid review which changed the focus of
the program. As these changes were translated through the
system, the underlying assumptions of the ISS assessment were
brought into question and replaced by more mainstream program
objectives. While the theoretical approach to industrial aid
did not change, the program priorities did.
While the CIDA example provides a specific case of how
industrial programming has been undertaken, it also provides
insights into the policy formulation process of other donors.
A model is presented in Chapter 6 which pulls together the
stages of policy development and the influences which are
relevant for each stage. The assumption of the model is that
donors make fundamental changes in programming when face by
extreme uncertainty. The resolution of this uncertainty is
seen in the policy formulation process.
Each donor faces some common variables which influence the
process of policy and program formulation. How a donor
develops its approach to industrial projects depends on a
confluence of forces which determine what variables are the
most important at any point in time. The four levels of the
decision making model are presented here with examples from
the experience of other donors.
Donors develop their own theory of industrialization which
dictates the approach and analysis which will be undertaken
within a country. The differences between approaches which
result can be traced back through the organizations to the
overall policy framework within which the donor operates. The
implications of these findings for both recipient countries
and donors are included in the concluding chapter.
II. DEVELOPING A DONOR'S THEORY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
only in the last decade has the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) begun to directly support industrial
projects. Before this time it funded industrial development
indirectly through infrastructure, rural electrification,
training and other support projects. Now programs have
shifted to include credit to industrial enterprises, promotion
of joint ventures and technology transfers and provision of
marketing and entrepreneurial support to small and medium
scale enterprises.
This shift reflects a change in CIDA's approach to
industrialization. Wood (1986) contends that donors have
limited industrial projects during the 1970s due to a
theoretical bias. This bias manifests itself for two reasons.
First, by withholding finance from industrial undertakings,
the donors increased reliance on private capital which they
felt was more appropriate for industrial projects. Second,
donors wanted to promote a certain type of industrialization
which relied on private ownership, openness to foreign
capital, reliance on market forces and export orientation. By
forcing developing countries to turn to private capital (both
internal and external), these objectives were accomplished.
Certainly the policies of CIDA during the 1960s and 1970s
did reflect this approach to industrialization. The
reluctance to fund publicly owned enterprises prevented direct
participation during the 1950s and 1960s. The emphasis was
clearly placed on ensuring that the private sector remained
open to foreign "assistance". As well, the fear of supporting
competitors to Canadian producers limited the possibility of
support to the developing country's private sector.
What is not answered by Wood's argument is why CIDA or other
donors would change their approach in the late 1970s to more
directly support industrial projects. While still believing
in private capital and the importance of the private sector,
CIDA, along with other donors such as the World Bank, adapted
its strategy and increased its direct participation in
industrial programming.
Was this change a rational extension of a development theory
which was deemed "correct" for development agencies to
promote? Did the change merely reflect the pressure from the
membership of the organization? Or was the move a reaction to
an uncertain climate which forced changes in existing
operations? The contention in this chapter is that
uncertainty triggered the changes and a complex set of
variables dictated how these changes were manifested within
CIDA.
The Decision Making Framework
Analyzing how donor organizations make policy decisions is a
difficult task and one which is not greatly understood. The
international organization literature, which is supposed to
provide insights into donor organizations (particularly
multilaterals), has remained fairly one-dimensional in its
approach. These theories tend to view the decision making
process merely as a function of the political membership of
the organization.
Cox and Jacobson (1973) contend that decisions are
influenced by: the membership of the organization; the actual
process for making decisions (i.e. who votes and how); the
types of decisions being made (i.e. specific programs versus
general policies); and different actors involved. To
understand the changes in policy requires simply an
understanding of the interests of the relevant members and
changes in power between members. Mapping these shifts will
provide insights into future policy changes within the
organization.
This type of reasoning supports the analyses which declare
that multilateral organizations are more "objective" than
bilateral organizations. If political influence is considered
the prime determinant of behaviour then organizations such as
bilateral donor agencies, which have a more clearly delineated
"membership", are more subject to shifts in policy based on
political objectives. 1 As an extension, multilaterals are
more subject to differing influences from a variety of member
countries which temper the donors' policies and allow more
developmental criteria as the basis for making decisions.
1 This is the contention of recent aid reviews such as
Cassen and Associates (1986).
This emphasis of the international organization literature
on one dimension--the political influence of member states--
has been increasingly criticized as inadequate.2 Ness and
Brechin (1988) point out that international organizations are
not mechanical implementors of the policies of their creators.
Nor are all organizations alike. Instead different
organizations must be viewed as complex undertakings which
must be analyzed in relation to the environment within which
they operate.
In fact, conflicting interests and political pressures are
inadequate to explain the changes which have taken place over
the last decade within CIDA. While these factors have
contributed to the process of policy formulation, these
pressures have not been sufficient in themselves to reorient
policies. They can only partially account for behaviourial
changes. Other factors besides politics have intervened.
Accepting the idea that a donor agency can be buffeted by a
wide range of forces besides immediate political pressures
allows other types of organizational models to provide insight
into donor decision making. The most relevant of these models
deals with the issue of uncertainty. March and Simon (1958)
put forward a model of organizations which focused on the
profound effect which uncertainty had on the decision making
2 This criticism has become more acute in recent years.
See for example, an article by Rochester (1986) entitled "The
rise and fall of international organization as a field of
study".
process. As organizations became more complex, coping with
uncertainty in the organizational environment became an
essential part of the administrative and decision making
processes and, in fact, acted as a motivating force.
Ascher (1983) extended this approach by adapting the model
of uncertainty to the workings of the World Bank. Ascher
defined the concept of uncertainty as a continual grappling to
find solutions to development problems. The apparent
intractability of these problems despite a wide range of
approaches adopted over the years had been instrumental in
pressuring for change within the Bank. It is this continual
attempt at problem solving which clearly moved donor
organizations from being the repository of answers to being
one more actor in the development field looking for solutions.
It is this inability to find the right solution to the
growing development issues which also acted as a catalyst for
change within CIDA. CIDA chose numerous programming routes
over the past thirty years in an attempt to find partial
answers to development questions. The decision to change
these approaches, however, was traditionally triggered by a
confluence of forces which came together to create an
atmosphere of uncertainty around the existing aid program.
These forces include not only the political or commercial
interests within the country, but also the global economic
situation, the shifting demand for aid at the developing
country level, organizational failures with implementation of
existing programs, and pressures from the external developed
country community. When uncertainty becomes so great that
minor changes will no longer suffice to keep the organization
viable, the ability to undertake any programming is
threatened. It is at this stage that CIDA has moved to
reorient its policies and redefine programming.
The issue of uncertainty as a motivator of change is
important in understanding why CIDA, and some other donors,
reconsidered their approach to industrialization. Faced with
acute uncertainty in the 1970s and 1980s, CIDA had to act. By
the 1980s, conditions had shifted at both the recipient
country level and within Canada. The debt crisis was changing
the possibilities at the developing country level, decreasing
the demand for traditional infrastructure projects--in effect
eliminating the markets for CIDA programs. In response to the
rapid changes throughout the world, CIDA's approach became
increasingly aid and eventually ineffectual. Reservations
about the existing approach were being expressed at all levels
within the organization and a decision to change was made.
How the policy was formulated to combat this uncertainty was
a slow process of weighing the options for successfully
resolving conflict. March (1988) describes solution (or
opportunity) driven change as a method used by organizations
to resolve uncertainty. While faced by a large number of
problems of about equal importance, organizations are rarely
faced with more than a limited number of solutions. The chance
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of finding a particular solution to a particular problem is
small, but the chance that a solution will match some problem
is high. The focus then becomes on reviewing the solutions
not the problems in an effort to come to terms with complex
decisions.
This approach reflects much of the debate about changing
donor priorities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To solve
the enormity of development problems was impossible, to focus
on developing a particular solution or niche in the overall
strategy was more practical. CIDA, along with some other
donors such as the World Bank, concentrated on finding a niche
which would provide a focus for programming.
Official policy formulation for CIDA became a process of
weighing various solutions proposed by internal groups, the
government and the overall donor community in the context of
both development theories and developing country
opportunities. From this analysis came a redefinition of the
development niche filled by CIDA and a reorientation of
policies towards industrialization.
In terms of industrial programming the shift took the form
of two changes in "theory". First, while recognizing that
private capital should continue to play the key role in
industrialization, CIDA was now saying that public funds were
appropriate and necessary for progress to be made in
industrialization. Second, while supporting the importance of
the private sector and market forces, CIDA was also
acknowledging that obstacles existed within developing
countries which prevented the most efficient functioning of
both the private sector and markets. This allowed a role for
additional capital from donors to support private sector
adjustment.
The purpose of this chapter then is to trace the changes in
orientation toward industrialization within CIDA since the
1950s, what triggered those changes and how they fit with the
overall philosophy of CIDA as a donor agency. The objective
is not to do an exhaustive review of industrial theory but to
highlight the theories which grew in prominence within CIDA at
various stages, laying the foundation for CIDA's theory of
industrialization.
In each phase, the events and pressures which created
uncertainty within the aid program and triggered a policy
shift are reviewed. The interplay between demands of
developing countries, interactions with domestic and
international pressure groups, organizational relationships
and the current development theories are analyzed vis a vis
possible solutions. Finally, the implications of the choices
made on the organization's theoretical approach to
industrialization are identified.
The first portion of the chapter treats CIDA as a monolithic
organization with one view of the development process.
obviously, conflicts always exist within an organization.
However, these differing views are not important for my
purposes until the 1980s when industrial programming began to
take hold within the agency.
The process of policy formulation in response to uncertainty
must be distinguished from policy implementation. Numerous
works have pinpointed the problem of matching the official
policies of an organization with the implementation of those
policies. Tendler (1975) was one of the first to discuss this
issue in terms of donor organizations. The argument was that
the organizational environment played a more central role in
determining the content of aid programs than was played by
policy directives or project analysis. This organizational
adaptation of the official policy framework by CIDA is
discussed in Chapter 4. The focus of this chapter is on the
official policy framework itself.
1940s to Mid 1960s
CIDA as an organization was not started until 1968. Between
1950 and 1968 Canada gave aid through the Ministry of External
Affairs. While the early programs were haphazard in both
goals and administration, they did represent initial attempts
at providing support to the industrialization process.
The first entry in aid giving was as a member of the Colombo
Plan in 1950. British Commonwealth countries joined together
to provide aid to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Malaysia.
The intention was not only to assist the countries in meeting
a shortfall in foreign exchange (developmental reasons) but
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also to help put off a communist threat in the Asian region
(political concerns).
Political pressure from the US in the wake of the Cold War
was instrumental in getting the Commonwealth countries such as
Canada to begin aid programs (Arndt 1987). At the end of the
1940s the US was a powerful political force in the world. The
pressure from President Truman to help with the efforts to
fight communism was a compelling argument -- particularly for
a country so closely involved with the US.
Canada entered the aid sphere to support this geopolitical
position. The initial policy statements by Prime Minister
Pearson clearly stated that funds were being provided to Asia
to prevent the region "from being conquered by communism ...
[which would] prevent social progress" (Pearson 1950). Despite
the fact that Asia was a region with which Canada had little
contact previously, Pearson's government felt it was important
as a member of the Commonwealth to support this political
effort.
By participating in the Colombo scheme, Canada basically
adopted the developmental approach of the other donors as the
initial foundation for its aid program and continued to follow
the general donor approach until the late 1960s when CIDA was
created. Underlying this development concern (particularly
expressed by the U.S.) was the notion that aid would assist in
the capital formation process within developing countries.
If, as the Harrod-Domar model indicated, the rate of capital
formation was the only determinant of economic growth, then
assistance to developing countries to fill any savings gap was
seen as contributing to development. By increasing physical
capital through infusions of aid, they could increase
production within the developing economy and indirectly
alleviate poverty. With the right mix of savings, investment
and aid, growth would follow automatically.
The work of Rostow was apparent in much of the reasoning of
the aid projects in the early 1960s.3 Rostow (1960) attempted
to place industrial development within an historical context
by developing a scenario of five stages of growth. The stages
represented a linear path along which countries moved in the
development process. The third stage or "take-off" was in
essence the rapid industrialization of the country or the "big
push". During this period the rate of investment increased
dramatically, key sectors became the lead in the process,
production techniques changed rapidly, and the drive for
modernization was not only accepted but promoted by the
populous. During this phase, Rostow saw the influx of capital
as a way to increase the level of investment within the
economy. This could be accomplished by large flows of aid.
In the mid 1960s the two gap model of Chenery and Strout
(1966) became influential within some donors such as the US
and Canada. The model saw two types of gaps which could limit
3 In fact, references to Rostow's theory of takeoff
continued to appear in CIDA documents well into the 1970s.
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a country's progress: savings gap, when the total of domestic
and foreign savings was less than the investment the country
wanted to finance; and trade gap, when export earnings and
foreign investment were less than the imports the country felt
it needed to expand. The model saw one of these gaps as
binding, with foreign aid as a method to alleviate the
shortfall.
The acceptance of the aid program and this development model
within Canada was facilitated by the support garnered within
the country from commercial groups. As early as 1951, the
Canadian Manufacturer's Association saw aid as a way to gain
knowledge of new markets and increase access to followup trade
opportunities (Baldwin 1951). Canadian technicians could
recommend Canadian equipment; and Canadian goods and services
could be provided. To further galvanize the support for the
program within the country, the Pearson Government's aid
program after 1951 was basically 95% Canadian in content. It
was not until 1961, however, that this "sound self-interest"
aspect of aid was used as part of the internal rationale for
aid increases (Spicer 1966).
Having accepted the existing donor community's theoretical
approach to development and winning support within the country
for aid, Canada was faced with a decision about what form its
aid should take. The focus of many donor programs at the time
was on two types of aid: infrastructure; and technical
assistance. These two aspects fit well with the internal
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pressures within Canada and became the foundation of the aid
program until the late 1960s.
On a theoretical level, the provision of infrastructure at
that time was seen as a vehicle for helping with the "big
push" needed within developing countries. The notion that
industrialization could not proceed piece by piece but needed
a planned and complementary approach to decrease the risk of
not selling the goods was an approach initially put forward by
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). These ideas were further developed by
authors such as Nurske who stressed the importance of capital
formation in this process. Nurske (1953) built on Rosenstein-
Rodan's theory and advocated a balanced, simultaneous pattern
of investment in a number of industries. A balanced approach
would allow people to work more productively (therefore earn
more), have access to more capital and improved techniques,
becoming each other's customers. Given this reasoning,
Canadian aid could assist the state in building infrastructure
which supported the simultaneous efforts of investment within
the developing country.
The provision of technical assistance as the second prong of
donor programs in the 1950s also fit with the development
thinking at that time--at least within developed countries.
Even as the capital formation theories were being developed, a
recognition was growing that physical capital was not enough.
Human capital had to be built up as well. The UN Group of
Experts (1951) stressed the need for technical assistance.
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Development assistance to help overcome the shortage of
technical skills was seen as an important part of facilitating
the absorption of technology.
Donors, including Canada, originally took this to mean
sending foreign technical advisors who could help get quick
results and changes (Rondinelli 1985). This "tool oriented"
approach assumed that administrative capacity could be
improved simply by transferring techniques from developed
countries. In Canada, the technical assistance was
coordinated through the Department of Trade and Commerce. Its
approach basically equated technical assistance with Canadian
experts on short term contracts.
This definition of technical assistance eventually gave way
to a broader emphasis on education. Schultz (1959) was one of
the first to identify the importance of education in economic
growth. In the same way that investments could be made in
physical capital, Schultz saw education as a way of investing
in human capital. In effect, education was a form of capital
formation.
Singer (1961) made a clear case for the need to shift the
focus from foreign advisors. His contention was that while
foreign experts could help with short run problems--filling
temporary gaps--the need existed to invest in human capital to
promote long run gains. Only the latter would allow the
production of new indigenous skills through the education
system. The criticism directed at the donor community
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triggered a recognition of the short comings of experts as the
primary vehicle for technical assistance. Canada shifted its
program to include both education and technical assistance.
By 1965, education expenditures had increased from $1m in 1960
to $17.3m.
It is important to note at this point that by accepting the
donor thinking of the 1950s and 1960s as the basis for aid
programs, the Canadian programming ignored some critical
questions which were becoming more important at the recipient
country level. Among these were the questions of trade,
import substitution and public ownership.
The mainstream development theories during this period did
not address the question of trade per se. Instead, underlying
most of these theories was an assumption that trade had a
positive effect on the development process. Foreign trade was
considered an effective engine of growth and therefore, the
more open the economy, the better the development prospects.
This idea built on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of the 1930s and
the factor price equalization theories.
Another stream of thought developed during the late 1940s
which brought these assumptions under increasing criticism.
The principal work in this area came from Raul Prebisch, Hans
Singer and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).
Prebisch (1949) viewed problems of underdevelopment as criti-
cally connected to the trade system. Within the existing
division of labour, developed countries specialized in
manufactured goods and developing countries focused on primary
goods--in keeping with the comparative advantage theories of
trade. This division ensured, according to Prebisch, that the
profits from productivity increases went to developed
countries. This was accomplished by the declining terms of
trade faced by primary products. Thus any gains which could
be realized from trade went to the developed countries.
To keep the gains from technical progress, the developing
countries had to speed up their process of industrialization,
in essence, changing their comparative advantage within the
international system. This speeding up was accomplished
through substituting domestically produced goods for imported
manufactured goods--import substitution. The income which was
generated from the export of primary products could be used to
import the capital goods needed for this industrialization
boom. Foreign ownership would be controlled and an attempt
would be made to form integrated markets for products.
By the early 1950s, ECLA had focused its attention on
developing a practical application of this theory. While this
process took a number of years, import substitution became the
first step in almost every country's industrial strategy
(Hirschman 1968).
Canada, along with most developed countries, stayed out of
the import substitution debate. Throughout the 1950s and
1960s, the continued emphasis on providing infrastructure aid
was based partly on the momentum of the programs and the
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initial capital constraints analysis. However, infrastructure
also provided a way of avoiding the debates about direct
support to what was called the "productive sectors".
The developed countries including Canada did not accept the
centre/periphery arguments underlying the Prebisch/Singer
approach. They saw the new protectionism within developing
countries as unwarranted and against their attempts to
establish a freer trade system through the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (Arndt 1987). While import substitution
was seen by the developing countries as a way to change their
comparative advantage, Canada and other developed countries
chose not to provide direct support to these infant
industries.
A CIDA policy review noted two problems with direct
industrial support: competition; and public ownership (CIDA,
Policy Branch 1969). The potential competition which the
import substitution industries caused for Canadian producers
made it difficult for CIDA to justify direct support to
developing country firms. If CIDA provided funds for these
undertakings, the domestic producers would strongly object.
The provision of infrastructure could not be perceived as
competing with Canadians and therefore was domestically
acceptable.
The question of public ownership was more complex. The CIDA
document stated that the "prevailing attitudes in (developing
countries) strongly favoured public ownership over private,
particularly in the new and dynamic sectors of the economy".
This emphasis made it difficult for Canada to assist in the
process despite the fact that Canada had a mixed economy
itself. The replacement of public ownership for private in
the developing countries was not accepted and neither was the
need for import substituting industries as outlined by
Prebisch.
The state's role was not to overwhelm the private sector
but allow development of industries in which the private
sector would not or could not participate. As with Nurske,
the issue of public versus private control was one of
expediency not ideology. This split between public and
private responsibility appeared to underlie much of the
reluctance of Canada and other donors to directly support
productive activities throughout the 1960s. Regardless of the
patterns of mixed ownership in developed countries, the donors
saw public ownership as largely inappropriate in the
developing country context. The resulting theory of
industrialization relied on private ownership and private
capital to directly assist enterprises. Donors would focus on
support services such as infrastructure.
The Mid 1960s to 1978
a) Changing the Structure of Aid
Throughout the 1960s, Canada continued to increase its aid
levels--perpetuating the approach and programs started in
1950. While aid increased from Cdn $400,000 in 1950 to Cdn
$211,700,000 in 1966, 75% of these funds were still going
towards the Colombo Plan. An additional 20% of the aid monies
were going toward other Commonwealth countries in the
Caribbean and Africa. The movement into these other
Commonwealth countries was also highly geopolitical. In the
case of Africa, a Colombo type aid programs was set up by
Britain, New Zealand, Australia and Canada to support newly
independent African countries.
The increase in volume of aid began to make the mechanics of
aid delivery more cumbersome. An ad hoc collection of
government ministries were administering the various
components of the programs (basically infrastructure and
technical assistance) with increasing problems in terms of
coordination by the external Affairs Department. The
Government decided to formalize the aid program to reflect
this growing need for increased coordination.4
CIDA was started in 1968 in a rather inauspicious manner by
an order in council not an Act of Parliament.5 A former
President of CIDA indicated that the decision not to have
legislation governing CIDA was done on purpose. "If there was
legislation it would have been focused on the lowest common
4 This trend towards formalizing aid organizations was also
seen in a number of other donor countries during this period.
5 An order in council is a decree by Cabinet which in this
case simply states that CIDA will come into existence.
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denominator" (Standing Committee on External Affairs and Trade
1986).
This "denominator" would have had to take into account views
of a wide range of ministries, internal pressure groups, the
international donor community and foreign policy objectives--
making explicit the objectives of aid. Instead, the intention
was to remain vague about the mandate of the aid program. By
simply presenting a one statement sentence which said that
CIDA would exist under the Department of External Affairs, any
resolution of these pressures was avoided in the shortrun.
The first policy statements which emerged from CIDA were
also careful not to appear to change the rationales and
programs already in existence. A CIDA Policy Branch document
(1969) reaffirmed that the basis for aid within Canada was to
promote economic growth and to support development in
countries which were "allies". At the same time, however, in
its submission to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
in 1969, Canada did begin to more concretely look at its
approach to aid giving for the first time.
The submission laid out three options for its relations with
recipient countries (CIDA 1969). The first was for CIDA to
take a completely passive role which would involve simply
transferring funds to developing countries with no concern
over how it was used or who received it. The second was a
semipassive approach where Canada would allocate aid,
establish broad guidelines, and then sit back and wait for
recipients to present projects. The third approach was active
and consisted of not only allocating aid but becoming directly
involved in policy and project formulation. This latter
option was equated with the approach taken by the World Bank
and US and was viewed as too inflexible in terms of donor/
country relations.
Canada's recommended path was a combination of all three
options. It felt that it could devise a policy strategy which
would maintain "control over the use of Canadian funds,...
exercise leverage effects in the development process while
minimizing friction with recipients, and (provide) a program
of specialized high quality aid" (CIDA 1969).
This philosophy was the first clear indication that Canada's
aid program would no longer simply reflect the views and
programs of the donor community. Prime Minister Trudeau saw a
more activist role for Canada in the North/South debate. While
cooperating with other developed countries, Canada wanted to
bridge the gap between developing and developed countries. By
being more open and flexible, it hoped to reinforce the
linkages between developed and developing countries through
its new foreign policy arm--CIDA.
Few changes were made to aid programming immediately,
however. The equilibrium and momentum of the programs were
maintained initially as CIDA began to examine how it could
reformulate programs. Studies were undertaken in areas such as
policy objectives, ways of increasing Canadian private sector
and new project options. A foreign policy review was called
in 1968 which was to review foreign policy in general and
specifically the role of aid.6
It was not until the early 1970s that CIDA and the aid
program in general became subjected to an increasing
assortment of pressures. An atmosphere of uncertainty set in
which brought into question the theoretical approach to aid,
aid programs and the basis of the new aid organization and
forced a reexamination of the policy approach.
b) Growing Uncertainty
Uncertainty emanated from a number of different sources
during the late 1960s and early 1970s--experience and demands
of developing countries, global economic situation, pressures
from the developed country community and internal
pressures within Canada.
While industrialization produced high growth rates in
developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, the policies were
coming under increasing attack for two reasons. A realization
was slowly evolving that industrialization was not self-
sustaining as many of the earlier theories adopted by the
donors had suggested. The infusions of capital had not
6 This review culminated in the document Foreign Policy for
Canadians published in 1970 which provided a very general
outline of six objectives: foster economic growth; safeguard
sovereignty and independence; work for peace and security;
promote social justice; enhance quality of life; and ensure a
harmonious natural environment. These objectives remained too
general for designing programs or setting priorities, however.
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automatically overcome bottlenecks within the economy. The
industrial process had become more complex and the theories
needed to reflect this complexity to see why growth could not
continue on its own. Rostow was too simplistic an analysis
and the developed countries were left groping for new
solutions.
The concentration on import substitution was also causing
problems within some developing countries. A shift in import
dependence from consumer goods to capital goods had taken
place with little reduction in overall import levels. The
neglect of the export sector had caused balance of payments
problems. An overcapacity in industries with limited markets
was causing inefficiencies within the economy. The benefits
from import substitution were not being sustained after the
initial surge.
The second group of concerns focused on equity. The trickle
down assumption inherent in previous theories was working
slowly at best. The lack of employment generation, con-
centration of benefits to a limited segment of the population
and general neglect of agriculture were being called into
question. The focus began to shift toward more explicit
programming aimed at improving social conditions.
At the same time, donors themselves were entering a crisis
period. The interest in foreign aid on the part of many
developing country governments was waning as countries wanted
to follow a more independent path to development. The demand
for large infrastructure projects was being replaced by
increasing attention to issues such as self-reliance, income
distribution and rural development. The market for
infrastructure was drying up and donor funds, including
Canadian, were going unspent.
This lack of demand for donor funds became particularly
evident after 1973. While the oil crisis put both developed
and developing countries into a severe adjustment period, it
also provided large quantities of recycled funds available on
the eurocurrency market. Developing countries with access to
credit were able to follow autonomous industrial strategies by
receiving funding from private sources. Those countries who
were least able to adjust to the shocks (i.e. many African
countries) were facing limited growth potential and poor
credit ratings. For this group, funds were increasingly hard
to find--especially for industrial projects. As UNIDO (1979b)
states, this meant that aid began to focus more on the least
developed countries who were facing fewer options. It also
meant that soft loans were not going to industrial projects
but were focusing more on rural development and basic needs.
At the same time as the market for donor funds was
decreasing, the number of aid agencies was increasing
dramatically as more donor countries, including Canada, were
deciding to formalize their assistance programs. More of
these donors were also tying their aid, making competition at
the developing country level more acute. Canada became
increasingly unable to disburse its funds to the traditional
programs which threatened its tenure within the established
Canadian bureaucracy.
During this period, the Canadian aid program also came under
increasing attack at home. CIDA was seen by the Canadian
public as transferring funds to richer developing countries
for large infrastructure projects which had little benefit for
the poor. The well organized non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), in particular, pressured the government to begin to
reorient its programs toward more grass roots, socially
oriented projects.
c) Policy Resolution
The changes at the recipient country level in terms of
demand for infrastructure, the crisis within the donor
community in terms of increased competition, the growing
problems within Canada in terms of the purposes of aid and the
inability of CIDA to disburse funds forced a policy review.
The increasing instability of the aid environment brought
Canadian aid into question. The issue was how to meld the
international and domestic concerns with practical ones.
The solutions presented by various groups provided a variety
of options. The Government was becoming increasingly
committed to the North/South dialogue by the early 1970s.
Part of the reason was Trudeau's commitment to the issues.
Another part was the continuing tradition of Canada to provide
an important contribution to multilateral debates (North South
Institute 1980). As a major secondary power, Canada continued
to see this as a vehicle to strengthen its position on the
international scene while also promoting both Canadian and
developing country interests.
The geopolitical pressures then saw the aid program as
supporting the North/South reform agenda and countries such as
Tanzania which were attempting to follow alternative
development programs (Young 1983). While supporting the
movement of other donors towards equity issues, Canada did not
see these efforts going far enough. The demand from
developing countries was primarily from the poorer ones (such
as Tanzania) who welcomed Canada's interest and funds.
The internal pressures within the country were putting
forward two very different sets of development solutions. The
NGOs and other social action groups were pushing for grass
roots projects within the poorest countries to directly
address poverty issues. The commercial groups, backed by the
Industry, Trade and Commerce Ministry (ITC), were pressuring
for more direct funds for Canadian exports. As one official
of the ITC remarked, "I see nothing wrong with do-gooders and
bleeding hearts... except when the Japanese are their with
their soft money, the Brits are there... and old Canada isn't,
you get pretty upset" (Carty and Smith 1981).
The official resolution of the varied solutions was
presented by the Government in 1975 in the Strategy for
International Development Cooperation. Three concerns were to
be the primary focus of the Canadian aid program: satisfaction
of basic needs; encouragement of self-reliant behaviour; and
building mutual relations and benefits. In line with the
changes at the recipient country level and the internal
pressures, the programs were to be increasingly aimed at
poorer countries.
Almost before the Strategy was announced, however, problems
arose with its ability to be implemented. The basic needs
approach advocated direct provision of water, housing, food
and other services to the poor.7 Priority for both production
and distribution would be placed on meeting human needs not on
changing the system to redistribute income. Production of
non-basic needs goods was no longer a priority--this was
particularly true for industrialization. In fact, in this
approach, industrialization had little or no role.
The acceptance by Canada of the basic needs (BHN) approach
meant that it was taking a more progressive policy approach
than some donors such as the World Bank. The Bank was
advocating a redistribution with growth (RWG) approach based
particularly on work by Chenery (1974). Chenery addressed the
issue of increasing inequality with industrialization noting
that obstacles in the system constricted the ability of the
trickle down effect. What was needed to generate growth with
7 For a review of the basic needs literature from this
period see Streeten (1981).
distribution was a redistribution of investment by government
to specifically target the poorer segments of the population.
The focus would be on increasing the productivity, income and
output of the poor as a way to improve their income levels.
The Canadian approach, however, supported the domestic
concerns within Canada about the growing inequities within
developing countries. By focusing on the poor and the poorest
countries, the objections of many Canadians regarding
infrastructure to rich countries were addressed. However, the
implementation of the BHN approach by CIDA illustrated the
problems of a donor trying to undertake grass roots
redistribution projects. The direct provision of food and
other services to the poor was translated into projects such
as wheat production, water supply and electrification to rural
areas.
These projects were partly dictated by Canada's expertise
since 80% of the aid funds continued to be tied. Ironically,
this meant a high degree of non-local costs for these "grass
roots" projects. As evidence from Tanzania showed (Young
1983), the benefits of these projects did not accrue to the
poorest who were unable to purchase electricity or switch from
staples such as maize to wheat.
The recommendation of the Strategy that all programs needed
to be untied, underestimated the pressure which the commercial
interests exercised on the overall program. The Canadian
Exporters Association immediately lobbied CIDA officials and
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insisted they be consulted before implementation of the
decision (Carty and Smith 1981). This was supported by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Government gradually
backed down from implementing the change.
The desire by CIDA to promote self-reliance also represented
an attempt to implement a new policy approach. Partly in
recognition of the NIEO debate which was an attempt by
developing countries to gain regional self-reliance, CIDA
began to stress the importance of promoting a strategy which
involved self-reliance on the regional, national and local
levels.
According to a study by Galtung (1978) for CIDA, self-
reliance was needed at all three levels. The regional
independence which could be generated by the NIEO approach
could be undermined by dependence relations which might form
between richer and poorer developing countries. Likewise,
national self-reliance was not enough since a guard was needed
at the local level which would prevent a take-over by the
local elite.
The result was a strategy which attempted to build self-
reliance at all three levels. Self-reliance was a goal with
the path to that goal focusing on use of indigenous skills and
resources. At the village level the production undertaken
would be small scale enterprises and local producers. The
market or demand within the village would dictate production.
The national government would ensure that this local autonomy
could be maximized and would provide products or inputs which
could not be done at the local level.
While this policy directive was apparent in the selection of
countries for support, it was increasingly difficult to
implement in the aid framework. A CIDA Policy Branch paper
published in 1977 highlighted the inability to match objec-
tives with reality. Calling the Strategy well intentioned,
the Policy Branch paper stressed that a better plan had to be
formulated to truly make CIDA programs aim at self-reliance.
While foreign policy may have dictated an importance on self-
reliance and this was accepted by CIDA's President, the
departments only became sensitive in what they said not did.
How the program could be implemented was never resolved.
The one area where gains were made in terms of the stated
Strategy of 1975 was promoting "mutual self-interest". While
the approach to the poorest countries was to provide basic
needs and promote self-reliance, CIDA began to adopt an ap-
proach to middle income countries which focused on interdepen-
dence and building industrial cooperation. From a theoretical
point of view, CIDA did not see a conflict between promoting
basic needs, self-reliance and mutual self-interest in
different countries. The principle of interdependence had
been legitimized by the NIEO debates and as such still
supported the approach being pushed by the developing
countries.
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At a policy level, CIDA saw an increasing emphasis on
cooperation between Canada and the developing countries which
was not based on the typical development assistance criteria
but on a "reciprocal interest and mutual beneficial exchange"
(CIDA 1975). The inclusion of the industrial cooperation and
mutual dependence approach in the Strategy solved a number of
problems. First, these middle income countries were much less
reliant on donors for funding, at that time, since other
options existed (such as the private banks). If CIDA was
going to provide funds to these groups at all it had to find a
niche. By focusing on private to private linkages between
Canadian and developing country firms, CIDA avoided the
problems of both competition and public ownership which
prevented earlier programming allowing increased chances for
disbursement of funds.
Second, an industrial cooperation program would serve the
self-interest of Canada by assisting Canadian firms to
directly participate in development. This idea was first
raised in 1969 and a department of Business and Industry in
CIDA was started in 1972 to help promote links. By the mid
70s domestic pressure increased for undertaking some direct
programming. Canada's sagging economic growth pushed for
increased ties between aid and Canadian benefits. CIDA's new
President in 1977, Michel Dupuy, made this explicit by
continually referring to the jobs and sales which were
generated in Canada as a result of the aid program.
Third, the UNIDO Lima Declaration of 1974 targeted 25% of
the world's manufacturing to developing countries by the year
2000. From a foreign policy perspective, Canada supported this
target.
By defining mutual interest to mean direct industrial
cooperation between private Canadian and developing country
firms, CIDA set the stage for its first direct industrial
programming (CIDA 1977). In 1977, the Industrial Cooperation
program (INC) was formed to facilitate technology transfers,
increase industrial capacity and promote joint ventures. The
announcement of the program reflected a process of
experimentation which was undertaken in 1976. Working in
partnership with the business community, CIDA undertook pilot
projects in nine countries aimed at identifying opportunities
for linking the capabilities of the Canadians private sector
and priority projects in the industrial sectors of developing
countries.
The Canadian private sector along with government officials
involved in industry and trade helped to design the program.
The INC program was set up to be reactive to Canadian firms
not developing country firms in an attempt to maximize support
within the Canada for the program. The idea was presented in
an international symposium in 1977 which also examined the
success of similar programs in countries such as Germany,
Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Denmark.
64
The previous objections to direct industrial support--
competition with Canadian firms and public ownership--were
even more overriding in the late 1970s. To develop a program
without changing the basic theoretical approach to industrial
issues required a structuring of the program which built on
mutual support. The industrial program would be dictated by
Canadian firms and therefore the program could be seen as
reacting to both Canadian self-interest and development
objectives.
1979 to Present
The two prong strategy as expressed in the Strategy of the
1970s--based on developmental concerns (basic human needs,
self reliance and the poorest countries) and mutual interest
concerns (industrial cooperation)--began to face increasing
obstacles by the late 1970s. A number of structural changes
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the second oil
shock; increased interest rates; increased protectionism by
developed countries; massive recession in developed countries;
and a decrease in the availability of funds. These global
shocks impacted the aid programming in terms of the
opportunities at the developing country level and pressures
for change in all donor programs.
While some developing countries were able to ride out many
of the problems in the early 1970s, the second series of
shocks in the late 1970s were more difficult to overcome.
Unlike the first set of shocks in 1973, developing countries
had limited access to funds after the second series of shocks.
At a time when demand for capital was increasing, the supply
of resources was diminishing. In fact, the commercial lenders
were no longer a path to more independent policy making but
were now part of the problem. This factor severely limited
the options of many countries.
The global factors changed the rules of the industrial game
for developing countries, forcing them to accept fewer
options. Suddenly, balance of payments constraints were
dictating industrial policy. Levels of debts increased along
with interest payments for existing facilities. Firms and
state owned enterprises encountered financial difficulties
and, in many countries, they began asking for increased
assistance and protection from governments. Fiscal
constraints meant that many governments became unable to meet
the demands. Domestic and international markets were entering
a deep recession.
At the developing country level, the options were becoming
even more constrained than previously with countries falling
into one of three basic groups. Those countries, such as most
of Sub-Saharan Africa, which faced problems during the 1970s
were now crippled by the international changes. Their
reliance on donors for support for any programs has been
increasing through the 1980s.
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At the other end of the spectrum, countries like Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand, while going through severe adjustments
in the early 1980s, have in recent years reached an
equilibrium with renewed growth. These countries have access
to private capital again. However, the flow of funds has been
voluntarily constrained in some countries such as Korea in an
attempt to make the economy more independent of international
fluctuations (OECD 1988a).
The third group consisted of a large group of countries
ranging from Brazil to the Philippines. While these countries
had potential for undertaking growth and industrial projects,
funds were limited from private sources, constricting the
possibilities for industrial programming. In some cases, a
role began to develop for donors in providing the necessary
discretionary funds for industrial projects (DAC 1987).
The approach to industrial development had to be altered
within developing countries to reflect these economic changes.
In most developing countries the previous approach to
industrialization was one of active state involvement in
orchestrating the economy and redistributing wealth. Social
issues, independence from world shocks, and state
participation in industries were all important concerns. The
global structural changes taking place put pressure on the
ability of countries to pursue this approach and forced them
to look at development from a much more restricted position.
Pressure was placed not only on decreasing the direct state
role in industrial projects, but the balance of payments
problems also meant that many countries were forced to
restructure their programs towards exports.
These dramatic changes at the recipient country level caused
a tidal wave of movement within donors. The demand for
traditional project lending decreased as countries no longer
had the required local counterpart funds. The emphasis on
social programming was lessened as attention shifted to meet-
ing balance of payments (BOP) concerns. While donors were
increasingly approached for funds, the requests focused on
quick disbursing BOP support not lengthy project support.
Donors had lost their market niche and were scrambling to find
new ways to approach the growing market.
At the same time, pressures within developed countries
triggered a theoretical shift in some countries regarding
appropriate development models. The "European" theory of
state capitalism was almost forcibly replaced in the early
1980s by the "American" philosophy of individual capitalism.
Donor agencies such as the World Bank and US Agency for
International Development were coming under attack.
The World Bank which had attempted to establish itself
during the 1970s as the premier development agency was
attacked the most viciously. Ayres (1983) provides examples of
how the Reagan administration singled out the projects of the
World Bank as examples of inappropriate programs. They were
attacked on many fronts including in the press as promoting
inefficient development, which emphasized social concerns over
questions of efficiency and effectiveness. These attacks were
ironic given that the Bank continued to argue for policies
such as realistic exchange rates and encouragement of exports
throughout the 1970s. Yet arguments were presented in places
like the Wall Street Journal and Forbes that the Bank was
giving power to the poor and undermining capitalism.
These pressures within both the developed and developing
communities caused a redefinition of donor programs. Some
donors began to turn to industrial programs in an attempt to
meet developing country demands, find a niche for aid and
satisfy pressure from internal constituencies. The World Bank
moved toward policy based lending with reforms in areas such
as trade liberalization. Some other donors, such as CIDA,
moved to provide firm level support through programs such as
credit and technology transfers.
The underlying principles of many of the donors' theories of
industrialization had not changed. Private sector
development, export promotion and market orientation were
still being emphasized. The shifts at the developing country
level in strategies being followed, however, meant that the
general policies being formulated were in basic agreement with
these donors' biases. As individual donors began to develop
8 The reasons for this shift are covered more fully in
Chapter 6.
industrial programs, their framework for analyzing issues
began to differ.
a) Moving to Direct Support
CIDA's initial response to these developments was an attempt
at organizational readjustment. Faced by the crises within
developing countries and CIDA's inability to disburse funds
under traditional programs, the aid agency reorganized its
approach to aid disbursement.
The first step was a shift from a focus on programs to a
country focus in 1982. Four geographical areas (Anglophone
Africa, Francophone Africa, Asia and the Americas) were set up
with programming being designed on a country by country basis.
These country programs were a recognition that the experience
of countries was becoming even more diverse with the
structural crises of the late 1970s. With the emphasis on
country specific analysis, CIDA wanted to develop programs
which directly target toward the needs of a country--in
effect, increasing the possibility for finding suitable
projects.
While a new official policy approach was not put forward by
the Canadian Government or CIDA, changes were becoming evident
in CIDA's programs particularly in the area of industrial
support. The organization was adapting to the realities in
developing countries and increasing pressure within Canada.
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The mutual support idea of the 1970s was gaining prominence
within Canada as public opinion toward aid giving shifted.
While public opinion in general still supported the
humanitarian approach to aid, pressure was increasingly placed
on the government--from a wide variety of sources besides just
the commercial groups--to justify why Canada should be
concerned with the problems of the rest of the world.
Editorials were criticizing the way aid was being spent.
Politicians and government officials increased their criticism
of aid in direct proportion to domestic economic problems,
attacking policies of developing countries in areas such as
employment practices, investment regulations, or even human
rights violations.
The result of this pressure can be seen in the increasing
emphasis placed on the benefits which accrue to Canada from an
aid program. The interdependence between Canada and the devel-
oping countries was stressed in annual reports and speeches by
CIDA officials. The INC program was continually singled out
and cited as an example of CIDA's commitment to the private
sector. Despite numerous studies which clearly found no
relation between aid tying and either economic benefits to
Canada or long run development of trade links, tying continued
at a level of 80% in the Bilateral program.9
9 See for example Hay (1978) which showed that tied aid was
not only producing limited benefits within Canada but also
reinforcing economic inequalities within Canada.
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At the same time, CIDA also began to recognize the need for
a better understanding of the industrial process outside of
the INC context. This reflected three distinct issues. First,
enterprises within developing countries were becoming
increasingly important in helping to generate foreign exchange
to fight the short run problems. This was particularly true
for small scale enterprises which were dynamic during this
period but also faced severe obstacles in many countries. In
essence, a market existed for support from donors to firms
with limited options in the private capital market. CIDA saw
a potential for filling this niche.
Second, this area was also being increasing targeted by some
NGO groups within Canada. While focusing on micro and small
scale enterprise, they pushed for increased recognition of
this type of "grass roots" industrial support as being an
important part of the adjustment process. As CIDA turned more
toward the NGOs for assisting in development of programs,
enterprise support increased in acceptability.
Third, these two shifts would not have allowed enterprise
support, however, if shifts had not also taken place in the
rationale or theory of industrial support. The increasing
emphasis on private sector firms within developing countries
as the engines of growth removed some of the traditional
barriers to industrial assistance. The two previous obstacles
to industrial support--the "public sector" hurdle and the
issue of competition--were less relevant or open to criticism
from commercial groups within Canada. With the start of the
country specific Bilateral programs aimed particularly at
small enterprises, CIDA could undertake specific programs with
the private sector in developing countries.
Implementation of this strategy in the early 1980s showed a
shift in programming for CIDA. As country programming began
to take place, the Bilateral desks were dealing more
specifically with a particular country's needs. The desks
were also increasing the role of Canadian private sector in
helping to fulfil these needs. However, the approach was
different from INC. While INC's primary objective was to
serve and react to Canadian firms, Bilateral groups had the
developing countries needs as their primary objective. The
pressures which created the two programs were different and
the "solutions" which they provided aimed at fulfilling
different needs.
The Bilateral program became increasingly involved in
enterprise development. As the structural crisis facing
developing countries continued, the traditional aid depart-
ments found themselves more involved with assisting
enterprises to adjust, to improve their access to inputs and
improve their skills. The Bilateral program began to turn
more towards small scale enterprise development, lines of
credit to fund imports, and assisting with marketing and
management skills.
The fact that these changes in Bilateral programming were
motivated primarily by the needs and demands of the developing
countries was an important factor in how they were
implemented. The Industrial Services Section (ISS) of the
Professional Services Branch was given jurisdiction over not
only technical consistency but program formulation.
CIDA as a whole, due to domestic pressures, did not publicly
promote these industrial programs within Canada. Despite the
increasing importance of the Bilateral programs, INC remained
the CIDA flagship for private sector interventions. This
allowed the ISS a certain degree of independence and the
ability to develop its own theory of industrialization within
the organization which allowed a more developmentally driven
analysis. 10
This independence was one of the reasons why the approach
developed by the ISS began to differ from some other donor
approaches. While still operating within the private
sector/market oriented framework, the ISS turned increasingly
toward a more structuralist assessment of issues. Just as
CIDA had differentiated itself from some donors in the 1970s
with its emphasis on basic needs and self-reliance, so now was
the ISS developing an approach which differed from the World
Bank "outward orientation" approach.
10 The organizational structure and relations which
supported this arrangement will be discussed in Chapters 4 and
5.
During the 1970s, a body of literature developed which
focused on the success of export promotion pursued by some
developing countries. A group of authors, characterized by
Little et al (1970), saw a number of problems with import
substitution. These problems included increased income
inequality, slow job generation, bias against agriculture, low
capacity utilization, strain on balance of payments and a
neglect of comparative advantage of a country. In their
argument, while industrialization may be a worthwhile goal,
industrialization by import substitution caused fundamental
distortions within the economy which resulted in biases
against certain income groups, agriculture and more
importantly exports.
While authors like Nurske saw the way out of the vicious
cycle as generating demand through planned centralized in-
dustrialization, Little et al saw decreased government invol-
vement, more reliance on market mechanisms and most important-
ly a reduction in price distortions. According to this argu-
ment, the growth of government intervention in the economy had
resulted in protectionist measures which had driven a wedge
between domestic and world prices for traded goods. This
price distortion had severe ramifications within the economy
since it caused resource misallocations, increasing
inefficiencies, high domestic production, and higher domestic
costs for products.
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Numerous other authors such as Balassa (1982), Krueger
(1985), and Bhagwati (1978) continued arguing along these same
lines. Working within the neoclassical trade arguments, they
built a case for "outward development". Support for this view
was drawn from reviews of the experience of successful
countries such as Taiwan and Korea. Based on these "success
stories", the authors attempted to build a case for getting
the prices right as the primary vehicle for allowing
development. With the crises in the late 1970s, this
literature began to gain support in places such as the World
Bank.
Inherent in these analyses were a number of policy
prescriptions that the authors felt would allow countries to
break out of the cycle of adjustment. Increased emphasis on
the private sector, a decreased role for the state and an
emphasis on increasing efficiency of economies were critical
to the approach. The neglect of an appropriate trade
orientation was cited as the cause of a lack of competition,
distortions in trade and inappropriate structure of industry.
What was needed was a fundamental change in the policy
approach--one that corrected price distortions and allowed the
private sector to dictate an economy's industrial mix and
growth.
While the approach taken by CIDA's ISS conformed with some
of this analysis, it differed in three important assumptions.
These differences in assumptions explain the theoretical
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differences between the World Bank/outward orientation
approach and the ISS/structuralist approach and are important
in understanding the CIDA assessment of issues within the
Philippines presented in Chapter 4.
The first distinction revolves around the role of prices.
The outward orientation model is based on prices and assumes
that prices respond flexibly to changes in supply and demand--
quickly eliminating any gaps. Any bottlenecks in the system
are perceived to be supply problems. The market, namely
prices, will move in and solve them by adjusting the demand or
supply as needed. As part of this formulation, the model
relies on two factors of production--capital and labour.
Other inputs into the process such as imports of capital goods
are not included.
The ISS based model has a different perception of prices and
inputs. When dealing with industries, markets are assumed
not to be perfectly competitive, and many times do not clear.
Prices are seen as responding mainly to costs and not changes
in demand. Thus prices are set in an oligopolistic manner and
are a form of mark up pricing. The inputs are capital, labour
and intermediate imports.
Both the assumption of mark up pricing and of an inter-
mediate import are important variations and are realistic
within the developing country context. The number of firms in
particular industries are usually limited and rarely faced
with "perfect competition". The mark up pricing conforms to
the procedures most often used (Taylor 1983). Most of the
manufacturing sector also requires an intermediate import and
capital goods.
The second distinction between the two theories involves
assumptions about people and classes. The outward orientation
model is embedded in the liberal paradigm. The individual is
the basic unit of analysis. A homogeneity exists among
individuals who act "as if" they were maximizing utility.
Actions are always rational and motivated by the same factors
everywhere. These assumptions allow the model to operate in
any geographical area and with any group of people. Class
distinctions and conflicts among groups are eliminated.
The structuralist model, on the other hand, assumes that at
least two classes are evident--at a minimum workers and
capitalists. The marginal propensities to save are assumed to
be different between the two groups. Workers have no savings,
while capitalists save a fixed proportion of their earnings.
This sets up a relationship which sees shifts in income
distribution with each change in the marketplace. Shifts to
capitalists may increase savings, but will also decrease
aggregate demand through decreased relative earnings of
workers. Wages are not a function of the demand for labour
but are a product of the wage bargaining process. As such,
money wage is assumed to be fixed in the short run, not
responding flexibly to changes in supply and demand.
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The last distinction is the role of investment. In the
neoclassical model, Say's law is predominant, contending that
supply creates its own demand. This means that in equilibrium
savings must equal investment, through the action of the
interest rate.
In the structuralist model, savings does not have to
determine investment and the interest rate is not the prime
determinant of either savings or investment. Long run
investment is the function of expectations of future profits,
and as such is determined by firms. As the profit rate or the
rate of capacity utilization increases, growth rate of capital
stock (investment divided by the existing stock) increases.
Income distribution adjusts through forced savings to meet the
levels of capital formation.
Based on this thinking, the structuralist approach is
critical of the "outward orientation" model. A primary
reasoning for the intervention in the industrialization
process is a recognition that price alone could not put an
economy on an optimum path. The importance of economies of
scale, the market imperfections, and complexity of production
processes negated price as the sole determinant for invest-
ment. Pack and Westphal (1984) argue that these factors are
still important and as a result price guided investment can
not be the sole approach taken.
The approach taken by CIDA's Industrial Services Section is
strongly connected to the structuralist interpretation of the
current situation facing developing countries. An a priori
solution does not exist for industrial development. While the
promotion of exports is an important short run strategy to
assist with balance of payments problems, the promotion of
exports is not an end in itself. These sectors must
contribute to building vital linkages within the economy which
promote self-reliance.
The price mechanism is not viewed as the market clearing
mechanism. Problems such as non-competitive markets and non-
availability of inputs act as obstacles which prevent the
industrial sector from developing. Interventions are needed
directly at these levels which attempt to overcome the
obstacles at the firm level.
b) Changing the Official Policy Framework
An aid review was begun in 1986 which attempted to provide a
new formal framework for the CIDA programs. Three factors
were key in promoting this review: the shift in political
parties within Canada; the increasing inability of CIDA to
deliver programs; and pressure from the donor community to
conform to the "new aid approach".
First, the election of the Conservatives in Fall 1984 began
to change the overall aid debate within Canada. The
Conservatives saw the development process more in terms of the
need to rely more heavily on the private sector to solve
problems. An increasing importance was placed on assisting
the private sector in developing countries, on microenterprise
development as a route to improve the position of the poorest,
and on lines of credit aimed at overcoming import bottlenecks
for industries.
A Conservative Task Force in 1986 clearly stated for the
first time that industrial development should be a legitimate
part of both Bilateral and INC programs. It also indicated
that, unlike the Liberal Government approach, programs for
least developed countries should be treated differently than
those for more developed countries. For the former, CIDA
should provide small amounts of support to industrial
endeavours while for the latter, industrial development should
be the primary program focus.
Second, since the late 1970s CIDA had become merely a
responsive agency--fire fighting its way through programs
without developing a clear approach. Canada was trying to run
a multisector program in over 80 countries through a system
which had become increasingly bureaucratic. While countries
wanted quick disbursing assistance, CIDA's approval procedures
were becoming longer. As changes were continuing to take
place within the organization, new layers of issues and
decisions were making the environment more complex. As a
number of CIDA officials indicated to me, the ad hoc approach
had to change.
Third, a review had been undertaken between 1982 and 1985 by
the Task Force on Concessional Flows of the World Bank and
IMF. The results stressed the need for increased donor
coordination and a clearer definition of responsibilities
between multilateral and bilateral agencies (Development
Committee 1986). For bilateral agencies priorities such as
provision of technical assistance, institutional support and
aid to the poorest countries were stressed.
A Parliamentary Committee was struck in 1986 to review the
state of aid within Canada. The review was intended to
address questions such as what conditions Canada should attach
to its aid, what was the purpose of aid given the climate from
the mid 1970s, what role program aid should play and who
should be receiving aid. The Committee had members from all
political parties which meant that its results were to be
based on a consensus and extensive public hearings were
scheduled to receive input from a wide range of people.
The Parliamentary Committee produced a report in 1987,
referred to as the Winegard Report, which set out its approach
to aid (Canada 1987). This report was subsequently adopted by
the Government (Canada 1987) and, in a slightly revised form,
by CIDA (1987). The strategy focused on two concepts: human
resource development (hrd); and meeting the needs of the
poorest countries. Humanitarian objectives were put forward
as the primary force behind the aid program and the reason for
the focus on the poorest. CIDA's unique contribution (or aid
niche) was defined as hrd or institution building.
The reasons for this particular approach to aid resulted as
much from a desire to avoid certain issues as it did from a
concrete definition of what should be tackled. The most
critical issue avoided throughout the review process was the
issue of the Canadian private sector role in aid. The
Committee moved away from defining what the CIDA strategy
should be for individual sectors (such as industry) saying
that the sectoral focus should be defined at the country
level. The assumption was that each country needed a strategy
which reflected its own situation and priorities and therefore
sectoral programming needed to be developed for specific
situations.
While from a development point of view this approach has
merit, the decision not to directly address industrial issues
reflected a far more complicated set of pressures. Many of
the staff I had contact with at the various Bilateral desks
expressed their dismay and concern that industrial development
was not being directly addressed. In fact, within CIDA,
private sector development had become the issue to address by
1986. The question then became why did the Government use the
nonsectoral focus of the Winegard report to avoid an important
question--what role should the private sector play in aid?
Many staff members had informal views on this, although two
reasons repeatedly were mentioned to me. First, the Govern-
ment since 1984 had been increasing the role of the Canadian
private sector in delivery of aid programs. However, the
Conservatives had begun what some staff called a parallel aid
program. Many of the projects which had been approved in the
last few years had originated from the Minister's office not
from the assessments of the Bilateral desk. The politicaliza-
tion of the process meant that the Minister was increasingly
using a small group of firms to participate in Bilateral
private sector to private sector projects. The CIDA staff
members felt that acknowledging enterprise development as a
priority would result in setting up a system of criteria for
undertaking programming which would decrease the options for
patronage from the Minister's office.
Second, the private sector within Canada wanted its role
acknowledged so they could increase their leverage and get
CIDA to stop dealing with the poorest countries. The Canadian
Chamber of Commerce (CCC) made a submission to the Winegard
Committee which clearly stated that the basis for Canadian aid
programs should be "economic development" not humanitarian
needs. The CCC felt that the greatest contribution to
developing countries would be to assist NICs and middle income
countries which had "reached a stage where resources can be
absorbed" (CCC 1987).
Politically, Canada could not place priority on middle
income countries. The public support for the aid program in
Canada was based on humanitarian concerns not commercial.
While people expected some return for the aid dollar, they saw
aid more as a vehicle to tackle problems such as poverty,
hunger, and environmental issues. In fact, to many people,
assistance to NICs would raise questions about negative impact
on the domestic economy.
An additional reason for not tackling industrial programs
directly related to the traditional approach CIDA had taken to
the industrial sector. While undertaking more Bilateral
industrial programming, the Government of Canada was
emphasizing only its involvement in the INC program in its
annual reports and official documents. Despite the statements
of the 1986 Task Force regarding the need to have a spectrum
of industrial programs, the Parliamentary Committee backed
away from more blatant support for increased private sector
involvement. CIDA continued to appear reluctant to
acknowledge direct support in any context except the "mutual
self-interest" argument. It was easy to make this argument
for INC; more difficult for the Bilateral programs.
The support of many of the submissions to the Parliamentary
Committee was clearly on a more traditional humanitarian
approach to aid. African famine relief movements were strong
in the mid 1980s in Canada and the hearings received many
submissions which stressed the need to address poverty and the
poorest countries. The donor community was also stressing
that aid should focus on the poorest countries and not on the
middle income (Cassen and Associates 1986).
NGOs and university representatives both emphasized the
importance in defining a clear program aimed at developmental
concerns. How this should be accomplished differed, however.
NGOs thought funding should be increased to support the NGO
driven programs, not programs which were set by Bilateral
objectives. Universities and academics pushed for some form
of human resource development. NGOs, universities and business
groups all pushed for more funds being directly given to them
to deliver programs.
In addition, from a political point of view, the Mulroney
Government wanted to ensure that it remained part of the
development debate on a global level. Canada during the 1960s
and 1970s, had received the reputation of not being afraid to
be critical of the stands being expressed by other developed
countries.11 This was reflected in the view of Canadian aid by
the World Bank.
A number of people I interviewed at the World Bank in 1986
were particularly critical. They saw CIDA as potentially
undermining the "coherent" approach which the World Bank was
attempting to develop. For them, the Bank had established
itself as the primary development institution which set the
development agenda, negotiated the policy changes on a country
by country basis and set the pace for other agencies. The
other multilaterals were seen as vehicles to support the
pressure for change. The bilateral donors then were the
11 This is reflected in the previous discussion of the
Trudeau Government wanting to appear to be a mediator in
North/South relations.
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agencies which provided technical assistance and "projects"
which allowed the implementation of the Bank program.
While Prime Minister Mulroney wanted to continue the
tradition of independence, he also wanted to more closely
align himself with the overall donor movement. The human
resource development niche was one which was identified by a
number of donor reviews as being important one to fill (Cassen
and Associates 1986). It also conformed with pressures within
the domestic scene. Support of the structural adjustment
movement was seen as important for the overall donor
community, but here Canada wanted to clearly state the
adjustment must be done with equity.
The result of these pressures was reflected in the Winegard
report and CIDA's Sharing Our Future (SOF) which was to be the
focus of CIDA programming from 1987 onward. The primary
emphasis was on human resource development, structural
adjustment with equity and poverty alleviation. The focus of
the CIDA programs was to continue to be on the poorest
countries. While industrial programs were becoming more
extensive in both the Bilateral and INC areas, they were not
specifically acknowledged as a component of its programming.
Conclusions
CIDA has gone through a number of cycles of policy
formulation and reformulation. Each of the stages reflected
policy changes within CIDA which were brought about by a
growing climate of uncertainty. The uncertainty resulted from
changes in global economic situation, changes in the demands
of developing countries for aid, pressure from the developed
countries to shift approach, domestic pressures, and the
recognition within CIDA that the organization no longer
offered viable programs.
When the uncertainty became acute, policies were
reformulated both formally and informally. The process of
reformulation was a constant juggling of domestic and
international factors. on the international side the approach
of other donors had a critical role--particularly during the
1950-1960s. The opportunities for supplying aid to developing
countries determined where the new niche might be for future
programs. On the domestic side, the constituencies--pressure
groups, public opinion, government agencies, geopolitical
concerns--all played differing roles over the last thirty
years. While commercial groups were the easiest to trace to
changes in industrial programming, other factors have many
times been more important in defining programming.
During these cycles of change, industrial programming went
through a number of stages. Traditionally, CIDA avoided
direct support to industrial ventures. While indirectly
providing support through infrastructure and training, direct
support did not begin until the late 1970s. The reasons for
this lack of programs historically were threefold. First,
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groups within Canada feared that industrial groups assisted by
aid might become future competition for Canadian firms.
Second, the international donor community did not perceive
direct aid to public sector industries as appropriate. While
support was given to large scale ventures by some donors,
Canada turned its focus to providing support to the public
sector in other ways such as infrastructure provision. Third,
the demand for funds for industrial projects decreased in the
1970s with the increase in funds from the eurocurrency market.
Those countries who had few private capital options turned to
donors for support of industrial projects--which provided a
very limited market.
The first direct involvement in the industrial area came
during the mid 1970s. CIDA developed a program based on
domestic commercial pressures which aimed specifically at
supporting the efforts of Canadian firms in developing
markets. Based on the argument of "mutual interest", the INC
program was totally driven by demand from Canadian firms not
developmental criteria or objectives.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, CIDA recognized that an
industrial program based on developmental objectives and
driven by developing country demands should be a critical part
of its programming. Conditions in a number of areas allowed
this change in approach. The balance of payments crisis at the
recipient country level was decreasing the options for state
involvement in direct industrial projects. Emphasis shifted
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to the private sector as motivator which conformed with donor
biases. The "market" for donor funds reappeared as BOP
problems consumed the ability to undertake industrial
projects. Adjustment at the firm level was severely hindered
by lack of access to adequate funds. Groups within Canada,
such as NGOs, were confirming that support to small scale
enterprises would not only meet development objectives but
would pose little threat to Canadian economic efforts.
CIDA changed its approach. Industrial projects became
legitimate parts of programming for selected countries. While
not a priority in the assistance to Africa, it became
increasingly important in Asia. The industrial programs
expanded to include not only INC projects which were respon-
sive to Canadian firms but Bilateral programs which were
intended to respond to the developing country needs. While
the aid review which culminated in 1987 did not officially
endorse the Bilateral industrial programs, they continue to
be an important factor within CIDA operations.
Obviously conflict is inherent in terms of the objective of
programs and how they can be implemented. While CIDA policies
call for building self-reliance in recipient countries,
policies such as aid tying and building partnerships act to
increase interdependency of development. How these conflicts
get worked through the system will be dealt with in Chapters 4
and 5. We now turn to the Philippines with an investigation
into that country's fluctuating policies.
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR LOOKING AT THE PHILIPPINES
What makes an effective industrial policy? Is there a
uniqueness of experience which negates attempts at developing
replicable models for programming? Or do universal applica-
tions exist which allow the experience of one successful
country to guide the development of other countries? The
inability to conclusively answer these questions has been the
foundation of debate about industrial strategies for decades--
and will continue to be in the future.
The theories outlined in Chapter 2 begin to provide at least
partial answers to these questions. Many theories of the
1950s and 1960s such as Rostow's stages of growth assumed
there was universality. Rostow assumed that one linear path
to modernization existed. The speed with which a country
moved through the five stages of development could be sped up
by promoting changes in the economic, social and political
structure of a country. The outward orientation approach of
the 1970s and 1980s has focused on what certain authors
perceive as the sameness of experience of the Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs). These analyses have not only
attempted to outline appropriate policies but also to develop
quantitative measures such as the effective rate of protection
and domestic resource cost which could act as determinants of
appropriate policy mixes.1
1 See for example Bhagwati (1978), Balassa (1982) and
Krueger (1978).
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Other groups contend that the experiences at the country
level are sui generis--unreplicable between countries. Too
many factors come into play to precisely draw causal lines
between a particular policy and a successful result. This is
the foundation of the structuralist work of the 1970s and
1980s mentioned previously. Authors such as Taylor (1988)
argue that success or failure of an intervention depends more
on historical and institutional characteristics of the country
and how its institutions respond than it does on the policy
followed. While lessons can be learned from other countries,
policies can not be translated from one locale to another with
exactly the same results.
The underlying assumptions of both of these theoretical
approaches set the framework for how issues are analyzed at
the country level. Both groups of authors would provide
different explanations for the Philippines inability to
capitalize on its industrial potential. The outward
orientation group would focus on issues such as the continued
high protection under import substitution which has biased the
system against exports. The structuralist approach would see
the application of industrial strategies as the problem since
this caused extreme biases within the industrial structure.
These two analyses, in fact, illustrate the differences in
assessment between the World Bank and the Canadian
International Development Agency's (CIDA) Industrial Services
Section which are the focus of the next chapter.
To put these donor assessments into context, however, it is
important first to have a basic understanding of the character
of Philippine industrial development. This is presented in
three ways. First, some indicators of development will be
reviewed to provide general benchmarks for assessing
development to date. Second, the experience of other
countries will be briefly introduced to provide insight into
the spectrum of possible industrial strategies and where the
Philippines positioned itself on this spectrum. Third, the
policies of the Philippines from the 1960s to early 1980s will
be assessed to ascertain how problems began and the
distortions within the industrial structure.
The three sections of this chapter are not intended to be
indepth, however. Instead, the information presented focuses
on providing the background needed to understand CIDA's
assessment of industrial issues within the Philippines.
Indicators of Success
While no agreement exists on the causes of success, numerous
attempts have been made to define what "success" is or what it
means to be a NIC. These criteria for describing NICs are
based on ex post assessments. By most of these measures, the
Philippines has been on the verge of breaking into the NIC
category for a long time.
According to Chenery et al (1986) a number of initial
characteristics--namely size of domestic market and resource
endowment--strongly influence a country's ability to effec-
tively pursue industrialization. These factors allow an early
movement into import substitution, a higher manufacturing
share of GDP and lower shares of exports and imports (i.e.
less dependence on the world economy). The Chenery model then
indicates that countries should be able to move toward more
open trade arrangements--the import substitution then export
arrangement which has allowed countries such as Korea to grow.
The large domestic market, high resource endowment and
highly educated labour force in the Philippines have provided
a strong basis for development since World War II. While
these factors did allow the Philippines to attain a relatively
high share of manufacturing in GDP and fairly independent
status, the Philippines was never able to effectively make the
transition to more open trade arrangements. The character-
ization of the Philippines in the Chenery analysis (Chenery et
al 1986) as a "neutral" trade environment (not strongly biased
towards exports or imports) means that, according to Chenery,
the policies per se do not supply the answer to why the
transition was not effective.
A UNIDO study (1985b) found a high correlation between
structural change in manufacturing, growth rates of value
added in manufacturing and growth in manufactured exports. As
Bradford and Branson (1987) point out, these changes in sec-
toral composition of output and exports, rapid industrializa-
tion and surge in manufactured exports are all characteristic
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of the NICs such as Taiwan, Korea and Brazil. In terms of
these measures, the Philippines scored high between 1965 and
1980 (UNIDO 1985b). However, during this period the
industrial sector became an increasing lag on the economy, not
its basis for dynamism.
The World Bank in its World Development Report 1983 intro-
duced the idea of price distortions as a way of understanding
why an economy was not achieving its potential. Going back to
the outward orientation reasoning explained earlier, the
contention was that high growth rates were associated with low
price distortions. This was extended in 1985 to correlate
high price distortions with increased likelihood of debt
servicing problems (World Bank 1985b). On the World Bank
scale, the Philippines has one of the lowest composite price
indices. However, growth rates in recent years have decreased
while debt servicing has increased to an almost stifling pro-
portion.
All of these attempts at dissecting the issue of industrial
programming provide interesting inputs into the debate--
providing benchmarks against which countries can assess their
situation. What they can not provide is an understanding of
why a country like the Philippines has not reached its poten-
tial. According to most of the standards, the Philippines has
been a relatively open economy with low levels of public
ownership and reasonably sound fiscal policies. In a sense,
it has followed what is considered an "appropriate" route.
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The strategy has been derailed along the way, however. While
the country has the right "indicators" it does not have the
right outcome in terms of a dynamic industrial sector.
Typologies of Development
Many of the current approaches to industrial development
attempt to place the experience at the country level into
straight-forward models. Either a country was outward orient-
ed or inward oriented; either the state took a proactive role
or laissez faire. The strategies at the country level are
rarely ever that straight forward, however. In fact, my sense
is that a spectrum of policies and actions exist within
countries. A country's decision about where it wants to be on
the spectrum reflects a wide range of factors including
resource base, market size, geographical environment,
priorities, constraints facing the country, political and
social concerns.
The typology which follows in Chart 1 is an attempt to lay
out the spectrum of options which I believe were available to
developing countries between the 1950s and late 1970s.2 These
timeframes are qualified since some of the policies--namely
2 The country names mentioned on Chart 1 are meant to be
indicative of countries which at some point followed this route.
For example, Egypt's attempt to follow a national priorities
approach ended in the early 1970s. Sri Lanka's priority on
supporting basic needs began to shift in 1977 with the increase
in balance of payments problems. Countries have shifted between
the approaches and have undertaken various parts of any one
typology more or less strenuously than other countries.
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Chart 1
TYPOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
PURSUED IN THE 19506 TO 1970s
Goal: Growth as Vehicle for National
Goal of Self-sufficiency
Objectives: Capital creation
Development of Skills
Technical Capability
Employment
Trade Policy: Autarchic
State Role: Mixed Ownership
Foreign Participation in Selected
Investment: Industries with Controls
Technology Internal Generation of Technology
& Skills: High Technology Skill Development
Goal: Growth as Secondary to Basic Needs
Objectives: Employment and Income Generation
Links with Agriculture
Infrastructure 6 Investment
Stability and Independence, SSE
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Uruguay
Ghana
(Small country)
DOMESTIC
ORIENTATION
Trade Policy:
State Role:
Limited with High Protection
High Degree of Involvement
Foreign Disincentives
Investment: Careful Regulation
Technology Appropriate Technology
& Skills: Emphasis on Basic Education
Goal: High Growth
Objectives: Generation of Net Revenues
Exports- Foreign Exchange
Skill Development
Productivity
Trade Policy: Open
INTERNATIONAL
ORIENTATION
(Small country)
Ivory Coast
Costa Rica
Taiwan
Singapore
Hong Kong
State Role: Facilitator
Provide Infrastructure
Foreign Strongly Promoted
Investment: No disincentives
Technology Technology Imported
& Skills: Improved Skills to
Increase Flexibility
of Production
Goal: Growth as Vehicle to
Overall Development
Objectives: Generation of Net revenues
Capital Creation
More Efficient Resources
Generation of Foreign Exchange
Trade Policy: Selective Policies According
to Sectors
State Role: Strong but With Targeted
Development
Foreign-
Investment:
Selectively Promoted
Technology Adaptation of Technology
6 Skills: Attention to Higher Education
Mexico
Thailand
Philippines
Korea
Malaysia
Brazil
(Large Country)
ECONOMIC
PRIORITIES
NATIONAL
PRIORITIES
(Large Country)
China
India
Egypt
Indonesia
.......... .......
I
domestic orientation and national priorities--followed
previously are no longer viable under the changing conditions
explained in Chapter 2. During this timeframe a country could
be located anywhere along the spectrum and many countries
moved between categories.
The differences among countries in terms of industrial
policies were directly related to the goals the countries were
pursuing. Some countries such as Hong Kong and Taiwan placed
the emphasis on achieving high growth and chose policies to
support this. For others, such as India and China, the aim
was to increase national self-sufficiency with strategies that
focused more on domestic capital formation and technical skill
development.
The size of the economy was an important variable in terms
of which approaches could be chosen. The extreme openness of
the international orientation approach made it attractive to
many small countries with limited resources in terms of
financial markets, technology, labour skills or access to
markets. Without internal markets and skills, the more
selective approach of the economic priorities could not be
undertaken. On the other hand, the extreme case of national
priorities could only be pursued by a country that was large--
such as China and India. Delinking from the system required
not only a wide range of resources within the country, but the
ability to sustain development with an almost autarchic
approach to trade.
98
These groupings obviously conceal the intricate differences
between the experiences of various countries. They are meant
simply as a way to organize that experience, making some broad
conclusions and comparisons between groups. The application
of strategies differed significantly between countries. As
well, some countries were more successful with a strategy than
others. The intention is to place the discussion of the
Philippines into a broader context initially by providing some
evidence of past experience in other countries and some of the
critical points for success and failure.3
Within this spectrum, the Philippines has maintained an
approach which would closely relate to the economic priorities
group. The stated goals of the Philippines have never focused
on issues such as basic human needs, increased income
distribution or development of a strong nationalistic spirit.
Instead, until President Aquino was elected in 1986, the
government policy statements had focused exclusively on issues
such as generating foreign exchange through increased exports
and investment buildup. The approach was a tempered,
3 As seen in Chapter 2, the emphasis of donors vis a vis
industrial development has been to promote the International
Orientation type of approach. Not only does the state take a
facilitator role (providing social overhead capital) with the
private sector in the lead but the economy is open to foreign
ownership and trade. This has become quite explicit with the
new approach of the World Bank through the Structural Adjustment
Lending conditions with its emphasis on the outward orientation
model. The CIDA ISS approach, in practical terms, would equate
more to Economic Priorities where the state takes a more active
though targeted role in the economy to help overcome
bottlenecks.
strategic one--open to trade and investment on a selective
basis, limiting direct investment in public enterprises and
promoting high educational and technical skills.
a) Trade Policies
All developing countries at some point undertook an import
substitution strategy (Balassa 1982). The Philippines fol-
lowed a strong emphasis on import substitution to the mid
1960s then export oriented strategies were put in place.
Problems arose with the transition from import substitution to
export promotion, however, which undermined the opening of the
economy.
The experience of other countries shows that the important
question is not whether import substitution was followed but
how and when it was replaced by a more world oriented regime
(Chenery et al 1986). Firms must become competitive in
international terms to effectively make the transition.
Without the increase in competitiveness, import substituting
industries will, many times, continue to be effective only
within protected walls. This was the situation within the
Philippines.
A number of countries in the international orientations
group were among the first to switch from import substitution.
For countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, the pos-
sibilities of the strategy quickly dried up with such limited
domestic markets (Ballance, Ansani and Singer 1982). The
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rapid switch worked well for these three countries which were
able to build flexibility into their industrial structure
which allowed rapid changes in response to changes in external
world demand. Ivory Coast's shift to exporting without build-
ing a local domestic base, however, proved to be very high
risk. With a strong primary product base, the Ivory Coast
undertook a less diverse approach to manufacturing. This
inflexibility caused severe problems in the 1970s as the world
markets for those products dried up (Rondos 1979).
Attempts at striking a balance between import substitution
and a more world oriented approach have not always been
successful. Some countries following the domestic orientation
route have attempted to increase exports while trying to
control for the types of problems faced by the Ivory Coast.
The result was many times a complex set of regulations on both
imports and exports which do not increase independence nor
provide stability. Before the reforms in the mid 1970s,
Uruguay had one of the most complicated trading systems with a
wide variety of regulations controlling the amount and type of
exports and imports with only limited positive impact on the
industrial sector (Mezzera and de Melo 1985).
One of the masters of the import substitution then export
pattern of development was Korea. The Korean incentive struc-
ture assisted companies through three stages of development.
The first was an import substitution stage where companies
were not expected to be competitive and were protected by a
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series of tariffs and other supports. Once they reached a
certain economies of scale, the government provided a dif-
ferent series of incentives and assistance including marketing
information, tax exemptions, and tariff exemptions aimed at
breaking into the export market. The firm was then expected
to eventually become efficient enough to compete on the open
market with only minimal government support.
Direct foreign investment has also displayed a wide range of
potential and problems for developing countries. Some
countries such as Tanzania have undertaken a carefully regu-
lated approach to foreign investors. From the late 1960s to
mid 1970s foreign investment was only permitted in certain
sectors of the economy and only on the basis of joint ventures
with the state (UNIDO 1986a). Costa Rica's approach was not
only open to direct foreign investment but strongly supported
foreign investment as a primary means of industrialization. A
full set of incentives were extended including tax exemptions
and full repatriation of profits. While the approach worked
initially, the investors were primarily interested in obtain-
ing preferential access to the regional integration group.
With its collapse, no incentives were large enough to make
investors stay (Weeks 1985).
A vast literature has grown which deals with the pros and
cons of direct foreign investment.4  The Philippines has
4 See for example, Agosin and Gold (1986), Hill and Johns
(1985), Oman (1983) and Kindleberger and Audretsch (1983).
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traditionally kept a fairly open approach to foreign
investment with the result that substantial investment has
been undertaken in the last twenty years. Whether this has
been good or bad has been the subject of great debate within
the country and was one of the issue which triggered the
imposition of martial law in 1972.
Countries can find a middle ground between the desire to
follow nationalist objectives and its approach to foreign
investment. Malaysia is an example of a country that has been
able to attract foreign investors while still undertaking
rigorous policies to increase the economic benefits to the
Malay population. It is extremely difficult to strike this
balance, however, and much depends on the economic health of
the economy.
b) Role of the State
One area which currently inspires great debate is the issue
of what role the state should play in industrialization. Some
studies such as Krueger (1985) contend that the state should
be merely a facilitator of the industrial process and should
not even target industries for development. While the small
countries following the international orientation route seem
the closest to this "ideal", it is debatable whether even they
have stayed out of more active orchestration.
No country followed a totally laissez faire approach. The
issue is not whether the state should be involved in
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industrial programming but how it can effectively promote
industrial change. For example, Taiwan clearly targeted
industries and intervened in the economy when the government
felt it was necessary (Ballance et al 1982). This state
intervention is even more apparent in the economic priorities
approach. Here the state consciously manipulates trade
regimes, ownership, and investment patterns to target
particular sectors for development. This is seen in a wide
range of countries from Brazil to Mexico.
The form of state participation within India during the
1950s and 1960s was an extreme case of this orchestration.
India pursued a conscious program of mixed ownership. Both
private firms and public agencies were active within the
industrial sector, but the roles between the two groups were
quite distinct. The public sector undertook direct ownership
of much of the heavy industry sector. The private sector was
relied on for the spin-off production units. An elaborate
system of incentives and supports were used by the state to
not only target particular sectors but also locate industries
and establish capacity (UNIDO 1979a). This expanded public
role fit the goals of the overall approach--namely increased
self-sufficiency, employment and the ability to ensure that
the surpluses from investment were reinvested.
By comparative standards, the role of the state in the
Philippines was relatively small. By limiting public
ownership, it maintained one of the lowest rates of state
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owned enterprises. However, the direct interventions which
were taken became more oriented towards biasing the system in
favour of a few firms than promoting industrial change and
strengthening the overall manufacturing sector.
c) Technological Change and Skill Development
The last issue which has been important to each of the four
approaches is the emphasis on technical change and skill
development. Inherent in structural change within the in-
dustrial sector is the increased use of technology and the
development of domestic skills to effectively deal with that
technology. This incorporation of technology has been a
foundation of industrial strategies (i.e. Kuznets 1966).
The thinking now, however, is that developing countries can
not simply transfer technology as is and expect it to
substitute for domestically generated technology. On the
other hand, it is not necessary to generate a large portion
domestically as the India experience has shown. Instead,
technology can be transferred from abroad and adapted to local
conditions--preferably by a domestic skilled labour force
(Pack and Westphal 1984). It is in this adaptation which the
Philippines has experienced the most problems.
Two countries which have approached technology in this way
have had success in adapting it to meet their needs. Taiwan
took the route of obtaining technology from abroad as is and
then developing local skills to allow a flexible labour force
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able to quickly adapt products to changing market conditions.
Korea was much more careful about how technology was trans-
ferred. Not only was the technology adapted to local condi-
tions but emphasis was placed on building technical skills
which allowed the adaptation to be generated from within Korea
(Pack and Westphal 1984).
Obstacles to Success in the Philippines
What these typologies show are the range of interventions
which countries have taken since the 1950s. Within this
context, the Philippines has consistently taken a conservative
approach to industrial development. It has pursued a number
of policies which have been effective in other countries such
as an early shift to export promotion, targeting industries
for state support, and supporting the development of technical
skills. Yet the Philippines has been relatively unsuccessful
in making these policies work.
Some answers to why this is the case are outlined in this
section. The reasons can be found more in how the policies
were implemented than in what policies were pursued. In fact,
the typologies indicate that the differences between success
and failure of an approach can relate more to the application
of the strategy, the goals being targeted and the environment
within which it is being implemented.
An overview will be provided here of some of the reasons why
the Philippines has not been more successful. The analysis is
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not intended to be indepth but simply background for the next
chapters which define CIDA's approach to the Philippines
industrial scene.
a) Import Substitution then Export - What Went Wrong?
The initial import substitution phase in the Philippines
began in the early 1950s. The controls, initially aimed at
supporting domestic consumer industries, produced
manufacturing growth rates of 14% between 1949 and 1953 and
11% between 1953 and 1957 (Ofreneo and Habana 1987). As
expected, the structure of manufacturing also changed from a
heavy reliance on sectors such as food processing to textiles,
machinery, paper and chemicals (Bautista and Power 1979).
The momentum of import substitution lessened by the early
1960s, following a similar pattern seen in other countries
(Hirschman 1968). The import substitution policies were
coming under increasing criticism from a wide range of groups.
One group (which included US businessmen and the International
Monetary Fund) advocated an increase in exports and
liberalization of the trade regime. To this group, the
problems with import substitution revolved around issues such
as inefficiency of industries due to protection, higher costs
of goods to consumers, excessive dependence on imported inputs
and the growing income inequality generated by the growing
wage gap between modern and traditional sectors (Power and
Sicat 1981). To reverse these problems, exports in products
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of comparative advantage should be pursued, trade should be
liberalized and an attempt should be made to attract foreign
investment to infuse capital into the system.
The other principal group of critics focused on the need to
move to the second level of import substitution--namely
domestic production of capital goods. This group represented
a wide variety of interests including Philippine businessmen
who benefitted from the existing protection, political
economists who saw the end of import substitution as an
inevitable increase in dependence on the US and radicals who
saw import substitution as an "anti-imperialist tool" (Ofreneo
and Habana 1987). The criticisms of import substitution
centred around issues such as the creation of national elites
with little expertise, weak manufacturing sectors focusing on
light manufacturing, continued heavy import dependence due to
the failure to develop sectors producing intermediate and
capital goods, and high foreign ownership.
This nationalist sentiment was particularly critical of the
large number of US firms which had entered the Philippines,
set up assembly operations, and not contributed to "real"
industrialization (Bello et al 1982). The solutions proposed
focused on implementing a nationalistic industrial program
with tighter controls on foreign investment, extension of
import substitution to capital goods and massive income
redistribution.
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Obviously the export promoters and the nationalistic group
saw the industrial process in very different lights. These
differences formed the foundation for debate throughout the
1960s to early 1970s. While the debate was temporarily decided
during the mid 1960s, the real resolution did not take place
until martial law was declared in 1972.
The balance of payments crisis and the resulting need to
obtain funds from the International Monetary Fund in 1962
triggered a full liberalization of import controls such as
licenses and import bans. This took place along with a
devaluation and a dismantling of foreign exchange controls.
These measures resulted in rapid increases in import volumes
after 1963 and a slowing of growth in manufacturing to 3.7% in
1960-65 (World Bank 1987). When President Marcos took over in
1966, he continued the decontrol policy and began stressing
export promotion. A Board of Investment was established,
export incentive laws enacted, export processing zones
undertaken and a floating exchange rate put in place (World
Bank 1987).
The decontrol phase was not without trade-offs, however.
The industrialists who received protection during the 1950s
pressured for the retention of tariff protection. While other
reforms could be made in the trade regime, tariffs were to
stay. Thus a trade-off occurred--while direct controls were
eliminated and the peso devalued, tariffs stayed in place
(Baldwin 1975).
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The debate regarding industrial programming did not end with
these initial measures. The group of people advocating a more
nationally oriented approach to development became more vocal
and organized. The constitutional convention in 1970 which
was to rewrite the basic laws of the Philippines became a
platform for many of the dissenting industrial voices to
express their concerns particularly about foreign ownership.
At the same time the groups on the left started demonstrating
for a more nationalistic approach to development putting more
pressure on the system. These pressures triggered decisions
such as the Supreme Court ruling in 1972 which decreed that
lands acquired by Americans since 1946 would be subject to
forced sale or expropriation (Bello et al 1982).
The polarized debate between import substitution and export
promotion was forcibly ended in 1972 when Marcos declared
martial law. The Marcos Government moved to increase the
incentives for foreign investment and local exporters and
stated strongly its support for export promotion. At the same
time the Government indicated that it intended to dismantle
the import substitution instruments such as quantitative
restrictions and tariffs.
A study undertaken by the International Labour Office (ILO)
in 1974 was quickly endorsed by Marcos. The ILO team
reinforced the criticism of import substitution such as the
increasing disparity in income distribution and regional
development, profits being captured by a few industrialists
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and increasing capital intensity of industries. The ILO
called for a move toward a more market oriented, export based
approach which would increase employment and equity. The
export drive envisaged by the ILO was based on the development
of labour intensive industries, regional decentralization of
government administration and a "sharing in development" by
the populace.
The gains made during the 1970s in terms of exports were
impressive and resulted in the structural changes to the
economy mentioned earlier. The proportion of exports to value
added in the manufacturing sector grew from 1.5% in 1960 to
4.7% in 1970 to 13% by 1980. The export of non-traditional
products increased in constant US dollars from US$1.028b in
1970 to US$2.353 in 1980.
The problems of the late 1970s--oil price increases,
recessions, increased interest rates and decreased commodity
prices--triggered a balance of payments crisis within the
Philippines. At that point, the Government came under attack
for its industrial policies. The World Bank blamed the
problems of the economy on the unwillingness of the Marcos
Government to totally dismantle the import substitution system
and the need to increase export incentives (World Bank 1980).
This analysis became the foundation for the World Bank
Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) in 1980.
Other criticisms saw the root of the economic problems
outside of import substitution. Bello et al (1982) blamed the
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export promotion strategy itself for the crisis. Their
contention was that battering tariff walls and forcing open
regimes toward foreign investors caused the collapse of the
industrial efforts. Montes (1987) saw the burst of non-
traditional exports during the 1970s as triggering a form of
"Dutch disease". The enclave nature of the export sector
combined with overvaluation, capital flight and foreign debt
meant that the growth during the 1970s was unsustainable.
Based on my fieldwork in the Philippines, I believe that the
problems with the import substitution then export approach
were more complex than either extreme. The seeds of the
problem were laid in the way in which the import substitution-
export promotion debate was handled and ended in the early
1970s. The two polarized views on import substitution
reflected much the same debate as was taking place in the
Latin American countries. Issues from efficiency to
dependency were being debated there as well as in the
Philippines (see Hirschman 1968). A main difference, however,
became the either/or nature of the Philippines debate. The
imposition of martial law and the actions by the Government to
support export promotion meant that import substitution was
considered "wrong" and export promotion "right" in 1972.
The polarization, in essence, precluded building any
complementarity into the industrial system. While countries
like Korea and Brazil were successful in building on the
import substitution systems, their success was based on
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developing strategies which allowed and encouraged movement of
the import substituting industries toward a world market. One
strategy was not simply replaced by the other, but both became
part of an overall world oriented strategy.
By making statements which clearly rejected any positive
contribution which the import substitution industries could
make to industrialization, the import substitution programs
such as tariffs became more political than industrial. The
Government did not attempt to put in place either incentives
or penalties aimed at deterring inefficiencies in the
industries. The Government simply allowed the industries to
reap the benefits without having to perform. As one
Philippine policy analyst indicated to me, the tariffs and
restrictions became a way of ensuring profits without
performance.
Once import substitution was placed on a solely political
basis, then its continuation became more politicized. Not
only was there a strong lobby to continue the protection but
government policy became a way of concentrating economic
benefits in the hands of Marcos supporters, the so called
crony capitalists. The import incentive system exercised
under martial law took uncertainty out of the system and
resulted in the emergence of a new "super elite" industrial
class (Crouch 1985).
Despite having supported many of these activities in the
1970s, US AID in an internal report in 1988 indicated that the
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result of these policies was to shift the locus of profit-
ability from the market to Malacang Palace. Entrepreneurial
energy was no longer focused on decreased cost and increased
quality but on gaining exclusive privileges. As Montes (1988)
contends the import substitution policies became a method for
creating and protecting private monopolies.
The other half of the equation--export promotion--also
developed biases. The drive for exports did not attempt to
build on the domestic market either as a source for exporting
or for inputs. The export promotion approach was aimed at
labour intensive exports usually of the assembly variety.
Broad (1988) contends that this bias towards sectors such as
garments and electronics was based on over optimistic
assumptions by the World Bank regarding the growth of world
trade. The Bank promoted them as the wave of the future which
should be the foundation for development.
This foundation, however, proved to be the entire extent of
the export sectors. As Alburo (1987) points out, the
concentration in two or three product groups meant that the
influence of export firms on the manufacturing sector was
relatively shallow. These products were not only exclusively
for export markets but they also demanded high levels of
imported inputs and had few linkages to the domestic economy.
By the end of the 1970s, all of these problems were
magnified by a series of balance of payments crises. The
growth rate of manufacturing dropped between 1980 and 1983
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reaching -10.58% in 1984. The manufacturing employment index
shared a decline in jobs--for every 100 employed in January
1981, 22 had dropped out by August 1985 (Ofreneo and Habana
1987). Shrinking domestic markets, increased costs of
production (particularly in servicing debt) and dismantling of
the protection system (one condition of the World Bank SAL)
forced more decreases in industrial production. The
industrial sector had become a lag on the economy not a
contributing positive factor.
The businessmen who were outside of the Marcos elite group
were hardest hit by the adjustment and therefore became more
vocal against the Government after 1983 (Crouch 1985). This
group had the least ability to adjust to the crisis. During
the 1970s, many of these firms limited their activities to not
become too profitable for fear of attracting "acquisition" by
a Marcos backed firm. As a result, they were not in a sound
position to adjust to the crisis and many turned instead to
capital flight as a way of securing their position.
b) State Participation in Industrialization
The direct participation of the state in manufacturing
within the Philippines was kept very limited by most
developing country standards. Even in areas where Government
monopolies were set up, such as sugar and coconut marketing,
they were run by private firms. The Philippine Government
instead opted to provide support to the industrial process
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through activities such as infrastructure and financial
intermediation.
Infrastructure provision was the most important element in
the 1960s to mid 1970s. During this period, a majority of the
capital outlay by the national government went toward con-
ventional infrastructure--roads, bridges, schools, etc (UP
1984). Investments were also being made in export processing
zones (EPZs) by the late 1960s which were to sup port the
export orientation during this period. While these EPZs were
supposed to become self-supporting, most did not reach their
optimum capacity and as a result did not produce the returns
expected (Ofreneo and Habana 1987).
Whether this provision of infrastructure had a positive or
negative impact on the economy is impossible to tell in terms
of output. Presumably the infrastructure aided the
industrialization process at least around the Manila region.
What is obvious is that the rapid increase in funds going to
infrastructure development contributed to the substantial
government deficits which began to develop in the late 1960s.
Government construction quadrupled between the 1966-70 period
and 1971-75. At the same time, the gap between investment and
savings was widening from a surplus position to a substantial
deficit by 1975 (UP 1984). External borrowing was relied on
increasingly to fund this growing gap (Manasan 1988).
The government approach to capital outlays began to shift by
the mid 1970s away from traditional infrastructure towards
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more construction oriented projects. While these projects
were intended to stimulate employment and other spin-off
benefits, a University of the Philippines group of experts
contend that few benefits resulted (UP 1984). Instead, the
funds were increasingly used to build buildings for government
bureaucracies, medical centres, official residences and the
Central Bank mint. The group argued that these contributed
little to the overall industrial sphere but substantially to
the foreign debt.
More important than the question of whether government
supported infrastructure and construction contributed or
detracted from the economy was the issue of how much govern-
ment backed debt was being generated by the private sector. A
primary role which the government took during the 1970s was as
financial intermediary--both directly and indirectly.
Montes (1988) described the strategy during the 1970s not as
an export promotion phase but as a transition from import
substitution to a debt driven economy. From 1972 on, the
government increasingly attempted to solve balance of payments
problems, deficits and investment shortfalls by using
commercial bank financing. The sudden increase in private
international funds after the oil crisis of 1973 allowed this
strategy to move into high gear. Foreign debt increased from
US$2b in 1970 to US$24.3b in 1983.
The problem with this increase in foreign borrowing was not
necessarily the level of funding but the pattern of end use of
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the borrowing. By relative standards, the Philippines
debt/GNP ratio in the early 1980s was not out of line with
most developing countries. In fact, it compared favourably
with other Asian countries such as Korea, Malaysia and
Indonesia (World Bank Debt Tables 1985). The problem was the
increasing investment/savings gap and the government
guaranteed debt.
The investment savings gap continued to grow throughout the
1970s, moving from 1.3% of GNP in 1974 to a high of almost 6%
by 1976 (Montes 1987). These high levels of investment were
funded increasingly by government guaranteed foreign debt.
Much of this debt was channelled through a series of govern-
ment financial institutions (GFIs) such as the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). In fact, the share of Central Bank credit going to
these two GFIs rose from 30% in 1971-75 to 45% by 1981. The
foreign creditors preferred this type of guarantee arrangement
where it had recourse to the firm and the government
institution. The government saw these institutions as a way to
target credit to "dynamic" portions of the economy.
This idea of targeting financial resources was a critical
one for success in some other countries in the region. By
totally controlling the distribution and creation of credit
and foreign exchange, Korea was able to effectively target
borrowers to meet government industrial priorities. The group
of industrialists (chaebols) who tended to receive these funds
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were then able to undertake large scale industrial projects in
selected sectors (Ruggie 1983).
These publicly backed loans met with problems in the
Philippine context, however. As seen with the trade
incentives, the funds from both the GFIs and many commercial
banks became increasingly directed toward groups and
activities which were not productive. As one official of the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) explained to me, the projects
funded were not always selected based on sound economic, rate
of return analysis. Many times, the running of the business
was of only minor concern to the borrower. The profits were
made at the time of investment not through the operation of
the enterprise. This meant that many of the non-performing
assets of the DBP and PNB which were transferred to the APT
for disposal, may never become productive.
These biases in both the GFI operation and many of the large
private Philippine banks who also favoured select groups of
companies, resulted in obvious distortions at the firm level.
The loans given were primarily large scale for capital
intensive projects. Smaller firms were crowded out of the
credit scene even though their activities showed higher levels
of efficiency and productivity. In particular, small and
medium enterprises suffered from the increasingly closed
credit system (Tecson et al. 1988).
Another feature of the financial intermediation also set the
stage for problems from 1980 and on. The Philippine banks
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tended toward short term lending which meant that the firms
then had to use short term funds to cover long term assets,
making them vulnerable to interest rate increases. While not
necessarily a problem, in the case of the Philippines, many
banks were not strong enough to withstand the interest rate
jumps. Firms were also highly levered as many companies
traded their equity for easily obtainable debt.
The shocks of the late 1970s began to unravel this pattern
of financial intermediation. Many of the large, unproductive
enterprises which were funded through the GFIs began
experiencing problems with the increase in oil prices,
decrease in markets and increase in interest rates on the
world front. The Government began taking on larger deficits
between 1980 and 1985 which were aimed at keeping its GFIs
functioning. While the private firms were defaulting, the
GFIs continued to meet their obligations to foreign lenders
via Central Bank credits. By 1986, 58.2% of PNB assets and
87.0% of those held by DBP were considered "non-performing"
(Montes 1987). In 1983, the acceptance of the IMF program
targets put controls on the level of credits generated by the
Central Bank. As Montes contends, this narrowed the spectrum
of private sector firms who had access to credit even further.
To meet the targets, only the government and its private
sector group were able to receive the resources.
As part of the World Bank SAL in 1980, a series of financial
reforms were undertaken which had a negative impact on the
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industrial sector as a whole. Interest rate ceilings were
lifted. Laws were passed that allowed banks with a certain
level of capital to expand their activities to functions such
as equity investment. The intention was to increase the
economies of scale in the banking sector and allow more
coordinated, "universal services". The impact of these latter
reforms was to increase the concentration of the banking
system into fewer hands (Bello et al 1982). Higher
intermediation costs combined with higher real interest rates
caused a severe impact on industries by 1985 as firms could no
longer obtain working capital or service debts.
c) Technological Change and Technical Skills
Like most developing countries, the Philippines has obtained
most of its technology from abroad. Little emphasis has been
placed either by Government or firms on developing its own
technology. In fact, the Philippines has one of the lowest
research and development expenditures in the region at 0.19%
of GNP in 1982 (World Bank data). This lack of priority on
developing Philippine technology has meant that technology has
come from a combination of direct foreign investment (DFI),
licensing and capital imports.
The Philippines since independence from the US in the 1940s
has maintained a regulated but open approach to DFI. The
Omnibus Investment Code while controlling ownership levels in
key industries has not acted as a major deterrent to DFI
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(World Bank internal assessment). Not surprisingly, the
levels of investment increased sharply after the imposition of
martial law in 1972. The actions against foreign investors
which were proposed by the courts in the early 1970s were
never implemented. The investors saw the return to a stable
environment as a positive sign. As a result, real annual
investment between 1973 and 1980 was double that of the 1968
to 1972 period according to the Board of Investment.
How much this DFI has contributed to the technological
buildup within the country is impossible to say. Some of the
sectors which have had higher concentrations of DFI such as
chemicals, food, and basic metal products are relatively
capital and technology intensive. Presumably in these
sectors, the technology would have been imported and adapted
to the local factor mix. The resulting technology might have
been more advanced than the technology which was obtained
through the purchase of capital equipment only. Few studies
have been undertaken on the contribution which DFI has made to
technological change, however. From my interviews with
Philippine firms, it would appear that the other two sources
of technology transfers played a greater role.
Technology transfers through licensing or other agreements
with foreign suppliers are also regulated. These regulations
do not appear to have limited the extent of licenses only its
character. The Technology Transfer Board (TTB) was
established in 1978 to regulate agreements. The purpose was to
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try to limit the amount of foreign exchange which was remitted
to the licensors in an attempt to help with the balance of
payments problems. In essence, the TTB helped firms negotiate
with licensors to decrease rates, limit restrictions and
obtain flexible terms for the license period.
Based on TTB statistics, the licensing agreements have been
used extensively in areas such as electrical appliances,
pharmaceuticals, car parts and machinery. The transfers have
been primarily in terms of patents, trademarks and know how.
A review of the character of many of these sectors reveals
that, while technology transfers have occurred, they have
remained enclaves within the overall industries.
The licenses for pharmaceutical and car parts in particular
have required the purchase of packaged inputs from the parent
companies. The pharmaceutical industry within the
Philippines, in fact, is little more than a packaging
operation. Name brand drugs are imported primarily from the
US and the plants in the Philippines put them into packaging
for resale to the domestic market. While these transfers may
have increased the level of technology, many do not allow any
spinoff effects.
One of the most common transfers of technology has been the
importation of capital equipment. The development of a
domestic capital goods industry was not a priority for the
Government until the late 1970s. At that point, the
Government began to place more emphasis on domestically
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produced goods as a way to decrease foreign exchange needs.
In late 1979, the Government proposed the establishment of
eleven projects ranging from copper and aluminum smelters to
integrated steel plants. Funding for the projects was not
forthcoming. The projects did not receive the backing of the
World Bank and most foreign investors were lukewarm (Bello et
al 1982). Trying to undertake such massive programs in the
late 1970s and early 1980s when the economy was on a downturn
effectively negated any chance of implementation.
As a result, imported capital goods have been a primary
source of technology for industries. The import regulations
have remained fairly open with regards to importing capital
goods. This was reflected in the share of capital goods in
gross domestic investment which averaged about 23% throughout
the 1970s--comparable to Korea and slightly less than Malaysia
(World Bank data).
Whether the Philippine firms have been able to effectively
adapt this equipment to suit local needs is a critical
question. Pack (1987) in an analysis of the Philippine
textile industry determined that many of the plants with the
newest technology were not the most productive or efficient of
those he studied. In fact, some plants with 1950s technology
exhibited the highest productivity. These firms not only
understood the technology but even supplied machine shops with
drawings and specifications to produce spare parts on a
continuing basis. The newest technology was underutilized
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because technical staff did not attempt to or could not adapt
the equipment and production organization to increase
efficiency.
This problem with upgrading or adapting technology is seen
in other sectors also. A study of the metal working, food
processing and garments sectors showed that most technology
for small and medium enterprises came from simply purchasing
equipment and little technical skills were available to adapt
the equipment (Tecson et al 1988). "Experience" was the most
important basis for changes or adaptations. While this might
work with simple technology, the firms were having increasing
difficulty as the technology became more sophisticated.
The question of adequate levels of technical skills in the
labour force in the Philippines is a difficult one to tackle.
The Philippines has one of the highest levels of secondary
education enrolment--just slightly below the levels of Hong
Kong and Singapore (World Bank data). This high level of
education has been consistent for more than 20 years meaning
that the population as a whole is well trained.
Despite these levels of education, signs exist that there
are limited technical skills. A number of plant officials
indicated to me that while graduates had the skills, they were
not taught how to apply them in a practical setting. A lack
of formal on-the-job-training meant that large portions of the
skilled workforce were learning by trial and error. A
technical education school indicated that this was a major
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problem. Educational programs as a whole were not responsive
to job markets nor where they flexible enough to change with
changes in the economy. This meant that technical schools had
an increasing burden to provide practical training at a time
when they were being faced by decreased resources, outdated
equipment and increased demand from students.
Whether these explanations provide the principal reasons for
the technical problems or only a partial one, they do
highlight the need for assistance to help workers increase
technical skills and students learn to apply the skills they
have to a job setting. While the current government has begun
to turn its attention to these problems, the initial programs
will only provide very limited solutions.
Conclusions
The focus here has been to examine why, despite its
potential, the Philippines has not been able to capitalize on
the opportunities presented in the 1960s and 1970s. While
gains were made in terms of growth of manufactures, structural
changes within industries and the production of exports, by
the late 1970s, the industrial sector had become a lag on the
economy--something which has continued into the 1980s.
The problem does not lie in the extreme character of any of
the policies per se of the Philippine Government. Throughout
this period, it consistently took a strategic approach,
selecting and adopting moderate policies towards trade,
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foreign investment and state interventions. The problems
arose with the manner in which these policies were
implemented.
While attempting to follow an import substitution, then
export approach, which was so successful in other countries
such as Korea and Brazil, the Philippines was never able to
build in a complementarity between the two policies. Import
substitution and export promotion operated as two separate
approaches with little or no interchange or linkages between
the two. The result was an import substitution policy which
became increasingly politicized. Benefits were mainly
bestowed based on connections with the government not
efficiency in operation.
The export promotion side also experienced problems in terms
of export concentration. By making no attempt to tie into the
domestic market and by targeting large scale, labour intensive
industries, the non-traditional export sectors became
increasingly concentrated in three products--garments,
electronics and handicrafts. As well, the majority of non-
traditional exports had few links to the economy and high
import dependence.
The state did not take a large direct role in industries as
seen in countries like India which followed a mixed ownership
approach. In fact, the state had one of the lowest ownership
records of the developing countries. It did, however, use
financial intermediation as a tool for industrialization. It
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was here that many of the financial problems of the industrial
sector began. Throughout the 1970s, the Government guaranteed
debt for private firms expanded at an increasing rate. It
also began to use GFIs as a vehicle to target credit within
the economy. This targeting was supposed to build and
strengthen the industrial class as seen in the case of Korea
with the chaebols. Unfortunately in the Philippines, the
increasing use of non-economic factors became important for
the extension of credit. No performance criteria were
attached to the credit. As the financial crisis began to hit
in 1980, the amount of credit available to non-favoured
companies decreased dramatically and the foreign debt
obligations of the government increased as the GFIs faced bad
debts from the "crony" capitalists.
Productivity, the ability to adapt technology and the
technically skilled workforce have also proven to be a
problem. The technological change necessary to make gains in
many industries has not been easily attained due to
inappropriate uses of equipment, inability to obtain spare
parts, or inappropriate production technologies. The result
is seen in many industries which have high costs and low
efficiency when compared to other countries.
It may appear that a large degree of the blame for the
industrial sector problems have been laid on the biases of the
government towards certain groups or individuals. In fact,
the principle of supporting certain groups within the
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Philippines has been around since the Spanish colonization
period. What former President Marcos did was to establish
systems which reinforced and nurtured biases towards certain
groups. The agreement on this point is quite striking within
both the literature and the interviews I have conducted.
Where agreement does not exist is whether this rent seeking
behaviour is so entrenched that it is still a dominant factor
within the industrial sector even under President Aquino. As
will be explained in the next chapter, CIDA's response to this
question is one critical area which separates it from other
donors in the Philippines.
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IV. BUILDING A CASE
When CIDA's first mission arrived in the Philippines in
September 1986, the country was still in the throes of an
economic crisis begun during the Marcos regime. Since 1983,
the economy had been facing negative growth rates (-5.3% in
1984 and -3.95% in 1985) and decreasing capacity utilization
and production in industries. Debt had steadily climbed,
reaching US$26.3b by mid 1986 and demanding 45% of foreign
exchange revenues for servicing principal and interest.
Unemployment had reached 25% by 1986 and real per capita
income had declined to 1975 levels.
The problems facing the Aquino government were twofold: how
to reverse these trends in the short run; and how to broaden
the base of the recovery to make it sustainable in the long
run. The "Policy Agenda For People-Powered Development" laid
out a strategy of how the Government hoped to accomplish this.
The emphasis was placed on expanding purchasing power in the
rural areas through increased employment generation, improved
productivity, and land reform. Part of this effort was an
industrial strategy which focused on building rural based,
small scale enterprises with the intention that they supply
both export and domestic markets.
Inherent in the policy was a series of initiatives which
became the foundation of the Aquino economic plan released in
December 1986. The emphasis was clearly shifted to the
private sector as the vehicle for overcoming economic
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obstacles. The Government would privatize many of its own
holdings along with the non-performing assets held by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). The industrial sector was targeted to
increase production by 52% over a five year period. Foreign
investment would be promoted through changes to the Omnibus
Investment Code. The initial industrial focus would be on
generating exports in the short run to help with the foreign
exchange problems. The generation of jobs in depressed
industrial sectors also became a priority with emphasis placed
on small scale enterprises and labour intensive activities.
Government policies were also supposed to change in a number
of areas. Trade liberalization was to be undertaken to remove
quantitative restrictions and lower tariff rates. Government
programs aimed at assisting the industrial sector in areas
such as export finance, marketing and technical assistance
would be broadened to allow better access. Government
services would also be decentralized to allow rural areas to
have direct access to programs and approvals. Conservative
monetary and fiscal policies would be followed in line with
the requirements of the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan
(SAL). Direct public investment would be severely limited.
To undertake this programming, the Government recognized the
need to increase the levels of aid as a means to obtain
additional resources. To reach the projected 6.5% growth
rates over five years, Government estimates placed the
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resource gap between US$6 billion and US$8 billion. The
Government felt that aid would make an important contribution
to this since private funding was negligible and the terms of
the aid were concessional, decreasing the resource costs to
the economy.
Problems with relying on aid were also quite apparent,
however. During the Marcos period, an increasing gap had
grown between the Official Development Assistance (ODA)
commitments and the actual disbursements. By 1986, of the
total ODA committed for disbursal, only 68.4% was actually
disbursed (Makati Business Club 1987). The delays in ODA
disbursement were attributed to a number of factors:
* inadequacy of local counterpart funds which were
required even for grants;
* delays in fulfilment of policy changes required as
conditions of concessional loans such as those from the
World Bank; and
* the complexity of procedures and the skills needed to
disburse funds.
These delays meant that a number of government revenue targets
could not be met.
The other problem from the Government's point of view was to
target aid to the areas which were most critical for its
purposes. Unlike former President Marcos who closely aligned
himself to certain aid organizations such as the World Bank
and US Agency for International Development (AID), President
Aquino wanted to exercise a more independent approach to aid.
While willing to cooperate, the Government also lobbied aid
organizations to change the form of transfers to allow greater
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independence in setting its own agenda. When CIDA announced
its program in 1986, the Aquino Government had a clear idea of
how it wanted the funds transferred--through unconditional
balance of payments (BOP) support. This route would obviously
provide the most flexibility and leverage in terms of use of
funds.
Many of the other donors within the Philippines had moved
from project support to balance of payments support, at least
temporarily. All of them had undertaken these programs with
conditions, however. The World Bank had a US$300 million
Economic Recovery Loan which called for reforms in taxes,
trade liberalization and public financial institutions. US
AID had extended a US$300 million loan in 1986 for budgetary
support but with conditions which included privatization of
public corporations, dismantling of price regulations and
adoption of a more market oriented exchange rate.
CIDA was no more willing than any other donors to provide
unconditional support. Unlike the World Bank and US AID
programs, however, the CIDA conditions could not focus on
macroeconomic policy requirements. The relatively small
amount of aid being expended by CIDA meant that Canada would
have little leverage for policy changes--unlike the Bank and
US AID.
While CIDA was willing to supply some balance of payments
support, the aid took the form of commodities programs which
were implemented almost immediately. While not conditional on
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policy changes, the BOP support was conditional on the
purchase of Canadian goods. These programs supplied
fertilizers, paper and vaccines to the Government on a grant
basis. The paper was to be used for making educational
materials; the vaccines as part of a Government immunization
program. The fertilizers were sold to local farmers and the
pesos generated were placed into a counterpart fund which
would provide funds for specific projects agreed upon by the
Philippine Government and Canada.1
The Bilateral desk staff, particularly in the Philippines
felt that it was necessary to provide more than just commodity
aid, however. While CIDA management saw commodity aid as a
simple way to transfer funds, the line staff felt that it was
also a way for increasing the chances of having the funds
benefit a select group of people. By also undertaking
projects aimed at reaching the poorest people and attempting
to broaden the basis of participation in the economy, the
staff felt that a better chance existed to impact the system
and possibly even accomplish reforms which the Government
would be unable to implement.
The CIDA agenda was not macroeconomic but political and
social. When the Minister of External Affairs announced the
CIDA program to the Philippines the goal was made quite clear-
1 These commodities programs continue to be a primary part
of the aid programming, representing 50% of the funds which will
be transferred to the Philippines.
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-to support what was viewed as the democratization process
taking place within the Philippines. The denial of aid to
former President Marcos was a clear sign that politically
Canada did not want to aid the oligopolistic structure
developed under martial law. The extension of funds to
President Aquino was on the condition that political, economic
and social change take place within the country. The
Bilateral staff felt the only way to accomplish these
objectives was through a portion of the program being aimed at
projects targeted to specific groups.
The Process
The priorities of the Bilateral staff were important given
the administrative structure which had evolved in CIDA since
the early 1980s. The changes taking place within developing
countries, Canada and the donor community had placed the CIDA
program in a state of flux.2 The increasing diversity of
problems at the developing country level meant that a rigid
approach to programming would no longer work for CIDA. For
CIDA to have any chance at successful programming meant that
it had to become more flexible.
To increase its flexibility, CIDA reorganized its
administrative structure into a series of country specific
Bilateral desks. These desks were given responsibility for
negotiating country program priorities. The focus on
2 For a full discussion of these issues see Chapter 2.
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developing a series of individual, tailored programs based on
recipient country needs meant that the Bilateral staff had to
be given a high degree of discretion in program formulation.
Decision making had to be decentralized, technical expertise
had to be easily tapped and information at the country level
had to be quickly generated and synthesized.
To accomplish this, the Bilateral desks were staffed by
generalists whose job it was to produce the projects. The
technical expertise was provided by sectoral specialists from
the Professional Services Branch. In effect, a matrix
organization was set up where Bilateral officers and sectoral
specialists were to jointly develop programs to be implemented
in a given country. The two groups were to find mutually
agreed upon programs and solutions at the country level and
design programs based on this.
By the early 1980s, establishing matrix type set-ups had
become a common response to uncertainty and rapidly changing
conditions faced by an organization--both public and private.
According to Davis and Lawrence (1977), by setting up parallel
operations in a matrix setting--one focused on sectoral or
functional issues and one on delivering a product--an
organization could better deal with changes for three reasons.
First, a number of organizational tasks could be undertaken
simultaneously. Second, much more information could be
processed. Third, the organization had the ability to quickly
deploy an individual with the exact skills needed for the job.
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This organizational arrangement resulted in two
characteristics of program formulation within CIDA. First,
since the individual Bilateral desks had a high degree of
discretion over how programs were shaped, the CIDA operation
basically became, by the mid 1980s, a series of individual
programs with separate agendas. In fact, programming was
increasingly ad hoc within the agency.3 This allowed a large
degree of freedom in developing programs.
Second, the strength of the Professional Services Group over
sectoral planning slowly increased despite the small number of
staff. With an increasing administrative workload, Bilateral
officers relinquished more of their sectoral program
responsibility to the technical specialists who basically
developed the programs. This shift of responsibility to the
professional is typical in what Robbins (1983) calls the
adhocracy. Since decisions are based on a democratic process
as opposed to strict hierarchy, the influence on decisions
becomes increasingly based on expertise not positions of
authority. This means that the power of the specialist/
professional increases.
Increasing reliance on technicians within aid agencies for
programming is not uncommon. Ascher (1983) describes how in
an attempt to decrease uncertainty within the World Bank
greater power was transferred to those staff members who could
3 This was a feature which was strongly criticized by the
CIDA Task Force on Canada's ODA (1986).
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extract information from the environment and provide some
coherence to the planning process. The generalist managers
were in a poor position to overrule the specialists who were
responding to both the Bank priorities and a set of
professional standards. Those best able to deal with
uncertainty were usually not those in the most senior
positions but those with the most concrete skills.
It was within this organizational context that the CIDA
industrial sector programming in the Philippines began.
Chosen by the Bilateral group as one of the sectors of primary
focus for the project oriented operations, the Industrial
Services Section (ISS) began the process of determining what
the most critical problems facing the industrial sector were
and which of a whole spectrum of issues should be dealt with
by CIDA's program. While theoretically doing the programming
on behalf of the Bilateral desk, the ISS was in fact in
control of defining the issues and developing an approach to
the industrial sector.
The approach taken was typical of most donors. Troops of
Canadian experts were dispatched to the field to assess the
situation, talk to a variety of key people within the
Philippines and come to some conclusions about what should be
done. The approach was based on a strong methodology which
attempted to combine inputs from a number of different sources
and establish an objective assessment of issues and, above
all, a rational approach to programming.
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This reliance by professionals on making programming as
"rational" and objective as possible has been an increasing
pattern within donor agencies. Rondinelli (1982) contends
that attempts to deal with changing development issues has
triggered an increasing interest in rational planning. As
strategies became more complex, the success of the projects
and programs became less certain. Donor agencies turned
increasingly toward more detailed and systematic planning of
programs. Not only did the role of professionals increase,
but the need to have foreign technical advisors and objective
assessments increased.
This trend was clearly seen in both the relations between
the Bilateral staff and the technical staff, and in the
extreme emphasis placed by the technical staff on following a
strict methodology. A detailed, multi-stage process was
initiated which aimed at systematic assessment of the needs of
the Philippines and the possibilities for CIDA's response.
The foundation of the ISS assessment was the need to do an
independent analysis of the issues, outside of the Government
of the Philippines. While the Government of the Philippines
had clearly laid out a program for interventions in the
industrial field, CIDA's ISS and Bilateral staff saw this as
only one input into the programming process. The Government
priorities and focus were not automatically accepted as the
basis from which CIDA should build its program.
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While wanting to support the Government efforts, the staff
did not want to be confined by these parameters for a number
of reasons which they indicated in internal discussions.
First, meeting CIDA objectives was an important part of any
Bilateral programming exercise. The emphasis within CIDA on
issues such as poverty alleviation, women in development and
environment had to be an integral part of the program
formulation. While the Philippine Government put some
emphasis these issues, none were high priorities for action.
Second, under the new CIDA Strategy report, a number of
areas were not available for funding including infrastructure,
large scale industrial rehabilitation projects and equity
capital funds. All of these, however, were priority areas for
the Philippine Government. While considering them initially,
the ISS group eventually dismissed them as possibilities since
these programs would not receive approval within CIDA.
Third, some concern existed within the Bilateral desk about
whether the Government of the Philippines would be able to
expand access to the development process. Entrenched inter-
ests within the country and the Government bureaucracy
provided major obstacles to implementing Philippine Government
policy, particularly in areas such as decentralization. By
working outside of the confines of simply supporting the
Government, the CIDA staff thought they could play a role in
formulating an alternative decision making process.
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Two other reasons were just as important for not simply
accepting the Government of the Philippines priorities for
CIDA industrial involvement. First, the ISS had a clear
framework or theory of enterprise development (the
formalization of which is found in the Enterprise Development
Issues Paper) within which the program in the Philippines
would have to fit. 4 In many cases, the plans of the
Government fit within this framework. For example, the
reliance on private sector development and the support role of
the government in providing selective interventions to impact
the efficiencies of the firm were both supported by the ISS
approach. However, the technical group felt that only through
an independent analysis could the issues in the Philippines be
tested against this theoretical framework to determine the
approach that should be taken toward industrial problems and
the type of projects which should be implemented to impact on
these issues.
Second, since 1980, CIDA moved away from "government to
government" negotiations as the basis for their Bilateral
program. While previously, all programming had been
undertaken in cooperation with the government of the host
country, now programs were being developed which were outside
of this process. CIDA staff either dealt directly with
private groups within a country or designated Canadian NGOs or
4 The theoretical approach which underlies this document
is indicated in Chapter 2.
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private firms to assist with the programming and
implementation. The industrial programs was targeted to
private firms within the Philippines, and therefore, the
assumption was made that the Government should not be the
determinant of the programs.5
The ISS missions were guided by a strict methodology which
aimed at combining input from a number of different sources
and keeping the selection of interventions as rational as
possible. Interviews in the Philippines would provide the
CIDA team with a basic understanding of the industrial process
in the Philippines--where the key issues were, who the key
players were, and which sectors had potential.
In fact, the interview process 6 produced a wide spectrum of
opinions about the problems facing the industrial sector.
Some of the problems were clear cut, others were plagued by
conflicting opinions and evidence. Issues from privatization
of non-performing assets to land reform had taken on
importance in the quickly changing industrial sphere. All
raised more questions than they answered.
5 While taking a different form, this tactic of lessening
responsibility of the recipient government for project
generation was seen in other donors since the 1970s. Tendler
(1975) notes that taking over the manufacture of projects was
one way for donors to decrease the uncertainty of the
environment from which it must get its inputs.
6 The interview process referred to here took place over
a period of a year starting with a mission in September 1986 and
ending with another mission in November 1987. The primary focus
is on the information gleaned from the latter time period since
gains were being made in the industrial sector by this point.
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Would privatization simply transfer ownership or would it
result in productive industries? Could the rural banking
system be revitalized to give support to rural industries?
Will the consumption led growth change to investment led to
sustain the economy? Will foreign investors come back in or
continue to take a wait and see attitude? Will the purchasing
power in the rural areas be raised through land reform and
other actions enough to change the prospects for the most
depressed areas?
The breadth of issues which were important in both the long
and short term presented a whole range of options for the CIDA
team in terms of areas for possible programming. What was
needed was a way to organize the issues presented during the
interviews and formulate a structured approach to CIDA's
modern sector programming.
The methodology stated that the issues would be identified
and then analyzed based on a number of different inputs. This
sifting process was to draw on the CIDA program priorities
stated in the CIDA Strategy, the stated plan and goals of the
Government of the Philippines, an assessment of Canadian
private sector capabilities in terms of program delivery and
the activities of other donors. From this, the framework for
the program should emerge.
While all these factors were supposed to have an influence,
the application of the method proved impossible without some
way of organizing the issues and prioritizing them. Each of
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these inputs focused on a different portion of the picture.
While the rationalist approach raised many questions, it
produced little insight into a solution for CIDA to follow.
The emerging picture was far too complex.
Attempts by technicians at increasing the planning
procedures and tools to deal with a complex and uncertain
development situation rarely produce the answer or even
decrease the questions. According to Strachan (1978) the
usual results are merely increased number of technical
advisors, increased cost and a large amount of time expended.
In reality, the ISS team had to make a "leap of faith" in
determining the approach to be taken to the modern sector. The
issue (although never stated as such) was how to do this. The
result was based on the "theory" which the ISS followed in
terms of analyzing industrial issues.7 This theory--
specifically a structuralist approach--defined how two
critical debates would be resolved: about small scale
7 This theory was embodied in a document entitled
Enterprise Development Issues Paper which was a report done for
CIDA's President's Committee. The document was really the first
attempt within CIDA to define its role in industrial
development--outside of the "mutual interest" rationale used for
the INC programs. However, the document was never officially
adopted. The President's Committee saw the scope of some of the
recommendations put forward as being too broad a mandate for the
ISS to undertake. Support for the analysis did not appear to be
a problem--in fact, the document reflected much of the thinking
within the organization. The issue of acceptance revolved
around territorial disputes within CIDA and the changing role of
the professional within the organization.
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enterprises (and rent seeking behaviour); and about structural
adjustment with equity.
The Assumptions
a) Scale - Is it Important in the Philippines?
Whether CIDA should be targeting its program by size of
enterprise became an important point during the issues
identification stage. The first two ISS missions assumed
that the interventions in the industrial sector would be aimed
at small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This was based on a
combination of factors.
First, the interviews in the field indicated that the most
dynamic groups during the crises in the Philippines in the
early 1980s were the SMEs. They were able to adapt more
quickly to changes in the market and were able to overcome
obstacles such as lack of credit. An Asian Development Bank
study confirmed that a high proportion of the SMEs were more
efficient than the larger scale enterprises (Hiemenz and Bruch
1983).
Second, the CIDA Industrial Services Section clearly placed
an emphasis on SMEs as a way to increase employment and equity
within a country. The reasoning behind this was based on
8 The issue of dividing the debate by sector or type of
firm was not dealt with directly by the team. The chief CIDA
technician felt that a much broader approach was necessary to
ensure that the "methodological process" was not biased. In
fact, this unwillingness to narrow the focus of investigation
caused continual problems throughout the process. Some of these
are mentioned in Chapter 5.
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literature developed during the 1970s and early 1980s. During
the 1970s, the issue of scale of enterprises became important
with the increased interest in integrating equity issues into
industrial programming. International Labour Office (ILO)
missions led by Dudley Sears in the early 1970s to Sri Lanka
and Columbia began to formulate the argument.
The Kenya mission report (ILO 1972) clearly recognized the
importance of the "informal sector" as a productive sector
within the economy began. A number of studies were completed
on the importance of small and medium scale enterprises in
generating employment and distributing gains from growth (i.e.
Anderson 1982). The SMEs were seen as a way to promote
industrial development and equity. Many donors, including
CIDA, moved to support these enterprises which many times had
few other sources of support available.
Since 1980, CIDA ISS has become one of the leading advocates
within the donor community of SME development, organizing
conferences and exchanging information on SME related issues.
The emphasis made sense within CIDA's context. The foundation
of the ISS Enterprise Development Issues Paper was support to
SMEs as the most dynamic sectors within the economy. CIDA's
official policies stressed the need to help microenterprises
and small scale enterprises as a way to increase income and
employment.
Some of the recent literature has reoriented the discussion
away from size of enterprise, however, to focus on the issue
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of efficiency. Little (1987) contends that while SMES may
generate employment, they are not the most efficient users of
either capital or labour and are not inherently more labour
intensive than larger scale enterprises. His conclusion is
that the emphasis on size should be secondary and the basis
for developing programs should be on trying to get markets to
function properly.
Within the ISS team, discussions focused on whether the
programs should be targeted by size of enterprise or by some
measure of efficiency. It soon became clear that the question
of scale of enterprise went beyond the issue of whether or not
they generate employment or were more or less efficient. The
debate was closely tied to the structure of Philippine
industry.
The Philippines has a skewed industrial structure with a
large number of cottage and small firms at one extreme and a
large number of large firms at the other. Few firms are in
the "middle". The resulting industrial structure produced
what the Harvard Institute for International Development team
called one of the most concentrated industrial sectors in the
world (HIID 1987). While this skewed distribution is not a
problem per se (as evidenced in Korea), it has developed into
a problem in the Philippines in terms of interactions within
the market.
As discussed in Chapter 3, years of biases in policies have
produced a system which does not provide equal access to all
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industrial players. Government policies, while aiming at a
spectrum of firms, have resulted in only a few firms receiving
benefits. As the biases became perpetuated, the resulting
structure was one of large firms with a high level of
sophistication and market access and small firms with limited
skills and access to credit or other supports.9 This
distribution would not have been so detrimental if the large
firms had been forced to be more productive in return for the
incentives.
As opportunities developed in the market or as Government
policies were put into place, the same group of firms moved in
to capitalize on the situation. Many times the movement into
sectors was more a search for a quick profit than a commitment
for the long term investment and development of the sector.
The use and understanding of Government programs became a
critical part of doing business. If a firm was outside of
this group, the ability to identify opportunities and
capitalize on them was limited. Even if a firm could take
advantage of them, it faced an added problem--becoming too
successful and being taken over by the larger firms.10
9 This was clear from the interviews which I have conducted
in the Philippines on seven subsectors. Evidence of this can
also be seen in interviews and recent reports on the SMEs
including HIID (1987) and Tecson et al (1988).
10 These phenomena have even been documented in internal US
AID and World Bank documents.
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The CIDA ISS team debated whether or not these biases had
changed during the crisis period after 1983. Part of the
argument for changed behaviour was based on the World Bank
analysis of the industrial sector done in 1987. During this
period, the Bank determined that the policy changes taken
since 1980 in terms of tariff reform, import restrictions,
interest rates, exchange rates, indirect tax system and
privatization of public enterprises had resulted in a
fundamental transformation of the policy environment (internal
World Bank documents). According to one discussion with a
World Bank economist, the prices were no longer an issue
within the Philippines.
The conclusion from Bank studies was that the biases within
the system were eliminated with the result that the industrial
sector had shifted from one dominated by rent seeking
behaviour (where a small number of firms used up resources
offered by government programs and in the marketplace just to
capture the profits) to one which was more open and neutral.
The underlying assumption was that prices were the most
important dictate of behaviour and that industrial policy
equalled trade and macroeconomic policy.
The outward orientation theory described in Chapter 2 acts
as the basis for the Bank approach. If certain externally
oriented policy changes are made, then the environment for
investment and industrialization will improve sufficiently to
encourage firms to expand. In essence, by changing policies,
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industrialization will take hold on its own. Firms which can
not adjust and take advantage of the opportunities will die.
In this scenario, efficiency not size dictates success or
failure.
Many of the interviews held within the Philippines focused
on trying to see whether this change in approach had actually
taken place or whether rent seeking behaviour was so
entrenched in the system that more than policy changes were
needed. The interviews made it quite clear that the issue was
not whether large scale enterprises were bad or good. Agree-
ment existed on the fact the large enterprises provided a
majority of the exports and employment in the manufacturing
sector and would make the greatest short run contribution for
stabilizing the economy.
The question became one of built-in biases and whether these
biases would prevent the "dynamic efficiency" which would be
important for longer run gains to be made. The consensus from
those interviewed was that more was needed than changes to
policy framework. The basis of industrial development--with
its foundation on individualistic behaviour, getting
incentives in exchange for favours or using favoured access as
a way to expand--was not changed and little evidence existed
that it would without specific interventions. The interviews
with Government, policy analysts and some industry officials
all indicated that the small scale enterprises were forced so
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far outside the system, that breaking into it, even with
targeted programs, would be extremely difficult.
Unlike the Bank, the CIDA ISS team concluded that rent
seeking behaviour had not ended with the policy changes and
still acted as a critical obstacle to effective development.
While changes on the policy level had theoretically allowed
larger access to opportunities, the bifurcation of the in-
dustrial sector and its overwhelming enclave nature meant that
old patterns were not fundamentally changed. Smaller firms
could not graduate to exporting, had little or no access to
formal credit and were not able to use Government programs
under current circumstances.
Just as the Bank assessment had conformed to its theoretical
foundation of "getting the prices right" so had the CIDA
analysis built on the more structuralist approach outlined in
the ISS strategy paper. A number of implicit assumptions were
evident throughout the process. First, all policy shifts
result in a change in the distribution of income and impact
different groups differently. Thus, while the policy changes
should allow better access to the system, CIDA did not accept
the approach that a firm should either adjust or die. A
middle ground should exist to help firms who have been
previously discriminated against.
Second, markets are not perfectly competitive and as a
result prices respond to costs not just demand. The adjust-
ment period in the early 1980s increased costs dramatically
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for some firms in terms of imported inputs and cost of credit.
Those facing the least flexible markets were the small scale
enterprises outside the system.
Third, the concern for equity as well as growth was inherent
in both CIDA's policy approach as well as the ISS industrial
approach. While growth was considered necessary, it was not
sufficient for sustained industrial development. The
distortions within the system were considered to be so great
that changes for the better at the sectoral or macroeconomic
level would not automatically result from improvements in
efficiency. Changes in equity also had to take place to
ensure that gains made in the industrial sector were more than
short term.
The decision by the CIDA ISS team that rent seeking had not
ended and that the CIDA program should target assistance
through the small and medium scale enterprises became the
basis for the assessment of issues.
b) Structural Adjustment with Equity
The CIDA Strategy document Sharing Our Future states that
CIDA's aid should aim at
helping economies cope with debt and reduced export earnings
and to improve economic management (while being sensitive to
the economic and social effects of this adjustment) (CIDA
1987).
What this idea of combining structural adjustment with equity
means in practical terms is being debated within CIDA with
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different interpretations coming from different sections of
the organization.
The relationship between efficiency and equity has been a
matter of controversy for a number of decades. The develop-
ment theories of the 1960s focused on generating efficiency in
industrial sectors as a vehicle for economic development with
the underlying assumption that income distribution would
trickle down through the system. The recognition in the late
1960s and 1970s that "trickle down" was either a myth or
exceedingly slow, triggered much of the literature and polic-
ies aimed at redistribution and basic needs. Whether the two
objectives were considered complementary or trade-offs dic-
tated how a country would undertake its programming. Sri
Lanka opted for focusing on equity, Korea for growth.11
The severe shocks of the late 1970s and the deepening of the
crisis situation in many countries temporarily suspended this
debate. Countries were having to undertake adjustment
programs, many times aimed purely at changes to the macro-
economic environment. Early World Bank Structural Adjustment
Lending (SALs) stressed these macro changes, with the assump-
tion that everyone would be better off within countries once
adjustment had taken place. The trade reforms, privatization
of public enterprises, reforms of the financial system, etc.
11 Cline (1975) contains a survey of the distribution
literature throughout the 1950s to 1970s which provides
background on this debate.
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would allow biases within the system to dissipate with the
long term result of greater efficiency, growth and therefore
improved income distribution.
The early reviews of the SALs and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) programs by the Bank and IMF downplayed the
negative impact of stabilization programs on income
distribution. Johnson and Salop (1980) acknowledged that
stabilization programs had distributional impacts but how
severe and negative these were depended upon how the domestic
policies were implemented. An internal World Bank review of
SALs in 1986 indicated that the quest for efficiency and the
improvement in equity were complementary policies in the long
run. While the adjustment programs appeared to have lowered
incomes in the short run, this impact would be less important
once the adjustment was complete.
As experience with the programs was gained, the social
impact of adjustment became an increasing issue, however.
Were the poor bearing the greatest burden of adjustment?
UNICEF in 1987 published a report which concluded that the
poor were being hurt and focused on how the impact of
adjustment could be lessened on the poorest groups (Cornia et
al 1987). A number of Bank sponsored reports also began to
emphasize that many of the poor had suffered severe problems
as a result of adjustment (Huang and Nicholas 1987). Even the
International Monetary Fund, in 1988, acknowledged for the
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first time that adjustment might exact a greater toll on the
poorest.
The recent SALs now require an analysis of social impacts
along with inclusion of a program element designed to temper
the short run impacts of adjustment on the poor. An internal
review of poverty and adjustment within the Bank divided the
poor into three groups: the "new poor" who were direct victims
of adjustment such as civil servants who had lost their jobs;
the low income and vulnerable groups who were hardest hit by
changes in food subsidies, etc. such as the landless, elderly,
etc; and extreme poor who were not that affected by adjustment
since they were too marginalized from the system. For the
first group, the Bank suggested that emergency public works
projects or similar programs be funded as a vehicle for
transitory assistance. For the low income and extreme poor,
the suggestion was that the recipient governments should focus
their support activities on improving the efficiency of
government operations to the poor and retargeting programs to
ensure that the poor are the true beneficiaries.
A confidential 1988 World Bank report on the poor in the
Philippines argued along similar lines. The report stressed
that 60% of the population were below the poverty line, with
real wages dropping constantly since 1960. Among the ASEAN
countries, the Philippines has the highest level of poverty.
The report also indicated that the situation had worsened in
the last ten years. The causes for the increasing poverty
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were seen to be unequal asset ownership, rapid population
growth and lack of jobs. The solutions which are suggested by
the Bank centre on three areas: spend more on roads,
irrigation and electrification; collect taxes more equitably;
and reduce the regression of social services which benefit
upper income groups.
This emphasis by the World Bank on combining adjustment with
equity was supported by CIDA's President and Policy Branch.
In internal documents CIDA has indicated that the two programs
being undertaken by the Bank--helping countries to incorporate
improvements in the efficiency of social expenditures and to
develop cost effective compensatory programs--were moving in
the right direction. Little distinction was made between the
definition of the Bank program and the goal which the CIDA
Strategy document outlined for structural adjustment with
equity. In fact, the documents indicated that increased
coordination should be pursued to ensure that the reforms were
being implemented by the Bank and supported by CIDA programs.
The Asia Branch, ISS and Bilateral staff interpreted the
issue of structural adjustment with equity in a different way
in the Philippine context, however. While agreeing that the
issue of distribution is important to deal with, they felt
that the Bank approach focused too heavily on the issue of
price again. The two prong Bank approach was seen as attempt-
ing to improve the efficiency of services to the poor while
assuming that the poorest would automatically benefit. Jobs
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are generated and better incomes follow. Health and education
programs are retargeted and access to the programs improves
for the poorest groups.
The CIDA staff analysis in the Philippines instead focused
on a different definition of adjustment with equity. The need
for macroeconomic stability, greater efficiency in the use of
funds, and better targeting of programs were not disputed.
The mission team members, however, also felt that other
obstacles within the system had to be dealt with directly if
gains were to be made in the Philippines in terms of income.
These obstacles included market malfunctions such as local
monopolies, lack of regional markets and rent seeking
behaviour; bottlenecks in the system such as lack of inputs;
institutional weaknesses such as failure of rural credit; and
the need to target particular groups such as youth and women.
In fact, the basic conclusion of the team was that improved
distribution was the key to sustained growth not vice versa.
The biases within the industrial sector in terms of income and
access were considered so strong that gains could not be made
on a sustained basis without changes in the social and
economic structure. The question became, how could this be
accomplished?
Issues
These two assumptions meant that the focus of the CIDA
industrial program would have to go beyond just providing
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support to any portion of the industrial sector. Instead, the
support was to be aimed at making changes in the industrial
structure. The conclusion of the analysis was that without
changes to the social and economic structure, the obstacles to
industrial development could not be overcome.
In a sense, this assessment conformed to the ideals of the
Government's "people powered development" and yet was removed
from the confines of both the desires of the Philippines
government and CIDA organizational pressures. While both of
these acted as inputs, the emphasis was clearly placed on
coming up with an "objective" analysis of what was and should
be happening in the Philippine industrial sector. The
conclusion did not call for support to social revolution but
for using these assumptions as the filter through which the
industrial problems were to be viewed.
Working from these two fundamental assumptions about the
Philippines, the modern sector team focused on four issue
areas which it thought should form the foundation of any CIDA
program in the industrial sector. The issues were important
in terms of what was identified and how the issue was defined.
In some cases, the CIDA assessment took a particular slant.
These four issues were intended to become the proximate aims
or strategies for the industrial interventions.
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a) Export Development
One of the most critical issues facing the Philippine
Government in 1986 was how to service the debt and still allow
gains to be made in terms of growth. The Government clearly
targeted the expansion of exports as the primary method of
bridging the foreign exchange gap. The emphasis since the
mid-1970s had been on the expansion of non-traditional ex-
ports. As mentioned previously, gains had been made in this
area during the 1970s. However, only a limited number of non-
traditional sectors had evolved--namely electronics, garments
and handicrafts.
The team agreed that to tackle the immediate balance of
payments problems in the short run would require a focus on
assisting existing non-traditional exporters. The acceptance
of an export oriented strategy was not even questioned from a
theoretical point of view. Instead, the questions revolved
around issues such as which type of exporter should be the
focus of any programming? Should foreign operations or
domestic firms be assisted? How important is the issue of
rehabilitation of production capacity? What kind of long term
export development should be targeted?
The interviews in the Philippines revealed two types of non-
traditional exporters. The first were the large sectors such
as garments and electronics. These two sectors produced the
majority of non-traditional exports (over US$2b in 1987). On
the whole, these sectors were considered world competitors,
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able to expand their markets with increasing world demand in
the short run. Their expansion capabilities were clear from
their performance in both 1986 and 1987 when production
increased rapidly. The firms in these sectors tended to be
large scale, import a high proportion of inputs and export a
vast majority of their output.
The second group of non-traditional exporters were found in
sectors such as furniture, leather and toys. Here the firms
were small scale with relatively modest export levels. The
expansion capabilities of the firms interviewed in these
sectors appeared to be severely limited in the short run. A
number of problems centred around the availability of inputs,
working capital, technology and marketing information. For
example, the footwear and leather industry as a whole
increased export sales by 70% in 1987. However, further gains
were severely limited by the lack of premium hides and skins
and imported chemicals for the tanning facilities. Toy
exports were booming but the identification of markets and the
competition within these markets were already slowing the pace
of possible production in 1987.
A number of factors clearly led to the CIDA analysis focus-
ing on the second group of exporters. First, the larger scale
garments and electronics were facing limited problems and
expressed little interest in having assistance from donor
sources. They felt that they would be able to expand if the
economy continued to turn around and no limits were placed on
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their ability to import the inputs into the production
process. The second group of small scale exporters were
facing a range of problems for which outside assistance could
help and would be accepted.
Second, the larger scale firms were many times joint ven-
tures or licensed agreements between Philippine firms and US
or Japanese firms. While an integral part of the CIDA program
would be promoting foreign investment in general--the aim was
to support Canadian firms--not US, European or Japanese--in
selling technology, joint ventures and other arrangements.
Third, the high proportion of imported inputs in the large
scale production processes were repeatedly cited in the
interviews as a problem. One industrial expert estimated that
the elasticity to import was greater than one and therefore as
these export industries expanded, their net impact on foreign
exchange was negative. The need to decrease import dependence
was repeatedly mentioned as one of the most critical barriers
to overcoming long term balance of payments stability.
The traditional cycle of import dependence appeared to have
been exacerbated by the recent contractions within the
economy. Many of the producers providing key products had
been forced out of the market by higher competition, high debt
costs, inability to adapt to a changing economic climate or
lack of access to inputs. This meant that the domestically
supplied goods had decreased.
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The ISS team concluded that in the long term, a
nontraditional export base had to be promoted which did not
rely as much on a high import content. Problems in
accomplishing this were apparent not just in terms of the lack
of domestic products which were suitable for providing inputs
but also the attitude towards sourcing locally. The industrial
sector focus on "importing first" was a major perception
problem. This attitude has increased over the years as larger
firms in particular have complained about the appropriateness
and quality of domestic inputs. They would rather import than
source locally.
While this perception may prove to be a longer term problem,
the desire to limit foreign exchange exposure may act as an
impetus to use local products in the short run. If local
products are used they would have to prove their worth in
terms of timing, quality control and flexibility in order to
maintain their market share.
In terms of rehabilitation and modernization of existing
facilities, the dramatic increase in investment between 1986
and 1988 had been aimed at making minor changes to production
in order to increase capacity utilization. The investment was
not aimed at buying new equipment or build new plants. The
interviews confirmed that the funds were being directed toward
increasing production quickly to take advantage of the
increased consumer demand. The need clearly existed, however,
for the investment to shift to modernizing existing production
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capacity on a much broader scale. Many of the firms
currently were using old technology and production process
which would have to be upgraded if the firms were to remain
competitive.
Three broad program strategies were drawn from this
analysis. First, existing exporting firms had to be used as a
vehicle to expand immediate production. SMEs were targeted
for programs such as credit provision, marketing assistance
and technology transfers to help them expand their production
in the short run. Strategies would have to be developed,
however, for diversifying the export base of the SMEs through
the promotion of non-traditional exports.
Second, programs designed to decrease import dependence were
critical for longer term viability of the economy. The
domestic producers could be helped with improving quality
control, evaluations of locally produced goods and their
markets, and support programs such as credit and technology
provision. Third, in some cases, SMEs needed upgrading of
existing production capabilities. Here a spectrum of support
could be provided such as evaluation of the production
process, product development, technology adaptation and inputs
into the production process.
b) Local Market Development
The foundation of the Philippine Government plans was the
decentralization of development out to rural areas. The
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depressed economic situation in many parts of the country had
severely limited employment opportunities and purchasing power
in the rural settings. This was partly the result of the role
the regional economies had played traditionally. They were
seen as suppliers of raw materials and purchasers of finished
goods. The manufacturing took place within the cities
(primarily Metro Manila) or within foreign markets. This
arrangement exacerbated the employment situation in the
regions where few non-agricultural jobs existed. The result
was migration to urban areas and severely constrained
purchasing power at the local level.
The CIDA Bilateral team in the field felt strongly that one
of the critical ways of increasing the chances for
democratization of the Philippines was through a system of
decentralized development. They strongly supported the
Government intention to decentralize operations to allow
approvals and support systems to move to the field. They also
supported efforts to build small local enterprises. In fact,
one of the interim programs undertaken by CIDA in 1986 was the
Negros Rehabilitation and Development Fund (NRDF). Aimed at
supporting both economic and social change in Negros, the
project gave funds to non-governmental organizations to
undertake agroindustry and microenterprise projects.
The success of this decentralization strategy in the long
run will hinge on the same factors which are currently block-
ing it. Increased purchasing power, provision of appropriate
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infrastructure and investment will all contribute to a
decentralized and strong local market system. These same
factors, however, could prove to be the obstacles to the
strategy.
The CIDA team looked at two long run approaches to this
problem of building an industrial base in rural areas. One
approach was to focus on agro-industry which builds on the
strength of the regions--their raw materials. Some industries
exist in this area already such as food processing. These
existing industries face a wide range of problems. For
example, many of the food processing plants have primitive
equipment, limited resources and inadequate storage
facilities. The plants which are the most successful are
those which are large scale and able to reach economies of
scale.
The potential for agroindustry appears to be high. The raw
materials, labour and interest exist in the regions. The
problems with implementation break down into two groups,
however. The first relates to capital and technology. The
collapse of the rural banking system and the traditional
biases against rural areas means that working and investment
capital are extremely limited in the rural setting. As well,
the shortage of technology means that any enterprise would
have to obtain technology either from abroad or domestically
(i.e. Manila).
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The second problem is in some ways more difficult to over-
come. While the pool of unskilled workers is large in the
rural areas, many times the workers need training before they
can make a transition to any type of non-farm employment. For
example in Negros, the sugar workers who were displaced by the
collapse in sugar prices found it extremely difficult to make
a switch to employment in manufacturing. The hacienda system
which operated on the plantations reinforced feudal work
patterns and skill limitations, thereby decreasing the ability
to function outside of the plantation setting.
The other focus for new engines of growth at the decentral-
ized level is building other types of industries which are
needed by the local market. This could include sectors such
as hand tool industries (which currently do not exist), metal
working, parts for electrical appliances or furniture. A wide
spectrum of people--from a representative of the European
Chamber of Commerce to the Governor of Negros--mentioned the
need to develop basic support industries in the regions. The
feeling was that without some support system, the
decentralization could never take place.
The purpose of this approach would be to bring local
producers into the mainstream of the economy. To build local
markets requires not only increasing access to the domestic
economy for locally produced goods but also gaining access to
end user markets. The local producers must be able to build
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strong local expertise and competitive products while securing
a recognized market share.
The biases in the financial sector have continued despite
high liquidity. Only a limited number of clients are given
credit through formal credit channels (some estimates place
the number of firms with access to commercial funds at
approximately 100). The clients who can receive credit are
those with good credit ratings and substantial collateral.
Without real estate, in particular, for collateral,
entrepreneurs are constrained in their development and rely on
family and informal credit markets.
This was recently confirmed by an Asian Development Bank
study of small and medium enterprises in food processing,
garments and metalworking (Tecson et al. 1988). The SMEs
rarely had access to long term funding and used short term
loans to finance investment. An executive of a local
Philippine Bank noted that anyone needing less than 500,000
Pesos in working capital had to resort to usurers or their
families.
The conclusion of the team was that the possibilities of
promoting local market development were contingent on
developing new techniques for rural industrialization and
credit. Training and technical assistance were needed to
support entrepreneurship within SMES. Extension credit
programs were needed to reach firms currently relying on the
informal credit market. Short term support in terms of
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technology, training, production assistance and marketing was
needed to help SMEs move into areas currently not serviced
within the domestic market.
c) Linkage Development
The economic system within the Philippines has few linkages
between the local and export markets, between sectors and
between firms. This lack of linkages has prevented self-
sustaining development and increased import dependence, non-
graduation of industries and enclave developments.
There is no doubt that building linkages within the economy
is critical for supporting both export and local market
development. The inability of most firms to move within the
system--either shifting sectors or graduating to higher levels
of production or exports--is one reason why sustainability of
the recovery is hard to achieve in the short run. If linkages
were more extensive, not only would imports decrease but the
economy could become more dynamic.
The lack of linkages has its roots in the policies described
in Chapter 3. The trade policies pursued by the Marcos
Government caused distortions in both the domestic industries
and the export industries. The domestic were many times
protected to the point of not having any reason for improving
efficiency or attempting to move to the export sphere. The
export industries, on the other hand, were kept as enclave
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developments with few attempts made to source locally or build
connections with the domestic market.
As a result, graduation within the system from a local
market to regional to international is rare. Few firms have
followed the import substitution then export path. Trying to
take a small or medium sized firm who currently deals with the
local market to the international market would require
extensive support systems. Changes would have to be made in
terms of quality control, marketing, training, distribution
channels and scale of production.
The question arose of how to deal with this linkage problem.
One approach was advocated by those who thought that changes
to the trade policy would remove many of these biases. The
World Bank program documents indicated that because of the
enclave character of the industrial sector, the liberalization
which was undertaken between 1983 and 1987 initially impacted
only a small segment of the firms. In the long term, with the
turn around in domestic demand and upgraded technology, the
Bank projected that the domestic industries would begin to
become more efficient and build linkages.
The CIDA team decided that this analysis might be true in
the very long term, but some interventions would have to be
undertaken at the firm level to overcome obstacles in the
shorter run. One of the effects of the liberalization to date
was to open the market to higher competition suddenly. Some
of the business organizations complained that this
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liberalization was killing their sector. While part of these
complaints were undoubtedly motivated by a desire not to have
to compete, some evidence was also presented that indicated
that smaller producers who were supplying to the domestic
market had been eliminated with the increased competition.
They were unable to cope with foreign products at the same
time as they were having to restructure loans or find new
suppliers for goods.
One area to promote linkages which was mentioned repeatedly
was subcontracting. Programs have been established by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, private sector groups as well
as non-profit organizations to match large, medium and small
scale firms. Large firms are interested in subcontracting
currently since it allows them to increase production in the
short run, taking advantage of increased market demand while
decreasing their risk. The individuals or small firms are
undertaking the subcontracted work since it gives them easy
access and work without extensive marketing systems.
While subcontracting is a partial solution to linkages, in
the short run, the CIDA team felt that the long run dictated
an expansion of this relationship. If markets stabilized, the
larger firms would expand their capacity and decrease the
demand for subcontracted work. If small firms relied only on
subcontracted arrangements, demand for their services might
fluctuate considerably. In either case, the linkages were
temporary.
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What needed to be built were longer term relationships
between firms. The ability to effectively achieve this was
dependent upon small and medium enterprises moving beyond
subcontracting to the development of parts or semi-finished
goods which sold to an end-user market. Decreasing import
dependence feeds into this idea along with building local
market capabilities. The local producers must be able to
build strong local expertise and competitive products while
securing a recognized market share. The CIDA ISS group
thought that parts of this process could be supported through
CIDA programs.
d) Employment and Livelihood
The fourth issue identified by CIDA for action was a more
direct approach to dealing with employment generation and
increasing income. While the previous issues tried to focus
on ensuring that more opportunities existed within the system
for employment, access, etc., the team felt that the issue of
deteriorating incomes should also be focused on separately.
The World Bank internal report indicated the extent to which
incomes within the Philippines had deteriorated since the
early 1970s. Even with growth rates of over 5% per year, the
Bank projected that the income levels within the Philippines
would not be restored before the turn of the century. The
fact that a majority of the population lived below the poverty
171
line meant that most of these individuals were very difficult
to reach by programs.
While the other three issues dealt with bringing about
changes in the production relationships within the country,
they also concentrated on the more formal production units.
Targeting small scale enterprises was seen as a way to assist
in eliminating some of the barriers to their active
participation in the industrial sector and presumably increase
the number of jobs generated. It was not necessarily assumed
to reach the poorest people.
The need existed to generate employment in the short run and
income distribution in the long run. The use of specific
targeting for microenterprises and community based activities
was seen to accomplish this. A number of the community based
projects which were visited indicated the potential for
generating income on a community basis. The projects stressed
that by providing minimal support facilities, a poor community
could begin to produce basic hand made goods (such as toys).
The CIDA ISS team decided that a micro/community based
component of the program was necessary to more directly attack
the issue of livelihood.
Adoption of the Approach
The purpose of the modern sector missions was to assess the
economic and industrial situation within the Philippines and
develop an "objective" view on the most critical questions
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facing industries. The issues identified within this context
were: the promotion of non-traditional exports as a way to
assist with balance of payments problems; the need to increase
domestic production; the fragmentation of the links between
firms and sectors; and the need to improve livelihood within
the country.
The underlying objective of addressing these issues was the
desire to support "growth with equity". The case was made
that improved distribution was the key to sustained growth not
vice versa. The biases within the industrial sector in terms
of income and access were so strong that gains could not be
made without changes in the social and economic structure.
Generation of foreign exchange earnings through export
development, government pump priming, revival of the
industrial sector, local and foreign investment in domestic
and export production and increased productivity of the
agricultural sector were not sufficient to ensure sustained
growth in the long run. Equitable distribution of income was
essential. By raising purchasing power, the increased
domestic demand would provide the basis for sustained and
equitable growth.
The findings of the modern sector team were quickly adopted
by the Bilateral group not just as the foundation for the
industrial program but for the Philippines program as a whole.
By saying that distribution was the key to growth and that
increased equity was a prerequisite for full recovery of the
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economy, the Bilateral group saw that a stronger case could be
made for why CIDA programming should not just rely on balance
of payments support. While this BOP support would help in
the short run, it would not support the longer term objectives
of Canada in ensuring sustained recovery and democratization.
In essence, the approach provided a rationale for what the
Bilateral staff wanted to support--namely economic and social
changes which allowed a sustained and equitable development
within the country. Because it provided the rationale and
analysis, the modern sector report was expanded into a
document on structural adjustment which set out the overall
objectives of CIDA in the Philippines. The differences
between the CIDA and the World Bank approaches to structural
adjustment were clearly outlined as underlying assumptions
along with the distribution question.
The adoption by the Bilateral staff of the ISS analysis
meant that the country program review (CPR) which had to be
completed would build on this distribution/equity theme.
While the CPR process began with this approach, changes within
CIDA demanded that these issues or goals be reoriented and in
some cases totally abandoned. This process of change is
addressed in the next chapter along with underlying problems
which the ISS approach to industrial development would have
faced regardless of organizational changes.
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V. REFORMULATING POLICY
When CIDA's Industrial Services Section (ISS) began its
issues formulation process in the Philippines in 1986, it was
operating within a policy framework and organizational context
which had evolved since 1980. As discussed in the previous
chapter, both of these elements reinforced an independent role
for the ISS in program formulation. Despite its small size
within CIDA, the ISS had control over program design at the
country level and had developed the theoretical framework for
addressing industrial projects.
This environment allowed the ISS to look at the problems
facing the Philippines industrial sector from an objective
position. The intention was to identify the issues and
strategies which should form the foundation of any CIDA in-
dustrial programming. Interviews in the Philippines would
provide a basic understanding of the industrial process. The
wide spectrum of issues which this would generate would then
have to be sifted through based on a number of inputs. This
sifting process was to draw on the program priorities stated
in the CIDA Strategy Sharing Our Future, the stated plan and
goals of the Government of the Philippines, an assessment of
Canadian private sector capabilities in terms of program
delivery and the activities of other donors.
In reality the most critical elements in determining the
approach to be taken to modern sector development were the
information gleaned from the interviews held in the Philip-
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pines and the underlying objectives and themes of the ISS
approach to industrial development as outlined in the
Enterprise Development Issues Paper. In a sense, the assess-
ment of issues was removed from the confines of both the
desires of the Philippine Government and CIDA organizational
pressures. While both of these acted as inputs, the emphasis
was clearly placed on independently identifying what was and
should be happening in the industrial sector.
The resulting analysis relied heavily on two assumptions
about the social and economic order. The first was that rent
seeking behaviour was so entrenched in the Philippine in-
dustrial structure that policy changes such as trade
liberalization would not eliminate it. Attempts by the
Government of the Philippines to promote dynamic efficiency
could not be successful until the balance of power shifted out
of the hands of a small group of industrialists who were able
to control programs and markets. The CIDA ISS group felt a
way to deal with this was the specific targeting of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) to allow them access to credit,
Government programs or even the ability to graduate to
exporting.
The second assumption involved equity and the need for
social change. The CIDA ISS team analysis was based on the
assumption that improved income distribution was the key to
sustained growth not vice versa. Not only did this go against
the trickle down approach to development but it also meant
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that the obstacles within the system which were currently
preventing a broader distribution of benefits had to be
directly assaulted. The economic rationale for this was based
on arguments about depressed purchasing power and underutil-
ized capacity in labour; the social rationale on issues of
empowerment and changing access to the decision making
process.
Compared to the three largest donors in the Philippines--the
World Bank, US Agency for International Development (US AID)
and Japan--these assumptions were a rather radical assessment
of the need for social and economic change. 1 The assessment
did not differ a great deal from the "people power" objectives
of the Aquino Government. The willingness of the Bilateral
group to accept the ISS analysis was based on their agreement
with these basic premises. on a political level, some CIDA
staff were concerned that President Aquino may not be able to
overcome many of the obstacles which blocked implementation of
social change within the country. They saw her moving towards
the right, supporting the oligopolistic tendencies and
ownership patterns. The need then was to support the efforts
1 The World Bank and US AID have been the dominant forces
within the Philippine donor community for decades and feel that
they set the pace for other donors to follow. The recent
attempts to put in place a mini-Marshall Plan within the
Philippines was started by the US and developed by Japan and the
World Bank. The intention was to increase aid from all donors
and increase control by the Bank over where this aid was
targeted within the country.
177
of broadening the base of power even if this meant working
outside of the Government programs.
Attacking the roots of these two problems--rent seeking
behaviour and need for improved equity--became the ultimate
goals of the modern sector program. The proximate goals or
solutions to these problems were decidedly more mainstream in
appearance2 . Four proximate objectives were identified as the
basis for CIDA's industrial programming:
* to promote development and diversification of non-
traditional exports, reduce import dependence of
manufactured exports and rehabilitate existing produc-
tion capacity of selected sectors.
* to promote decentralized local market development
through development of new engines of growth in rural
areas and better private sector access to competitively
priced credit and finance.
* to promote intrasectoral linkages between small, medium
and large firms, develop backward and forward linkages
and expand market and distribution linkages.
* to broaden access to income and employment through
micro and small scale enterprise development and com-
munity based schemes.
These four objectives represented a fair assessment of the
problems which needed to be addressed in the Philippine in-
dustrial sector. The feedback which the team received through
both formal and informal channels confirmed this. Formal
meetings were held with four groups--academics, government
2 The terms proximate and ultimate goals are used here to
distinguish between the two levels of CIDA objectives which are
used in the programming process. The proximate goals are the
direct objectives of a project which have a direct effect on
production, efficiency, etc. The ultimate goals are what is
expected to come out of the outputs or proximate goals.
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representatives, industry and bankers--within the Philippines
to obtain their impression of the analysis and how they would
prioritize actions for CIDA.
The general response was positive although each group
focused on a particular aspect as the most important. For the
academics the issue of building linkages was seen as the only
way to break the current patterns of production. For the
Government the promotion of domestic markets and the
generation of foreign exchange through exports were seen as
important. Industry representatives (mainly from small and
medium enterprises and industries outside of the "system")
felt that credit and assistance with marketing to graduate to
exports were their most critical problems. Finally, the
bankers saw the generation of foreign exchange and the
decrease in import dependence as the most critical for the
economy in the long term since this would stave off balance of
payments problems.
Where this analysis led the CIDA team in terms of actual
programs to be undertaken was a more difficult question.
While the proximate objectives appeared straightforward, to
successfully meet the ultimate objectives would take quite
dramatic changes to the current industrial system. It would
also take a narrowing of focus given the limited funding which
would be available for enterprise development from CIDA (less
than Cdn$30 million). Should the program focus on a limited
number of sectors? Or concentrate geographically? Should one
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objective be given priority and all the programming aimed at
that? Should the assessment be based on where the most impact
can be made? Or where the greatest need was as agreed to by
Canada and the Philippines?
How this narrowing took place became an important question.
While the ISS group laid out a methodology to attack this,
changes within CIDA put a hold on any further programming. The
impact of the CIDA policy debate during 1986 and 1987 was
beginning to be felt in terms of the priorities for
programming. The relationships within CIDA were changing,
including a fundamental change in the role of the professional
services groups. The translation of the issues analysis into
program design was impacted by a series of policy and
organizational changes which fundamentally changed the
programming possibilities -- forcing parts of the analysis to
be dropped while others to be taken up.
Changing the Policy Framework
a) Striving for Equity - Is This An Appropriate Goal?
When CIDA moved to a country focus in the early 1980s, the
Bilateral desks became responsible for developing the country
program priorities. These were developed based on discussions
with the recipient country and an assessment by the Bilateral
staff of where the most useful interventions could take place.
The desk staff had a high degree of discretion over how the
program was shaped and implemented. Since there was little or
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no policy guidance within CIDA,3 the desks basically decided
their own agendas and worked within the CIDA approval process
to make them operational.
Within this framework, the different sector programs were
also undertaken fairly independently. The Industrial Services
Section would be asked by the Bilateral desk to develop a
sector program. The ISS did an assessment of industrial
issues within a country which was then discussed with the
Bilateral desk. The Bilateral goals for the overall program
were considered an input into the industrial program but were
not a determinant of the program. While ISS had to take into
account the Bilateral concerns, the issues and technical
considerations basically drove the sectoral programming. The
primary constraint was the need to conform to operational
guidelines such as the tied aid requirements or budgetary
restrictions.
The CIDA operation basically became a series of Bilateral
desks that generated programming with the assistance of the
professional services group. Each desk had a high degree of
flexibility in terms of what they could tackle and there was
little or no attempt at coordination between them. This
3 The official policy document which guided CIDA activities
until 1987 was the 1975 Strategy outlined in Chapter 2. The
1975 approach was basically overtaken by events in the late
1970s, and as a result CIDA operated from the mid 1970s to mid
1980s without a formal or relevant policy orientation. The
result was an ad hoc approach, which became more ad hoc with the
move to Bilateral desks.
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system was changed with the CIDA policy review which took
place between 1986 and 1988.4 While a high degree of
discretion continued, the relationships within the system
changed quickly.
The CIDA policy document Sharing Our Future (SOF) outlined
specific new priorities for CIDA programming which revolved
around issues such as human resource development, poverty
alleviation, women in development and environmental concerns
(CIDA 1987). The Parliamentary process which generated the
basics of this report stressed the need for CIDA to have a
coherent approach to programming--something which had not been
the case for more than a decade. The themes of the SOF were
to become the underlying basis for all CIDA programming.
To ensure that the new priorities would become an integral
part of the Bilateral programming, relationships within CIDA
were reversed. The Bilateral desks were now required to
produce country program reviews (CPRs) which specifically
integrated the CIDA themes into the approach being taken
within a particular country. While the application could vary
by country, the approach had to specify how it was addressing
the "cross cutting themes" through its programming. These
documents and program funds were subject to approval by the
President ' s Committee.
4 The details of the Parliamentary Committees, Government
response and CIDA's program document Sharing Our Future are
outlined in Chapter 2 along with the rationale for their
adoption.
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As can be expected, much of the initial discussion within
the Bilateral desks focused on how to integrate the new
priorities while still maintaining the same programs as
before. As with most bureaucracies, CIDA Bilateral desks were
difficult to reorient towards a new approach. This problem
was exacerbated by the inability of anyone within CIDA's
policy groups to actually explain what the new focus meant.
What exactly was human resource development (HRD) in this
context? Was HRD the basis for every project or just one
component? Was the emphasis on integration of women into the
process as strong as the drive for poverty alleviation? How
were these prioritized? Could each desk come up with its own
definition as long as it provided a rationale? Answers to
these questions from CIDA management were not forthcoming and
the Bilateral desks began to formulate their own definitions
of CIDA's policy.
The one thing which did become clear from the process was
that the relationships within CIDA were changing on two
levels. First the relationship between the professional
services groups such as ISS and the Bilateral desks were being
reversed, with programming placed squarely on the Bilateral
staff. The second change was in the relationship between the
Bilateral desks and the Branch. The Branch increased its
power over the desks and imposed consistent criteria for the
CPRs. Each of these changes were critical to the ISS modern
sector program and are covered in turn.
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The move to set up a matrix type organization within CIDA in
the early 1980s was an attempt to develop a flexible response
to a changing environment.5 By having Bilateral generalists
work with sector specific specialists, the intended result was
programs which were more responsive to the developing
country's needs. The Bilateral desk officers would deal with
coordination, overall program framework and delivery of the
programs, while the professionals would provide the specific
expertise needed to make program and project recommendations.
The decision making would be mutual.
As the organizational arrangement evolved, the professional
took on more of the actual programming and decision making
functions. Since they were able to provide a "rational"
approach to programming which appeared to decrease the
uncertainty both within CIDA and at the recipient country
level, they also gained in power and influence within the
organization. Few Bilateral desk officers felt able or had
the time to refute the technical assessments and as a result
deferred decisions to the professionals.
With the changes in mid 1980s, the clear message to the
Bilateral desks from CIDA management was that all programming
would have to conform to the approach outlined in the CPR.
This meant that the professional services groups such as the
5 The factors which contributed to this unstable
environment are covered in Chapter 2 while the specifics of the
matrix arrangement are explained in Chapter 4.
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Industrial Services Section would now have to produce sectoral
programming which fit with both the CPR and the overall CIDA
themes. Whereas previously, the professional services groups
actually did the sectoral programming based on their
perception of sectoral needs, now the professionals were only
providing technical information on how the sectoral issues
could be addressed within the context of the CPR. While the
change might appear subtle, in fact, it basically reversed the
previous process.6
These changes basically halted the ISS program development
for the Philippines. The Bilateral desk indicated that before
the modern sector interventions could be formulated, the CPR
had to be completed. The acceptance by the Bilateral desk of
the basic approach being taken to the modern sector, however,
initially indicated that the issues would not have to change
significantly. The Bilateral desk would simply convert the
aims identified by the ISS group into the new framework. This
became increasingly difficult, however, after the next set of
changes took hold within CIDA.
With the movement of CIDA management towards unifying the
CIDA programs, more responsibility was given to the Branches
6 CIDA management also began to restructure the
Professional Services Group to ensure that this new role was
being followed. Technical staff were no longer supposed to be
undertaking programming, but were only supposed to be providing
advise to the Bilateral desks. Directives to this effect began
to be put forward causing a loss of morale within the technical
groups.
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for ensuring that the new policies were implemented. Asia
Branch decided that the best way to implement this was by
imposing a set of firm program criteria on each of the
Bilateral desks. The criteria set out the program management
choices which would have to be consistent across the Asia
country desks.
The desire of the Branch to have common CPRs, objectives and
policy options was motivated by two factors. The first reason
was basically management. The changes happening within CIDA
would obviously be easier to manage if each Bilateral desk had
to follow specific criteria. The Branch could better follow
its mandate of ensuring application of the CIDA policy if it
generated some uniform criteria for the desk programs.
The second reason was more important, however. Part of the
changes in CIDA organization was decentralization of one-
quarter of the staff to the field from Ottawa. Bilateral
program staff were being shifted to the Post in an attempt to
speed up the decision making process and the delivery of aid.
Once this decentralization took place, the field staff would
be able to approve projects and control program administration
away from Ottawa. This decentralization meant that if the
patterns of independence at the Bilateral desk level
7 The decision to decentralize was part of the results of
the Government aid review. Decentralization was started almost
immediately in 1988. Ironically, this expensive operation was
being undertaken at the same time that the Government of Canada
cut the aid budget by 25% in 1989.
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continued, the Branch would have little control over the field
operations and little ability to impose any consistency across
the region. The Branch opted instead to consolidate its
control over the operations of the desks before they were
transferred to the field. The development of common cpr
frameworks, goals and policy options meant that each program
would have to conform to Asia Branch policy even after the
program was operational.
The framework which Asia Branch developed was a combination
of the priorities of the CIDA policy document and its own
agenda for the Asia region. It was clearly not an issues
oriented approach which had been the driving force behind the
previous programming of both the Bilateral desks and the ISS.
The underlying assumption of the Branch was that the
traditional relations between Canada and Asia were changing.8
Asian countries no longer wanted or needed traditional
development assistance. Canada had to compete for projects in
the region. To increase its competitive position CIDA had to
build strong working relationships within the region between
Canadians and Asians (CIDA, Asia Branch 1988).
The internal documents of the Branch stressed the idea of
mutuality and even indicated that in a short time Canada would
need Asia more than the reverse. In discussions with Asia
Branch staff, the emphasis from the Branch was increasingly
8 For a more detailed discussion of the Asia Branch
strategy and its development refer to Chapter 2.
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focused on what the long run relations with each country would
be. Programs had to take into account long term objectives
such as trade relations, joint business ventures and
institutional linkages. This pattern of programming was seen
in the programs for China, Thailand and Indonesia.
Two goals emerged from this analysis which were to form the
basis of all bilateral programs within Asia:
* To strengthen the capacity of key public and private
organizations in Asia to develop the managerial and
technical expertise to implement policies and programs
consistent with national development objectives.
* To build linkages between Canadian and Asian
institutions which will foster sustainable, long term
relationships consistent with Asian development
objectives and Canada's longer term interests in the
Asia-Pacific region. (Asia Branch internal memos)
To accomplish these goals two priorities were set for
countries like the Philippines. The first was human resource
development (the CIDA overall strategy) which was aimed at
institution building, management training and the fostering of
linkages between Canadian and Asian businesses, non-
governmental organizations and the academic community. The
second was industrial programs aimed at providing direct
assistance at the policy and program level to technology
transfers, joint ventures and industrial development.
How closely the Bilateral desks had to follow these
priorities and goals became an increasing issue as the
Philippines desk prepared its draft CPR. The group realized
that it had to conform to the Branch approach but still wanted
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to ensure that the goals of the program continued to address
the question of increasing equity within the Philippines.
Goals were drafted which added terms like "support to
structural adjustment" or "sustainable, equitable and
increasingly self-reliant" development to the Branch goals.
All of these were rejected by the Branch.
The Branch position was that any goals of the program which
addressed issues such as equity were inappropriate. To ensure
that the Bilateral program actually addressed the issues such
as human resource development, the purpose of the programs
could not be "striving for equity" or "changes to the economic
structure" of a country but had to be capacity building in
institutions or building linkages.
The changed roles between ISS and the Bilateral desks and
shift in relationship between the Bilateral desk and the
Branch staff impacted the issues oriented approach of the ISS
sectoral programming quite dramatically. While the analysis
done by the ISS was not refuted, the focus of the program
could no longer be on changing the social and economic
structure of the industrial sector. Whereas before, the ISS
could undertake its structuralist analysis of issues with
little interference, now the parameters of what could be
addressed were more closely defined by Asia Branch. Issues
were no longer important; partnerships were.
What this meant to the ISS group was that the goals of the
industrial approach had to change. While equity might be the
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ultimate rationale behind what was being done, it could no
longer be the driving force. The emphasis of the modern
sector program--and the basis on which it would be evaluated--
would now have to be on institution building and developing
linkages between Canada and the Philippines. The industrial
program had a new set of goals which were not issue driven and
a new process to follow within the organization.
b) Targeting Institutions versus Groups
One of the foundations of the ISS analysis was the
assumption that to have an effective program, CIDA had to
somehow reach enterprises which were currently operating
outside the mainstream of the Philippine industrial sector.
The reasoning relied on the assumption that the skewed
character of the Philippines industrial sector meant that the
majority of firms (primarily small and medium enterprises)
were effectively shut off from credit, export opportunities,
technology and access to Government programs. The strategies
which were developed by the ISS team aimed at breaking down
these barriers by increasing access of these groups to
opportunities within the economy.
To do this, the ISS team assumed that specific firms or
groups would be targeted for assistance--as is typical of most
aid programs. Programming would aim at providing support in
areas such as marketing, quality control, access to credit,
development of new export areas, support to new domestic
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industries, and entrepreneurship development. These support
programs would be specifically targeted by sector and firm to
support the goals of linkage development, employment
generation and improved access.
The Asia Branch directives changed this situation, however.
The Branch interpreted the directive from CIDA management to
focus on human resource development (HRD) in a narrow way.
Strengthening human resources became specifically
institutional strengthening--or the process of improving the
ability of institutions to make effective use of human and
financial resources.9 This meant that the primary
interventions within Asia Branch had to aim at improving the
capacity within the developing country for implementing
policies and programs of target institutions.
With this as the goal, the Branch further restricted the
program options for the ISS group. Not only were the issues
of equity and sustained development no longer appropriate for
the industrial program, but the purpose of the program was to
build and strengthen institutions. The industrial program now
had to target institutions--such as industrial associations,
government agencies or non-governmental organizations--not end
user groups.
While Asia Branch did not specifically use this
definition, it is inherent in the goals presented in the last
section. This definition of institutional development comes
from Israel (1987).
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This interpretation of the CIDA requirement for a human
resource development approach fit with the Branch objectives
of building linkages between Canadian and Asian groups. These
interventions were seen to promote not only the long term
prospects of Canadians in the region but also to support what
the Branch saw as a shift in demand at the country level.
Canada's comparative advantage lie in areas such as training,
technology transfers and assistance with planning. The
developmental priority was self-reliance of the region.
The World Bank Task Force on Concessional Flows stressed
that one way of developing self-reliant behaviour at the
country level was to strengthen the technical assistance and
institutional programs of donors. This self-reliance had
three dimensions:
to determine knowledge needs that can not adequately be
met domestically; to develop the ability to undertake
domestic research, problem solving and policy
formulation; and to sustain these capacities (Cassen
and Associates 1986)
The definition which Asia Branch followed fit with this
interpretation. The objective appeared to be improving the
ability of institutions to make effective use of human and
financial resources. The Task Force saw the possibility of
"intellectual leadership" for the institution building coming
from the World Bank with other groups--such as bilateral
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agencies--executing these programs. This niche was agreed to
by Asia Branch and the overall CIDA management.10
The shift to institutional strengthening presented a whole
series of obstacles for the ISS industrial programming in the
Philippines. The first problem was CIDA's lack of experience
in institutional strengthening. As with most donors,
strengthening institutions had been a small part of
programming--usually in the context of a broader project. For
example, it has been a part of some large scale infrastructure
projects where the national highway or port agency needed
assistance with improving efficiency or training.
Strengthening or assisting the institution had rarely been
the ultimate aim of a program, however. This meant that
little experience or lessons had been gained about these
projects. In addition, an evaluation of 62 projects by CIDA
which contained some institutional strengthening showed a
spotty track record. Tle evaluation indicated that while 60%
of the projects had resulted in increased managerial
capabilities, over 60% had not enabled the institution to
become significantly more self-reliant (CIDA n.d.).
The difficulty of undertaking institutional strengthening
projects even within the context of other programming has been
reaffirmed by recent studies. Israel (1987) found that the
10 In fact, one of the motivating factors behind the
Government focus on human resource development was the fact that
this niche fit with not only the needs in the field but also the
roles being advocated within the donor community.
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more specific the objectives of the institutional programming
were, the higher the rate of success in its implementation.
Institutional programs aimed at transferring technology to a
particular industry were more effective than those aimed at
training workers in the operation of the equipment. The less
tangible the goals for the institution, the more likely it
would meet with problems in implementation.
This meant that using institutions to improve the marketing
skills of small scale enterprises (with this as the objective
of the exercise) would have a much higher success rate than
trying to use institutional development to increase linkages
or domestic production. In fact, pursuing an objective of
increasing linkages would set an institutional project into
another dilemma which Israel describes as competition
surrogates.
Competitive pressures exist both within the institution and
from outside which have a positive or negative impact on the
efficiency of the institution's operations. If the pressures
are not homogeneous then the institution becomes fragmented or
falls into the hands of elites (Israel 1987). Pursuing a goal
such as increasing linkages would certainly generate conflict-
ing pressures within the Philippines from those who wanted
reform and those with a vested interest in the status quo. In
fact institutions in the Philippines have been notoriously
open to "competitive pressures".
194
The Philippines is a country of organizations. For example,
over 10,000 NGOs operate at the community and national levels.
Assessing them becomes extremely difficult since they many
times have overlapping purposes and membership. The CIDA NGO
program has been plagued by this problem resulting in the fact
that programming must be aimed at a number of different NGO
groups and coalitions. By trying to satisfy a number of
groups, CIDA has still been criticized by both the left and
right. The Canadian NGOs feel that some of the Philippine
groups are too far right and not supporting social change
within the country. The Philippine Government, on the other
hand, feels that some of the Canadian support has gone to NGOs
who are too far left and are attempting to undermine the
government programs.
Knowing which formal groups to support in the Philippines is
very difficult since membership and control change quickly.
Some of the informal interviews conducted focused on how to
ensure that the institutions which are developed or supported
are not immediately infiltrated by other groups seeking funds.
This has been a chronic problem with other donors and is a
variation on the "rent seeking" theme. The Dutch aid program
while targeting NGOs ended up supporting the communist
movement. The World Bank has been taken in by the industrial
elite a number of times in the past when they have put in
place programs which have funded capital flight and
inefficient industries.
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The conclusion of the Israel study along with other studies
on institution building is that donor programs must aim at
more clearly defining their objectives, making them as
specific as possible. Industrial projects have been some of
the most successful but their success has been generated by
the "hard" services which the institutions are delivering--
i.e. science based technology, production process review, etc
(Cassen and Associates 1986). "Soft" services or objectives
even in the industrial sector have met with limited success.
Even by defining the objectives of the CIDA modern sector
program as the provision of credit, technical assistance or
training, the underlying problems with institutional
strengthening can not be eliminated, however. Some of the
current programs undertaken in the Philippines aimed at small
and medium scale enterprises have used existing institutions
as delivery agents. The most common programs are intended to
supply credit at various stages to SMEs from pre-investment to
financing working capital.
An evaluation of these programs by the Asian Development
Bank (Tecson et al 1988) indicated that all these programs
were begun to reduce the biases in the credit system against
SMEs. The conclusion, however, was that only the largest
small and medium scale enterprises were impacted by the
borrowing. Most of the programs still relied on collateral,
gave loans of at least 500,000 Pesos and were concentrated in
Manila.
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One of the principal reasons for not reaching their target
groups was the choice of conduit institutions to deliver the
programs. Most programs worked through the existing credit
system either using Government financial intermediaries or
commercial banks. The same biases operated under these
programs as under normal commercial lending. In addition, the
requirements of most programs in terms of administration on
the part of both the lender and the borrower, prohibited both
sides from actively pursuing the funding.
According to internal World Bank reviews, these have been
the major reasons why the World Bank Small Medium Industries
(SMI IV) program has met with little demand despite changes in
the price--ie. spread to banks. Administered by the
Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF), the program uses
commercial banks as the conduit for loans. Despite increases
in the spread, few small and medium industries have expressed
interest in the program and few banks are willing to relax
their stringent lending requirements.
Non-financial institutions have been slightly more
successful in spreading the benefits to small and medium
enterprises, although the gains have been limited. The
Technology and Livelihood Resource Centre (TLRC) administers
credit programs for a number of groups including the Japanese
aid program. The programs which aim at SMEs have slightly
more liberal lending requirements in terms of collateral and
have lower interest rates. Many of its clients are the
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"progressive" SMEs which the HIID team said should be targeted
for assistance (HIID 1987). While impacting a broader group,
the TLRC program rarely approves loans under 1 million pesos.
Using groups like the TLRC would be difficult, however, since
most are already overextended (Tecson et al 1988).
Programs also exist in areas such as export marketing and
technical assistance. Here the current institutions which
deliver these programs are plagued by a number of problems:
lack of coordination which results in duplication; limited
skills of those trying to deliver the programs; and the
failure of programs to seek out SMEs. Most programs are used
by the same group of companies.
If CIDA used the existing institutions and programs for
channelling funds, then programs may be delivered, but some
question would arise as to whether the ultimate goals of the
program would be achieved--i.e. overcoming the biases within
the system. Looking at alternative institutions is not
totally the answer either. Many of the institutions which
have been assessed by ISS as possible target institutions
focus on enterprise development as a livelihood vehicle only--
not as a viable economic enterprise. The programs which these
institutions deliver are, therefore, aimed at social
objectives not at allowing the enterprises to become
integrated into the economy. The amount of CIDA funding would
probably not be large enough to permanently change the
institution's mode of operation.
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The insistence of the Branch that the program be based on
institutional strengthening, therefore, poses special problems
in terms of not only implementation but any hope of
undertaking a more reform oriented agenda aimed at enterprise
development. The actions of the Asia Branch effectively
narrowed the possibilities for the modern sector program.
c) Mechanisms
The changes in CIDA priorities and the interpretation by the
Branch effectively eliminated the two assumptions or ultimate
goals from expressly being the basis for ISS programming.
They also presented problems in terms of implementation of
programming within the Philippines context. Some of these
obstacles might have been overcome, however, if it were not
for the character of the implementation now used by CIDA.
In the early 1980s, CIDA moved toward using "mechanisms" as
a way to decrease administrative burden within the agency.
Instead of having CIDA staff administer programs on a project
by project basis, CIDA put in place program mechanisms which
established the parameters of the programs: who was to be
targeted, how the program was to be organized, funding levels,
etc. The actual implementation was then carried out by an
executing agency--such as non-governmental organization,
private firm, or government agency--appointed by CIDA with
CIDA Bilateral staff as overseers of the process.
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This move originally involved the non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in what were to be called "country focus"
programs. The administrative burden for CIDA of handling
grass roots projects became even more difficult with the start
of country specific programming. Bilateral staff members had
to have a spectrum of skills to effectively put together and
administer a broad range of programming. The administration
of some of the more difficult programs--such as grass roots,
poverty oriented ones--were transferred to Canadian NGOs as a
way of easing the burden and presumably improving the
implementation. The use of intermediaries slowly began to
expand beyond just NGOs. Private sector firms began to be
used as vehicles for administering lines of credit and
technical assistance to small scale industries.
The use of mechanisms for all the CIDA Philippines programs
became clear early in the process. For ease of admin-
istration, the Bilateral group, under the direction of the
Asia Branch Vice President, agreed that the entire program
would consist of a maximum of 10 mechanisms. CIDA would set
up the mechanisms and then take the role of "banker" in their
administration. Canadian Executing Agencies (CEAs) would
manage the projects.
The industrial sector was assigned one of these mechanisms
and instructed that one CEA should be responsible for
administering and coordinating all of the enterprise
development projects. Unlike the NGO program which had active
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Canadian NGOs involved in programming before, the ISS group
did not have an identified CEA for its program.
The technical group decided not to deal with the issue of a
CEA during the issues formulation process, however. This was
partially based on a decision not to involve the CEA in
programming before the program was established--to ensure
"program integrity". In effect, the methodology of the ISS
assessment indicated that the program should first be
designed, then a CEA found to fit into that program design.11
Despite the attempt to ignore the importance of the CEA in the
program design, the use of a CEA to implement the ISS programs
further complicates the ability of the group to address the
issues oriented agenda.
The selection of a CEA is critical in the overall
implementation plan. Whether any of the issues agenda will be
implemented will be determined partly by which organization is
selected and what their priorities are. If the CEA disburses
the funds through a designated credit program, and is
evaluated on the disbursal rate (not on what proportion of the
1 This is roughly what ISS had done on previous projects
where the program was formulated and then a CEA brought in to
administer. This arrangement constantly faced two problems.
The CEA eventually chosen was not committed to the objectives of
the program and therefore administered it in a way which was
expedient but not in keeping with the spirit of the program.
This was the case with the enterprise program in Zaire where the
line of credit was used to import trucks not to assist small
scale enterprises. The second problem was one of timing. The
Thailand program, while it was developed in 1986, was still
without a CEA in 1989 and program start will likely not begin
before 1991--six years after program identification.
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money goes to SMEs "outside" the normal credit system), then
it is unlikely that the "ultimate goals" of the program will
be considered of primary importance.
CIDA's experience with other CEAs also indicates that they
slowly begin to help define the programming--with CIDA's
consent. A review of CIDA's operations in 1986 indicated that
these intermediaries (both NGOs and private sector) build
linkages with the private sector and groups within the
developing countries and begin to develop programs which are
then submitted to CIDA for integration into the programming
framework (CIDA. Task Force on Canada's ODA 1986).
Also, unlike the Canadian NGOs who have a developmental
interest in the Philippines and are therefore interested in
participating in the CIDA mechanisms, little interest has been
expressed within Canada by private sector banks, association
or firms (the typical CEAs) on working with small scale enter-
prises within the Philippines. Finding CEAs who are
interested and qualified (i.e. have some experience in the
country) has proven to be a critical problem in the
implementation of the Thailand program. The two main elements
of that program will use a Canadian commercial bank and a
Provincial agency as the CEAs. However, selection of both has
been a bitter and protracted battle.
The Minister's office under the Mulroney Government now
provides ultimate approval of CEAs for implementing projects.
If private firms are put forward by the Bilateral desk, then
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the process is particularly political with the Minister
sometimes "adding to" the list of appropriate candidates. For
this reason, the industrial sector has begun to increasingly
turn to provincial agencies engaged in business development to
act as CEAs--for both developmental as well as political and
approval reasons.
The job of administering the program will also be much more
difficult with the institutional emphasis. By having to deal
with Philippine institutions and a CEA, the implementation
process is multilayered. The chain of policy will operate as:
CIDA-> Canadian Executing Agency-> Philippine institution->
target group. To effectively have policies sifted through
this maze from CIDA to the intended target groups will take
"administrative regulations" of sizable proportion. The
implementation of this alone would take a large portion of the
budget.
The relationships between the Canadian and Philippine
institutions have also been an area of great debate. The
desire to have a responsive program has pushed the ISS toward
trying to find a compromise which would have a CEA for a
portion of the program including overall administrative and
financial responsibility but a more direct relationship
between the Philippine institution and CIDA staff on program
design and implementation--particularly with microenterprises.
The logistics from an organizational and legal perspective are
complex at best.
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The pressure for this compromise from the Philippine side is
clear. Their contention is that if any programs are to be
driven by Philippine concerns, then the funding mechanism must
have a formal route for Philippine input. While they support
the principles of the ISS approach, they rightly do not see
how the approach can be implemented with a Canadian CEA
driving all program decisions.
A compromise is possible with decentralization of the
Bilateral administration to the field. Part of the process in
the case of the Philippines is the transfer of the industrial
services specialist to the post. By having field operations,
CIDA staff will presumably have current information about what
is happening in the industrial sector in the Philippines and
will build relationships itself with various groups. This at
least will give it a better chance of effectively monitoring
the program and will allow staff time to become more involved
in the decision making process after program implementation.
Transferring the technical person to the field also has
drawbacks, however. The professional services role is
primarily one of ensuring that the technical integrity of
programming is maintained--that the analysis is sound, the
programs well structured and the implementation guidelines
clearly specified. The movement of the technical staff to the
field has in some ways merged the roles of professional
services and bilateral staff. The emphasis is increasingly
being shifted from technical mode to delivery mode. Pressure
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is being exerted to put together a fast program which can be
undertaken immediately (i.e. put all the funds into a credit
program administered through large Canadian and Philippine
banks). The threat is either that the funds be disbursed or
be taken up by someone else.
While the technical staff have operated with too little
regard to delivery mode, the possibility exists that the swing
may happen too much in the other direction. Numerous studies
have documented the pressures which drive program staff such
as the need to disburse funds, the career paths, the
evaluation mechanisms, and relationships within the
organization (Tendler 1975). The ideal situation might be one
which tries to combine the technically driven approach with
one aware of organizational constraints. The possibilities of
this will depend to a certain extent on the individuals
involved.
Tradeoffs
The issues identification phase of the modern sector
programming was a fairly open process. The ISS team met with
many people in the Philippines private and public sectors,
discussing issues, receiving feedback and reviewing program
objectives. This process paralleled the Bilateral CPR process
which also aimed at open discussions, particularly with the
Government of the Philippines, in terms of intentions and
future programming.
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Understanding the underlying assumptions of the ISS process
and the basis for its analysis will provide only a partial
insight into the final modern sector program implemented over
the next five years. The changes over the last year have
already placed the program in a state of flux as the principal
objectives have been overridden by CIDA organizational changes
and the focus of the program has shifted from targeted groups
to institutions.
Both of these factors have fundamentally changed the
orientation of the programming and its ability to effectively
impact the ultimate issues identified in the original
analysis. While this does not mean that the eventual
programming will have no impact on problems such as improving
equity, it does mean that the impact will be muted at best.
From the point of view of ISS programming the question might
be asked: were there ways of minimizing these policy changes
during the process in terms of their ultimate impact on the
modern sector objectives? The answer is yes, but only with
tradeoffs.
The driving force of the analysis was the desire to follow
what was considered a sound and strict methodology for
assessing issues. From 1980 on, the ISS, in effect, set the
industrial agenda within CIDA's Bilateral programs. The
motivations during the late 1970s and early 1980s for
beginning an industrial program within the Bilateral arm of
the organization were more driven by developmental and
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organizational concerns than by commercial interests. 12 The
industrial programs aimed at small and microenterprises had a
market within developing countries and had potential for
achieving programming which would be successful at the country
level.
The independence which was afforded the ISS group, along
with other professional groups within CIDA, meant that these
developmental and technical concerns would play a much greater
role in program formulation. They were allowed a relatively
independent path in programming. As long as the ultimate
program design took into account the obvious organization
constraints such as the need for tied aid, or budgetary
restrictions, then it was basically free to present issues as
the professionals saw them in the field.
In the case of the Philippines, this approach produced a
interesting assessment of what the major obstacles facing the
Philippines were and what needed to be done about them. It
captured the dichotomies in the Philippines industrial sector,
drew support within the Philippines, and provided a first step
in the development of a donor program by being transparent in
its process and honest about the problems facing the country.
The policy review in the mid 1980s did not negate or
disagree with the approach being taken to industrial
12 See Chapter 2 for a review of the pressures and
outcomes.
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development. Due to conflicting pressures , it simply ignore
critical questions about industrial programming and the role
of the private sector in its implementation. Without formally
acknowledging the sectoral issues, CIDA avoided political
problems but also developed a framework which made dealing
with industrial issues more difficult.
While it would have been impossible for the ISS to
anticipate the changes in structure and priorities which
evolved out of the policy review between 1986 and 1988, even
if it had anticipated them, it would have had little leverage
to change any of the outcomes. What it did have control over
was making its approach more relevant to the organization and
organizational change.
It is here where tradeoffs could have been made to lessen
the impact of the changes, however. The continued reliance on
"issues" to supply the basis for narrowing the programming
continued to ignore the organizational context within which
the programming was taking place. The ISS team acted as if it
were not part of a donor organization, but were formulating an
ideal program. While this approach produced what I believe
were positive results in the initial issue identification
phases (and results which were supported by many groups within
the Philippines), it also ignored the realities of
implementation.
13 See Chapter 2 for details.
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Little attempt was made to narrow the focus by sector or
region. Factors such as the CIDA priorities and Canadian
capabilities in program delivery1 were talked about but never
integrated. The methodology in reality translated into
defining issues first and worrying about other inputs such as
the plans of the Philippine Government and the CIDA
organizational constraints after the programming was decided.
The reluctance to move to the subsector level and begin to
specifically analyze, in depth, the problems facing specific
industries and firms made the ISS analysis more vulnerable.
While receiving general support from various sectors within
the Philippines, the ISS group did not develop a coalition or
constituency within the Philippines. It did not know what
subsectors it wanted to work with, who within those subsectors
would be key players, what were the obstacles, etc. This made
the enterprise development component of the CIDA program more
vulnerable than the other parts of the CIDA program which had
specific "clients".
The NGO group, women in development (WID), regional
government support and even commodities programs all had
specific contacts in the field with which they were developing
programs. These negotiations had been established and basic
ground rules set for the relationship between CIDA and the
14 Canadian capabilities refers to both the need for using
a CEA which the ISS group knew at the beginning of the
programming process and the fact that aid is tied 80% to
Canadian goods and services.
209
Philippine target group. While none of them had set their
programming, they had at least begun the process of narrowing.
They also had established allies which could be used to temper
the headquarters organizational changes. The CIDA NGOs and
Women in Development (WID) coordinators were successful in
gaining a number of concessions regarding programming
parameters because they could identify specific problems these
would cause with the program delivery.
Without any definition of specific programming or target
groups beyond a general "those outside the system", the ISS
group came under increasing pressure to conform to all the
directives. The fact that the ISS group had to wait until the
CPR and Asia Branch framework were in place was partly a
result of its focus on the ultimate aims of the program. No
specifics of programming were established which could be used
as the basis for arguing against directives or priorities set
by Asia Branch.
It has to be recognized, however, that building coalitions
within the private sector is more difficult than other groups
such as NGOs for a number of reasons. First, the private
sector firms, particularly in the Philippines, are very
individualistic in approach and obviously geared towards
making a profit. While many groups represent business
interests, each of these groups has their own agendas which
are often very narrow. Building support within these target
groups is very difficult.
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Second, the structure of the programs aims more at
delivering a service such as credit or marketing assistance
than at a sector per se. Therefore, selecting specific
sectors was not be as important as selecting a region for the
program. The regions for operations were approved outside of
the ISS control, however, and were ones where programming by
other donors has proven to be most difficult. The
implementation problems, particularly having to target
institutions, increased substantially with the regions chosen.
Third, choosing sectors to assist has to rely at least
partially on whether there are Canadian capabilities which can
feed into the process. The requirement that 80% of the aid be
tied to Canadian goods and services means that Canadian firms
(both manufacturing and service sector) are involved in
delivery. A program which targets technical assistance to
SMEs in the Philippine rattan furniture business may be
meeting the ultimate aims of the programs but would have
problems in terms of Canadians who could assist in this area.
If the ISS team had moved faster to the programming stage
and had incorporated some recognition of CIDA's ongoing
organizational constraints, then the current job of developing
a program within the Philippines would have been somewhat
easier and may have conformed more to the original goals. The
decision not to do this, and to stick instead to a more ideal
methodology, meant that the ISS program would be open to the
pressures for change.
211
Appropriate Approach for A Donor
A question can also be raised about whether the ultimate
goals of the ISS analysis, with its premise of changing the
industrial system, were appropriate for a donor organization.
The underlying premise of the analysis (supported by the
feelings of the Bilateral staff) was that the Government of
the Philippines might not be able to break away from the
traditional political pressures and implement a reform agenda.
While this assessment in some cases is true, I question
whether CIDA, as an outside organization, would be any more
successful in implementing a reform agenda than the Aquino
Government.
Both face internal and external barriers which make reform
extremely difficult. They both must contend with the same set
of entrenched interests and problems facing implementation in
the field. Each has its own set of internal blockages to
reform. The Aquino Government faces an inflexible
bureaucracy which refuses to change, and pressures from the
"elite groups" through channels such as the legislature and
lobbyists. CIDA faces problems such as 80% tied aid, the need
to channel funds through CEAs and the inexperience of dealing
with a new country. Both will have difficulty impacting the
current relations within the industrial sector.
Underlying this thinking by CIDA is the desire again to find
a rational solution to development problems. Donors have
continually searched for the solution which will increase
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certainty in developing countries and solve problems for
specific groups. Much of the development debate in recent
years has been about appropriate models and policies which
will provide this certainty. The World Bank, in particular,
presents itself as having "found" the solution. CIDA, while
differing on the approach, is really no different. It too is
solution driven. It too has been forced into continual change
by its inability to actual solve development problems.
The assumption that outside professionals can enter a
country, do an analysis, and determine the problems is
accurate in some cases. The assumption that a donor, however,
can then formulate a solution based on this rational
assessment which will solve the problems is highly unlikely.
Nelson (1985) points out the importance of government taking
into account political and administrative obstacles when
designing structural reforms.
Donors have not been sensitive enough to these issues--both
internal to the organization and within the developing
countries--and as a result have failed in many cases at
implementing changes. Donors formulate approaches based on a
wide range of factors which influence decisions. How these
factors come together is covered in the next chapter.
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VI. GENERALIZING THE CIDA EXPERIENCE
The process of change which has taken place within CIDA over
the last three decades has been driven by a continual need to
adapt to an uncertain environment and to find solutions to
development problems which allow a chance at successful
programming in developing countries. What has pushed CIDA to
change its approach has been a recognition that the course
being followed was no longer sustainable--i.e. current
programs no longer were in demand, events had overrun program
relevance or program implementation was effectively blocked.
This recognition of unsustainability triggered a number of
policy reviews which reoriented programs. It was not until
the late 1970s, however, that industrial programming was
considered a viable candidate for direct funding. The switch
to viewing industrial involvement as a solution for some
developmental problems was a reflection of changes both within
the development scene and within CIDA. Industrial programs
were seen as a way of adapting to realities in the world, and
developing programs for which some demand would exist within
developing countries.
The delay in addressing industrial development directly is
common to a wide variety of donors. In fact, donors for the
most part took a unified approach to direct industrial support
until the late 1970s--few of them engaged in it. After this
time, many donors began to view industrial interventions from
a different perspective in terms of programming. A wide
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variety of approaches to industrial programs were developed.
Some donors focused on program support aimed at changing the
environment within which the private sector operated. Others
developed specific interventions such as credit programs and
technical assistance.
The question is: what triggered this movement into
industrial programs and why were different approaches
developed by donors? The analysis of CIDA provides some
answers to these questions. While the specifics of the
experience of CIDA in industrial development are unique to
that organization, a number of factors can be gleaned from
this experience which have applicability to other donors and
provide insight into the process of change within donor
agencies.
As is evident in Chart 2, change has resulted from a complex
interaction of forces both inside and outside of CIDA. These
forces are not just political or commercial but involve
influences from a wide variety of sources which push and pull
the organization in a number of directions. How CIDA has
formulated its approach to industrial development has resulted
from the resolution of these pressures.
While some of the factors are common to all donors, others
have specific manifestations which influence how a donor will
approach the issue of industrial support. It is these
differences which determine how the various donors define
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their programming and why disparities exist between
approaches.
The Decision to Change
Each of the major shifts in CIDA policy has been triggered
by a period of growing uncertainty. This uncertainty has been
aggravated by varying combinations of four factors: the global
economic situation; pressures from internal or external
groups; demands of developing countries; and organizational
pressures for change. While presented on Chart 2 as
independent influences, in fact, these variables interact to
change the climate within which CIDA operates.
March (1988) points out that organizations are continually
changing in response to demographic, economic, social and
political forces. These routine responses present stable
processes of evolution which all organizations undergo. It is
only when the environment changes rapidly, that the
organizational shifts must be dramatic. A difference is
therefore evident between an evolving organization and one
undergoing large policy shifts.
While CIDA was continually buffeted by changes in the
external environment, it has only been in severe cases of
fluctuation that dramatic policy redefinitions have been
undertaken. While the process has not necessarily been fast,
in some case the trigger point has been finally reached when
the four factors--global economic situation, pressure groups,
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developing country demands, and organizational viability--
made continuing on the previous path unsustainable. At these
junctions, CIDA has moved to formulate a new approach to
development.
Each of these four factors represent common elements which
act as pressure points for all donor organizations. It is not
a coincidence that many donors have dramatically reoriented
their programs at about the same time. The nature of the
development process--specifically its unpredictability--and
the fact that both bilateral and multilateral organizations
deal with a wide range of countries makes the donor's
environment more unstable. Numerous pressures are outside the
control of the donor.
The fact that large shifts were seen in many donor's
programs in the early 1970s and again in late 1970s and early
1980s is a reflection of these forces. The late 1960s and
early 1970s saw fundamental changes in the developing country
approach to aid. The interest in aid based on large
infrastructure and technical assistance projects was waning as
countries began to target more independent industrialization
paths.
At the same time, the number of donors had increased sub-
stantially causing donor competition in the market. The
availability of recycled eurocurrency in the 1970s further
1 For a more detailed discussion of these changes refer to
Chapter 2.
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decreased the demand for donor funds in a wide range of
developing countries. These countries were able to access
private sources with no strings attached and as a result the
demand for aid lessened. The result in many cases was that
donors had lost their niche in the development market.
Current programming was no longer in demand and was therefore
no longer tenable. A new approach had to be developed.
At the same time, the underlying development theory which
donors had followed throughout the 1960s was also being
questioned by a wide range of groups. The capital constraint
approach had not produced self-sustained development nor a
more equitable distribution of benefits via trickle down.
Donor programs were being criticized and placed under
increasing review.2 Both multilateral and bilateral donors
began to shift policy focus and establish a new role for their
aid programs.
The factors pressuring for change, therefore, work together
to push for new programs. The global economic situation,
particularly in the last 15 years, has dictated to a large
extent the policies within both developed and developing
countries, and changed the possibilities for donors as well.
Developing countries, which act in essence as the donor's
clients, have shifted their demands for programming increasing
or decreasing the relevance of a particular donor's approach.
2 Including the commission set up by the World Bank and
headed by Pearson (1969).
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These pressures have been aggravated by internal
organizational problems faced by donors and the increasing
pressures from different pressure groups. The decreased
demand for donor programs meant that the donor organization
could not disburse funds, threatening the viability of the
bureaucracy. The constituencies of the donors also exerted
pressure to react to the changing climate. In CIDA's case,
the constituencies were the groups to which it related
domestically and internationally. This included the
electorate and pressure groups within Canada as well as the
community of developed countries.
While the pressures manifest themselves in different ways,
both multilateral and bilateral donors must respond to changes
in situations within developing countries, global economic
fluctuations, internal pressure groups and the outside
developed country community. How these forces interrelate
determines the program approach of the organization.
The changes within the World Bank during the 1970s show how
these factors work. The Bank had developed a market niche
during the 1970s which focused on implementing programs of
redistribution with growth and developing the Bank into an
institution which was the intellectual centre for development.
The structural crises of the late 1970s, negated this role by
forcing countries to refocus their efforts and deal with
immediate balance of payments (BOP) problems.
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This shift in "possibilities" at the country level and the
increasing emphasis on solving BOP problems demanded that the
Bank find a new role to play in the development process.
While wanting to maintain its position as the dominant player
in the development process, the Bank also realized that it
needed to shift its emphasis away from traditional project
lending, toward more quickly disbursed lending which was being
demanded by developing countries. The project focus hindered
the ability to disburse large amounts of aid. In 1980, the
Bank started its Structural Adjustment Lending (SALs) aimed at
assisting longer term policy changes and providing large
transfers for BOP support.
The direction which this shift took, however, was largely a
function of the pressures being exerted by the Bank "internal
constituencies". Although multilaterals are viewed as being
above political pressures and more "objective" than bilateral
donors (for example see Cassen and Associates 1986), in fact,
the Bank is subject to pressure from its developed country
members--particularly the US. The Reagan administration
singled out Bank projects as examples of inappropriate lending
and promoting inefficiency (Ayres 1983). A report of the US
Treasury Department (1982) formalized the US criticism of the
Bank and its agenda and insisted that the Bank more
aggressively enforce conditions which ensured that developing
countries moved toward greater emphasis on market signals,
private sector development and greater financial participation
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by banks and private investors. The character of the initial
conditions was partly a result of these internal pressures
within the Bank's Board of Governors.
To solidify its position vis a vis the rest of the donor
community, the Bank also had to ensure that it maintained the
role of prime development agency within the developed
countries. The threat that the increased demand for IMF
programs posed to the Bank's position as BOP supporter meant
that a clear distinction had to be made between the Bank and
IMF programs. As one official at the InterAmerican Develop-
ment Bank indicated to me, this competition for definitional
distinction and purity ended with both organizations pursuing
the same development model.
The IMF took a short term approach with the Bank claiming
territory over the longer run development strategy as a whole
and sectoral policies. This meant that the Bank's approach to
industrial development aimed at changing policy initiatives
within countries. Industrial policy basically became equated
to trade policies. The other donors were then expected to
operate within this framework.
Policy Formulation
While differences exist between donors, the pressures for
change many times are similar--and beyond the organization's
control. The donor must act to resolve these conflicts by
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formulating programs which allow a new program niche in the
development process to be established.
The CIDA policy formulation process was solution driven--
something which appears to be common with other donors. March
(1988) indicates that organizations faced with a large number
of problems tend not to focus on the problems but a selected
number of solutions. The problems are too complex and
focusing on finding solutions to problems only increases the
uncertainty for the organization. Instead, solution driven
organizations tend to focus on a small number of possible
solutions--choosing among them.
The policy formulation process followed by the Bank in the
above example reflects a similar process followed by CIDA.
Once the decision is made to change direction, a number of
factors come into play--namely pressure from internal
constituencies, relations with donor community (and developed
countries as a whole), the opportunities at the developing
country level and acceptable theories of development. Each of
these contribute to formulation of the solution or niche for
donor programming to follow.
CIDA's initial movement into direct bilateral industrial
programming in the early 1980s reflected pressures from a
number of different directions. While one would have expected
the commercial groups within Canada to be the most vocal
regarding industrial programs, in fact they played a limited
role in the bilateral programs developed. A number of other
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groups, including non-governmental organizations, were
becoming more involved in micro, small and medium enterprises
and were pressuring for programs in this area. The fact that
the focus was on smaller enterprises dispelled any question of
competition between the Canadian private sector and the
developing country.
A more important factor was the shifting priorities at the
developing country level. The structural crisis had opened up
opportunities for programs aimed at smaller enterprises. Many
of these were hard hit by the BOP problems--limiting imports,
markets, etc.--and the government's ability to assist with
adjustment was limited by fiscal constraints. Yet much of the
literature during the 1970s indicated the important and
dynamic role which the smaller firms played in development.
The fact that the donor industrial programs could now focus
directly on the private sector, not public sector industrial
enterprises, meant that philosophically Canada did not have a
problem with industrial support.
In addition, the donor community as a whole was shifting
focus toward a more private sector orientation. The shifts at
the Bank described above were reflective of this process. The
Bank started to promote a development strategy which was
private sector driven and which set the tone for other donors
to follow. Industrial programming had now gained
acceptability and Canada and other bilateral groups began to
develop programs.
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The changes which have taken place within the Dutch aid
program in the 1980s reflect a similar process to CIDA.
According to Erath and Kruijt (1988) the global economic
situation in the early 1980s triggered a re-examination of aid
programs from the self-reliance and poverty abatement focus of
the 1970s. The relevance of these programs was brought into
question by pressures within the country and by the shifting
focus at the developing country level.
The Dutch aid program shifted towards a focus on rural and
industrial development. As of 1983, the emphasis was placed
on "increasing productive capacity, undertaking activities
which generated income, and created employment rather than new
welfare services". The key to development in developing
countries was now seen to be in directly targeting the
industrial enterprises and working with the developing country
private sector.
a) Constituencies
In terms of industrial programming, the assumption is many
times made that bilateral programs are driven purely by
commercial interests. Export groups within the donor country
pressure for changes which support their desire to participate
in the markets of the developing countries receiving aid. The
programs which result are focused on promoting the donor
country interests as much as the developing country needs.
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This analysis was true for one type of programming which
increased during the 1970s in a wide range of bilateral
groups--including CIDA. Many donors began to move into
industrial cooperation and mixed credit programs. The former
groups of programs aimed at building linkages between the
developed and developing country private sectors while the
mixed credits were purely schemes for increasing
competitiveness of the developed country commercial groups.
CIDA's Industrial Cooperation Program (INC) which was begun
in 1977 represented the culmination of pressures from both the
commercial groups within Canada and other portions of the
Canadian bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Industry and
Trade. These groups wanted a program which was responsive to
Canadian needs and would operate outside of the normal
bilateral aid channels in middle income countries. While the
Bilateral programs at this time were focusing on basic needs
and the poorest countries, the INC program would run an
independent series of programs which were driven by Canadian
needs.
This INC program, while small in terms of percent of overall
budget (less than 1%), served to dispel many of the pressures
on CIDA for commercial support. It also gave CIDA an
additional argument for how aid was benefitting Canada and the
developing countries--something which became increasingly
important with the recession within Canada in the late 1970s.
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While the driving force behind the program was clearly
commercial, the rationale put forward was one of "mutual
interest" which originated in the NIEO debates and was
reinforced in the Brandt report (1980). Portions of the NIEO
debate rested on the notion of interdependence of nations.
This interdependence meant that programs aimed at mutual
benefits were no longer "selfish" but in each country's "self-
interest". A program therefore could have two objectives;
supporting the donor's domestic interests as well as the
developing country's developmental interests.
Other donors took similar steps and provided similar
rationales during the late 1970s. By the time CIDA put in
place its program other countries such as Germany, Britain and
France were already operating similar ventures. Sweden
started a program in 1978 to enhance industrial cooperation.
The Swedish example is interesting because it also represents
a donor--who like Canada--perceives itself as being more
developmentally driven than commercially.
The Swedish program, SWEDFUND, was begun outside of the
Bilateral stream as well and aimed at much of the same types
of support as the INC program--technology transfers, joint
ventures, preinvestment promotion and training. Clearly
driven by commercial interests, the program was also put
forward with the "mutual benefit" rationale. As Grettve
(1986) contends the NIEO debate provided an easy way for
Sweden to put forward programming which supported aid giving
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at a time of domestic recession and was a concession to
commercial interests.
While the industrial cooperation type programs in most donor
countries were intended to have some positive developmental
impact, the mixed credit schemes which developed were clearly
only benefitting the donor countries' commercial interests.
The increase in mixed credit type programs as part of the aid
scenario has taken on greater importance in a number of
countries especially Britain, France and Japan and has acted
as a pressure on other countries to follow suit.
By combining commercial credit and aid, the country's
exporters can have an advantage in the export market. Canada
has begun to increase the proportion of aid funds which are
used as complements to Export Development Corporation
financing, although the proportions are small. The US moved to
mixed credits in 1983. Increased use by competitors in Europe
and Japan caused a movement within the American business
community to develop programs. An act was passed in 1983
which allowed AID to join with the Export Import Bank to
develop mixed credit schemes. The irony of this was that the
shift to mixed credit contradicted the free market approach of
the Reagan administration. As well, the AID administration
fought against the implementation of the mixed credits since
they undermine the purpose of the development assistance by
diverting scarce development dollars.
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Mixed credit schemes have been continually condemned by the
Development Assistance Committee as being clearly non
developmental. When the British program was begun in 1977,
its purpose was to develop programs either where no aid
program existed or in countries where funds had been fully
expended (Toye and Clark 1986). While developmental concerns
were stated as part of the rationale for the program, another
objective was "combatting the aggressive use of aid by trading
competitors" (which was a demand of the commercial groups at
that time).
While both developmental and commercial objectives were to
be served by the British program, achieving both objective has
proved impossible. As Mosley (1987) notes, the large sums
involved and the short approval periods many times mean that
little or no developmental criteria can be applied to a
project before approval. As he describes it, a proposal may
have to be approved within the British ODA system within a
matter of days if a company is trying to compete. Unless
commercial competition decreases, it is unlikely that
bilateral donors will drop the mixed credit schemes.
While the industrial cooperation and the mixed credit
schemes represent clear cases of programs driven by commercial
interests, other types of industrial programs--under the
bilateral umbrella--have commercial interests as only one
input into the program formulation process. While they
contribute to setting the bounds for acceptable solutions, the
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programs are not dictated merely by commercial interests. The
reluctance of CIDA to enter direct industrial programs during
the 1960s was partly driven by fears of competition for
domestic firms. These concerns were overridden by other
factors during the late 1970s when the bilateral industrial
programs were being formulated.
Other groups besides simply commercial interests must be
analyzed to track policy formulation, in both multilateral and
bilateral groups. International and domestic movements bring
some issues into prominence as has been seen in the last
decade with women in development and the environment. The
strength of these groups partly dictate how much influence
they will be able to exert on policy formulation.
Constituencies also include the political environment of the
donor as well. In the World Bank example, the pressures from
its member countries, and especially the US, pushed it toward
a more private sector oriented approach in late 1970s. In the
case of US AID the changes during the 1980s have clearly been
a reflection of shifting political focus of the Reagan
administration. The ability to actually implement these
reforms was partly the result of the Administration's move to
place carefully chosen appointees in critical positions
governing the international development sphere (Sewell et al
1985). This was confirmed by interviews which I had with a
number of the leading advisors within AID. Not only were the
advisors politically appointed, but more importantly they
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portrayed a uniformity of approach to development which
supported and extended the Administration's policies.
For Canada, its relationship with international
constituencies has also impacted policy formulation. Canada
has attempted to position itself in development debates in a
fairly distinctive manner. While not breaking ranks with the
rest of the developed countries, Canada has made sure that it
is seen as more flexible and open to developing country
concerns. 3 An article in the Economist (October 8, 1988)
stated that "Canadians like to be liked by everyone,
especially in the Third World countries." This desire to be
an intermediary in development debates had an influence on the
policy formulation of CIDA especially during the 1970s.
A wide range of internal and external constituencies,
therefore, play a role in the programs formulated. While some
industrial programming has clearly been driven only by
commercial interests, others have a more tempered approach.
It is necessary, therefore, to move beyond the assumption that
understanding industrial programs is merely a function of
understanding the commercial interests within a country. The
range of constituencies which are involved in pressuring for
changes within both multilateral and bilateral donors is much
broader.
3 A number of the reasons for this desire are included in
Chapter 2 and reflect a range of variables including the
personality of the Prime Minister as well as the position of
Canada in international affairs.
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b) Donor Coordination and Competition
One of the influences on policy formulation within donor
agencies are the actions of other donors. As indicated
previously, many donor agencies have entered periods of crisis
at the same time--and caused by many of the same reasons.
These cycles of change are often triggered by events outside
the donor's control--such as changes in global economic
situation, changing attitudes and demands of developing
countries--and impact both bilateral and multilateral donors.
This growing uncertainty within donor organizations is
translated into periods of flux throughout the aid community,
increasing the instability of the environment. Many donors
are looking for solutions to the same development problems at
a time when the entire community is coming under criticism.
Cyert and March (1963) put forward a theory of negotiated
environments for firms. This theory states that organiza-
tions, in an attempt to stabilize their environments, are
sometimes willing to come to an agreement with competitors
about who will handle which markets if this will make the
organizational environment more stable. The cooperation,
which can extend to firms helping each other with technical
expertise, financial resources, or finding new clients, is
seen as enhancing the individual organization's chances of
success.
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Crane and Finkle (1981) argue that this type of compromise
is impossible for the World Bank since its models of
cooperation have allowed it to play the leading role in the
donor community since the 1970s. This means that the Bank is
unwilling to compromise with competitors. The reasoning fits,
however, the expectation which the Bank has for the rest of
the donor community. The Bank's philosophy is that it should
set the pace and design the broad approach to development
assistance and the other donors should fit into the slots
which the Bank develops.
This principle supports what the Bank sees as the ideal
division of responsibility between itself and other donors.
In my interviews with Bank staff they clearly stated the roles
they see for various donors. The Bank considers itself the
primary development institution which sets the development
agenda, negotiates the policy changes on a country by country
basis and sets the pace for other agencies. The other
multilaterals are seen as the vehicle to increase and support
the pressure for change. The bilateral donors are then the
agencies which provide funds (conditional on Bank targets) for
technical assistance and the "projects" which allow the
implementation of the Bank program.
It is obviously in the Bank's interest to have other donors
supporting its efforts. The focus of the policy dialogue of
the Bank means that the more donor support the Bank receives,
the more leverage it will have at the country level to obtain
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the changes wanted. It also means that the possibility of
acceptance of its development solutions is increased.
The calls by the Bank for increased coordination of
activities are being reflected in the overall donor community.
The demands for increased coordination are seen in annual
reports of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and in every
aid review undertaken in the last eight years (DAC 1987).
Most of the rationale for increased coordination is based on
the problems created at the country level with conflicting
programs. Many examples exist of countries trying to cope with
a plethora of donors all demanding different policy
initiatives, doing independent analyses and trying to lever
the system. These often conflicting demands and programs put
a strain on resources at the recipient country level and make
effective planning and implementation more difficult. As
Cassen and Associates (1985) indicate, the solution to this
problem is increased donor coordination and complementarity of
programming.
These pressures for coordination do have some impact at
bilateral donor level. Inherent in the pressure exerted by
donors on each other (through consultative groups, donor
coordination through DAC and through foreign affairs channels)
is the desire to reinforce the role that each donor has staked
out and decrease the competition among donors. Each is
attempting to establish a separate niche in the assistance
picture which supports the general development effort. In
234
this sense, donors do have an incentive to cooperate and
coordinate efforts.
Part of the reason why CIDA moved into a heavy emphasis on
institution building in 1987 was because the need had been
identified and promoted by the developed countries (and
numerous aid reviews such as Cassen and Associates 1985).
Canada saw an opportunity to provide a part of the puzzle
which complemented other donor activities--such as the World
Bank programs--and for which demand could be generated in the
field.
While donors may have general approaches to aid which
complement an overall coordination effort, the actual
coordination between programs tends to be more influenced by
other factors when applied to a specific country. According to
Berg (1980) the chances of increasing donor coordination at
the country level are minimal. The sheer number of donors
operating in an individual country makes it difficult for
effective coordination by the country. The level of
complexity and diversity of approach of donor programs make it
impossible for DAC or other donor groups to coordinate
efforts. What Berg recommends is that the developing
countries increase their ability to manage resources--
development budgets, trade credits, private investment, etc.
This along with the cooperation of donors should help to
resolve conflicting demands.
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Berg's assessment appears to be naive about the motivation
for donor coordination, however. Whittington and Calhoun
(1988) put forward a case study of an attempt within Sudan to
simply develop a data base of the ongoing, planned and
completed development projects which had been funded by
donors. The project, which was funded by US AID, was a
complete failure since few, if any, of the donors were willing
to cooperate and provide the information.
Two reasons were put forward by Whittington and Calhoun for
this reluctance in the Sudan project. First, little incentive
existed within donor bureaucracy for working with other
donors. Unless there was something for the individual to
gain, they had little reason to cooperate with another donor.
Second, most donors viewed the Ministry of Planning not as a
help in implementing projects but as an obstacle. An
effective Ministry would limit the discretion which the donors
currently had over formulating their own projects and plans.
While donors may be willing to coordinate some efforts at
the policy level, coordination becomes more difficult at the
country level. The current attempts to increase donor
coordination can be viewed from two perspectives--decreasing
the conflict between donor programs within a particular
country or increasing the monopoly position sustained by the
donors. My involvement in the Philippines indicates the
emphasis there is certainly on the latter point.
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CIDA as the new player in town has been developing relations
with the other donors in the Philippines, trying to establish
where they have programs, ensuring that CIDA programs do not
conflict with existing ones, and exchanging information and
perceptions. The donor community in the Philippines, however,
is very strong. The World Bank and the US in particular have
not only had very active and large programs for decades but
both organizations have exercised considerable influence over
the decision making process within the Philippines (see Bello
et al 1982 and Ofreneo and Habana 1987 for a review of this
issue).
The US, during 1988, put forward the notion of a Mini-
Marshall Plan scheme for the Philippines which would see all
the donors banding together to make a long term commitment to
Philippine development. The idea would be to channel US$10
billion to the Philippines over a five year period with US$300
million per year coming from the US. The funds would be tied
to meeting World Bank targets with the World Bank monitoring
the country's progress. Japan, the country's second largest
bilateral donor, has agreed to the plan (although Japan wanted
the IMF as the monitoring agent). If the plan goes ahead,
little doubt exists within the Philippine donor community that
all the donors have to and will come together to support this
process.
The strength of the primary donors and their ability to
influence actions within the Philippines is partly the result
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of a lack of coordination within the Government vis a vis
donors. The lack of unity is evident in discussions with
officials and even in the speeches and newspaper reports of
various Ministries. One group says one thing, only to be
contradicted by another Government spokesperson. This has
helped the donors to solidify their position towards policy
reforms and increase their control on the donor process.
While the Government tries to call donor meetings or negotiate
an agreement, the donors are in command.4
The consequences which this arrangement has for CIDA and
specifically the industrial programming are important.
Pressure is already being exerted on CIDA to not only conform
to the policy reforms being demanded by the US, Japan and the
Bank, but also to undertake programming which specifically
supports their efforts. The Bank in particular is concerned
that the industrial programs implemented complement its
efforts and discussions are being held about how to accomplish
this.
While coordination is needed between donors, the debate
about coordination should focus on whether that coordination
should be done by the country or by the donors. In the case
of the Philippines, a few donors are clearly in control and
4 This was evident particularly when a notice of a meeting
of donors was forwarded by one of the Government Ministries to
the Canadian Embassy. At the same time, the Bank and US AID
were indicating that they did not want the meeting at the
scheduled time. The result was a retraction within days from
the Government.
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have the leverage to pressure the rest of the donor community
into coordination of a particular type.
With donors in control, coordination becomes a way to ensure
a greater degree of domination over the transfer of funds and
the actions of the recipient country. The pressure which is
exerted within the donor community even at the policy
formulation stage to ensure compatible programs acts as an
influence on the overall program approach which will be
developed. An acknowledgement of these pressures is found in
Erath and Kruijt (1988) when they state that the aid program
in the Netherlands was guided by "the policy guidelines
elaborated in circles of the World Bank".
c) Developing Country Opportunities
Hughes (1987) puts forward a model of capital flows to
developing countries which sees countries passing through
three stages. In the first stage a low income country is
dependent on trade credits and official development assistance
for providing external capital. As a country grows, its
ability to attract private international capital is increased
and acts to supplement aid. In the third stage, the country
has reached a sufficient level of development and
creditworthiness that it is no longer dependent on tied funds
such as aid but can now receive funding through banks.
While these three levels are more or less still evident,
events over the last fifteen years have forced movement
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between levels to become more inflexible. During the 1950s
and 1960s, demand for foreign aid increased partly in response
to the many countries who became independent in this period
and partly to assist with the growing economic activity in
Latin America. During the 1970s many countries, particularly
in Latin America, were able to accelerate their access to
private flows of funding because of the eurodollar markets.
This allowed countries, which would have otherwise been
dependent on aid to a much larger extent, to define and follow
more independent routes, thus decreasing their demand for aid.
The decrease in private flows since the late 1970s has
narrowed the possibilities for countries and forced the three
scenarios to become more rigid. According to the OECD
(1988a), developing countries currently have limited options
in terms of new funding. While official development financing
represented only 35.2% of the total net resource flows to
developing countries in 1980, by 1987 this figure had
increased to 70.6%. The report also notes that African
countries are almost totally dependent on aid for funds and as
a result donors are now determining the development agendas.
At the other end of the spectrum are countries such as Korea
and Taiwan which are becoming less dependent on even private
financial flows due to the strength of their economies.
Inherent in both the Hughes and OECD analyses is the correct
assumption that developing countries accept aid as a resource
flow when other options are limited. Demand for aid for a
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range of countries decreased during the 1970s.5 The current
increase in demand for assistance, particularly for balance of
payments, is attributable to the lack of private funds and the
desire by governments to pursue both adjustment and some form
of growth strategy. In five years, the demand patterns may
shift again, depending on a wide range of factors such as the
debt and global economic situation.
With each of these shifts in availability of private funds
comes a shift in the demand for donor funding. Developing
countries represent donors' markets, and the donors' products-
-both programs and projects--must be geared to fulfilling the
demand in these markets. Currently, the highest demand is for
untied grants--or straight balance of payments support. These
would allow the maximum flexibility at the country level. Few
donors want to provide this without conditions, however. At
the other extreme, while it is true that many developing
countries target their requests for funds to programs which
the donor is offering, factors within the "market" make some
products unviable. This was the case with infrastructure to a
certain extent in the 1970s. It is also currently the case
for any programs which require a large counterpart fund
requirement from developing countries as part of the package.
5 The shift in Canada's programs in the 1970s to the
poorest countries partly reflected the fact that these countries
had limited options and therefore represented the highest
demand.
241
The narrowing of private capital markets has translated into
increased demand for aid funds for private sector projects.
The restricted access of firms to capital, the decreases in
government spending, the increased costs of adjustment, the
pressures for employment and income, and the desire of
governments to follow a strategy partly based on growth have
all contributed to increased demand within developing
countries for private sector oriented aid projects.
The development of programs by donors, therefore, is a
tradeoff between what is desired by developing countries and
what is no longer viable for the donor to offer. The shifting
demands at the developing country level translate into shifts
in opportunities for donors to deliver programs. The need for
finding a market niche has driven donor programming to a
certain extent over the last two decades.
d) Theoretical Underpinnings
The donor community as a whole has shifted its theoretical
base a number of time since the 1950s. While these shifts
never included more "controversial" theories such as
dependency or centre/periphery arguments, they did reflect an
attempt by the international community to come to terms with
the development problems faced by developing countries. The
debates at the international donor community level have also
clearly had an impact on the basic theoretical approach taken
by individual donors. In essence, the shifts at the
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international level act as parameters for acceptable theories
of development and act as a boundary for finding suitable
"solutions" to development problems.
The initial focus of Canada's aid program in the 1950s and
1960s built on the theories of development prevalent among
donors during that period6. The capital constraint theories
maintained that a distinct contribution could be made by aid
aimed at increasing the physical capital within a country.
Programs such as infrastructure and training could help the
development efforts by providing needed capital (physical and
human) which would increase production and indirectly
alleviate poverty.
CIDA did not directly involve itself in industrial projects.
CIDA saw two problems with directly supporting industrial
ventures. The first was competition with Canadian producers.
The second was the emergence of publicly owned industries
which were the obvious market for donor funds (since they were
many times large scale and based on more developmental than
rate of return analysis).
While the first pressure has already been discussed, the
question of public ownership is important to review from a
theoretical point of view. Despite its mixed economy, Canada
6 Theories of development behind CIDA programming are
addressed in detail in Chapter 2. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the program relied heavily on approaches such as Rostow (1960)
and Chenery -Strout (1966) two gap model. only passing
reference is made here to specific orientations.
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saw a real problem with supplying funds to public projects.
The fact that many of the industrial projects being undertaken
within developing countries involved the public sector made
Canada and other donors reluctant to provide funds.
Wood (1986) documents this trend throughout the 1960s and
1970s. His contention is that donors withheld support as a way
to ensure a certain type of industrialization--one which
relied on private ownership, openness to foreign capital,
reliance on market forces and export orientation and private
capital. The support which was reluctantly given during the
1970s by the World Bank and a few other donors was aimed only
at very large scale projects. The rationale given by donors
was that these projects were too big for private support but
were still necessary for developmental reasons. The
assumption also was that the ownership would eventually be
transferred to the private sector.
From a theoretical point of view, donors clearly did have a
bias towards the private sector playing the key role in
industrial development. Underlying the development theories
of the 1960s that were being advocated was an inherent split
between public and private roles. The public sector was to
provide the support mechanisms, the private sector was to
provide the production.
This bias was particularly upheld by the World Bank during
the 1950s. Mason and Asher (1973) describe how the Bank
attempted to constrain the activities of its borrowers in
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terms of public involvement in industrial undertakings. Not
only did the Bank not want to fund public projects but it felt
that the countries should not even be engaging in them.
India, in particular, was criticized for "underestimating [the
private sector] and subjecting its operations to unnecessary
restrictions".
This division of responsibility totally ignored the import
substitution debate started in the late 1940s. Prebisch (1949)
and others brought into question the accepted trade theory and
put forward an analysis which called for developing countries
to aggressively change their comparative advantage. The
vehicle was through an import substitution program. Within
this, the public sector took a more active role including
direct provision of industries. Neither the argument nor the
active role of the public sector were accepted by donors
during the 1960s.
While the stand of donors softened somewhat during the 1970s
towards direct involvement in industrial activities, it was
not until the late 1970s that the theoretical obstacles were
lessened. The balance of payments crises within developing
countries forced a shift in approach to industrial development
which suited the donor community. Industrial programs were
now being dictated by budgetary constraints and as a result
the split between public and private sector responsibilities
was changing. The private sector was increasing relied on as
the engine of growth.
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The increased reliance on the private sector within
developing countries allowed a redefinition of industrial
projects by the donors in the late 1970s. While still
focusing on the importance of private capital, foreign
investors, etc., the donors were able to set up programs which
directly supported the industrial sectors within developing
countries.
As Cassen and Associates (1985) state this shift reflected a
change in approach to industrialization within the donor
community. Four elements were now important to guide
industrialization: a better appreciation of the limits of the
public sector; an enhancement of the private sector's role
through improved management capabilities; a focus on the
context within which the private sector operated including
pricing, markets, technology, and technical skills; and
attention to the overall policy environment which impacted the
firm.
These principles appear to be fairly consistent across donor
programs. Within this broad approach, however, variations in
application do exist. The World Bank takes a very price
oriented approach to programming, while CIDA's is more based
on overcoming structural problems. How they went about
designing the programs was based on their underlying
theoretical approach to industries which is covered in the
following section.
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Developing a Theory of Industrialization
The overall policy framework which is determined at an
official level within donor agencies is adapted by the
organization before it is implemented in the field. Unlike
traditional theories of organization which see bureaucracies
simply as implementors of policies, the aid bureaucracy
assists in the policy formulation process by adapting the
broad official program guidelines into a specific approach to
an issue. As Cohen et al (1985) states, bureaucracies "play a
significant and active role in framing the policy agenda,
supporting particular options, ... and affecting the course of
policy, program and project implementation".
In CIDA's case, the adaptation was influenced by two
variables--the traditional theoretical approach of the donor
organization, and its internal administrative structure.
While many of the specifics of the CIDA example are not
applicable to other donors, some general comments can be made
about these two factors.
a) Traditional Theoretical Approaches
Developing countries continually criticize donors for
attempting to impose their perspective of development on the
recipient countries. Inherent in this criticism is the belief
that donors do not simply undertake objective assessments and
produce rational solutions which should then be implemented.
Each donor has a theory of development from which it works,
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which partly shapes past programs and influences the
parameters for undertaking new programs.
Underlying this document is the belief that donors do have a
theory which guides the way they undertake programming.7
Donors do not have any more ability to find the right answer
to development problems than developing countries. In fact,
donor's quests for various new solutions which might work are
one of the driving forces behind changes in programming. Yet,
donor organizations are rarely viewed as institutions which
have ongoing or consistent value sets.
Crane and Finkle (1981) present one of the few examples of
treating a donor as a organization with values. They contend
that the World Bank has become an institution with key values
and possessing a distinct identity--in essence a "committed
polity". These values make the Bank more resistant to changes
that threaten to alter its fundamental character. In
approaching the population issue, Bank officials redefined the
objectives of the program to fit with the way the organization
approached problems--a solution which relied on a traditional
project approach. This project approach proved to have little
7 It should be kept in mind that the focus of the
discussion is primarily on industrial assistance. Other types
of programming--particularly disaster relief or food aid--are
driven more by humanitarian concerns and therefore might break
out of the organizational approach. Enterprise support has
traditionally been more open to theoretical biases and therefore
is more clearly shaped by the donor's values.
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applicability to population issues, however, and as a result
programs were unsuccessful.
In a review of rural development projects, Tendler (1982)
evaluates the shift in the World Bank toward poverty projects.
One of the obstacles to effective delivery of programs to the
rural poor was how the Bank defined its programming. Tendler
contends that in an attempt to have continuity in its
theoretical approach, the Bank designed the poverty programs
as a modification of the old growth theories. This bias meant
that income generation would be accomplished through increased
production. The production orientation of the Bank meant that
the target groups were rural producers not workers. While
this generated some positive results, this focus on production
also caused a number of problems in terms of effectively
reaching the poorest groups. The Bank's theoretical bias
predetermined the success or failure of certain initiatives.
The World Bank's theoretical approach to industrial support
continues to focus on the same variables of growth, production
and rate of return. The Bank's theory of industrialization
currently relies on the price mechanism for making adjustments
within the economy which will allow industrial development. If
certain externally-oriented policy changes are made, then the
environment for investment and industrialization will improve
sufficiently to encourage firms to expand. In essence, by
changing policies, industrialization will take hold on its
own. Firms which can not adjust and take advantage of the
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opportunities will die. Those that show they can make it will
be given assistance to increase their production facilities
and capacity utilization.
This bias in the way each donor approaches a problem sets
the bounds for how solutions can be found. The industrial
sector provides an interesting example of this since
industrial projects would appear to be more traditional in
character. However, the movement towards enterprise programs
represents an interaction between values of the organization
and adaptations of theories.
As mentioned above, the shift toward direct programs by some
donors during the late 1970s was partially the result of the
removal of theoretical barriers to direct involvement. With
the growing balance of payments problems, increasing emphasis
was being placed in developing countries on the private
sector, export orientation, openness to foreign capital--the
elements which conformed with the donor view of the industrial
process. The demand for private sector support was also
changing as the country's opportunities for private capital
decreased. Programs could now be developed which did not
contradict the general theory of appropriate industrial
activities. The issue became how each donor would define its
own approach.
The decision by CIDA in the late 1970s to enter this area
represented a shift in how enterprises were viewed. CIDA's
Bilateral programs saw enterprise development as providing
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developmental support through small and micro enterprise
programs. To do this, CIDA needed to redefine industrial
issues from a developmental perspective. The CIDA tradition
of emphasizing self-reliance, trying to align itself more with
developing countries, and emphasizing efficiency with equity
meant that the approach formulated within CIDA used this
framework for developing an enterprise approach.
The result was a more structuralist analysis by the
Industrial Services Section. While relying on the private
sector, the CIDA approach acknowledged structural bottlenecks
within developing countries. Problems such as non-competitive
markets and non-availability of inputs act as obstacles which
prevent the industrial sector from developing. All policy
shifts result in changes in distribution and therefore firms
should be supported in the transition to a more efficient
economy.
These theoretical underpinnings are clearly seen in how the
different donors translate their policy framework into
programs at the country level. CIDA provides support in
terms of imported inputs, marketing, credit access, building
8 It should be remembered that the theoretical approach and
the specific interventions between donors are partly a function
of how they view themselves in the overall donor community.
The Bank's niche has become program lending which by its nature
has to be grounded in one development model. The choice of the
outward orientation model was an outgrowth of the discussion in
the previous section. As well, the role which CIDA has taken on
as the more moderate, micro oriented donor focusing more on
distributional needs is the niche which the organization has
tried to maintain over the last two decades.
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linkages within the economy, and informal sector development.
The World Bank focuses more on lending programs which support
policy reforms in areas such as trade liberalization,
financial reform and privatization of public enterprises.
b) Organizational Adaptation
An interesting question in terms of how the organization
adapted the approach to industrial development revolves around
the issue of how a donor organization implements a new program
stream. The focus on solutions which has driven many donor
organizations in their attempt to find new approaches to aid,
is also clearly at work within the operations of the donor
agency. The program options or solutions are rationally
reviewed and fit into the technical framework to develop an
operational approach.
The shift which began in the 1970s toward more "rational"
programming was an attempt by donors to decrease the
uncertainty of their environment. Rondinelli (1983) contends
that donor agencies continue to assume that their programs can
be rationally conceived and comprehensively planned solutions
to development problems. This assumption allows them to
undertake a highly technical approach to developing and
implementing programs with the assumption that the programming
will work.
CIDA's reliance on the professional staff within the
organization to operationalize its approach to industrial
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development was partly driven by this need to increase the
rationality of its approach. The matrix organization
structure which was put in place in the early 1980s was a
response to the quickly changing environment within the
developing countries. The willingness of the staff to have
the technical Industrial Services Section determine the
industrial program was based on the technicians' ability to
find solutions in a complex situation.
The Industrial Services approach of formulating a
theoretical framework for industrial programs and using this
as the basis for "rational" assessments within developing
countries is common to many donors. The assumption that an
objective assessment could be undertaken and programs
developed is a typical approach but one which constrains how
the programming can be shaped.
The ability to implement a particular approach within a
donor organization appears to be partly a function of this
"core technology". Crane and Finkle (1981) argue that the
World Bank's attempts to implement a population program were
unsuccessful, not only because of the complexity of the
population issue, but because of the Bank's inflexibility in
how it implements programs. The Bank staff have developed
techniques for developing programs and projects which
represent standard operating procedures. These define how
tasks are performed and therefore how issues will be defined.
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In some ways, industrial programs make the application of a
rational planning approach appear more appropriate and
reasonable. Unlike other interventions, programs aimed at the
private sector can be based more on "objective" indicators
such as risk and return. A review of the US AID private
sector programs in the early 1980s, indicated that while
appropriate programs could be designed, the lack of profitable
opportunities particularly within Africa posed a problem for
program implementation (US AID 1985). If profits could be
increased, then AID predicted that the programs could be
effective.
The focus on rate of return, however, may miss the real
opportunities for programming within the industrial sector.
As Rondinelli (1982) indicates, the tendency to insist on
sophisticated techniques for analysis and implementation of
programs many times creates more problems than it solves.
It is questionable that donors will have any more solutions
to industrial problems than are already being investigated in
the developing country. The need to bring some degree of
certainty to programming, however, will perpetuate the feeling
within donors that they do have the answers, particularly in
the areas of policy framework--where rational techniques are
least effective since no one set of policies can be applied in
the same way to every country.
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Country Specific Policy Formulation
a) Setting Their Own Agenda
Throughout the Bilateral and Industrial Services policy and
program formulation exercises in the Philippines, an
assumption was made that CIDA had a right to formulate its own
program and attempt to put together a reform agenda which in
some ways was more radical than the government's. CIDA never
questioned the rationale that they could, in effect, operate
outside of the Philippine Government framework for action.
While always trying to take the Government preferences into
account, the process was not to be confined by them.
This pattern of programming is typical of how the developed
countries approach aid giving in a sector such as industrial
development. The right of a donor to set its own agenda in a
recipient country has always been an underlying assumption of
the developed countries. When CIDA was started in 1968, one
of the first debates within the organization was whether aid
giving should be passive or active in terms of setting its
priorities, becoming involved in policy and project
formulation and establishing eligibility criteria.
CIDA decided on an approach in the late 1960s which tried to
meld the organization's desire to control the use of Canadian
funds with minimizing the friction between Canadian objectives
and recipient country objectives. CIDA wanted to be more
flexible than other donors who it saw as simply imposing their
objectives on recipients. In a sense, CIDA took this same
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approach in the Philippines--attempting to be open and yet
still implementing its own agenda.
Underlying CIDA's program was the assumption that aid is not
automatic or a developing country right. Donors have never
viewed aid as an automatic transfer of resources but as a
matter of their discretion. Despite attempts during the 1970s
by developing countries to change the terms of aid giving, the
decision to give or not give funds is still controlled by the
developed country. According to Wood (1986) an adjunct to
this reasoning is that a donor has the right to analyze the
situation within a country and develop conditions for aid
approval. These conditions are supposedly arrived at
objectively and are justified on economic and technical
grounds.
The rationale given by donors regarding the need to under-
take independent assessments is usually founded on the
principle that their assessments will not be overwhelmed by
the local politics of the situation or the bottlenecks thrown
up by bureaucratic unwillingness to change positions or
procedures. By putting the analysis in terms of independent
thinking, the donors are more able to look at problems and
policies and recommend changes or programs which would not
necessarily have support within the country.
Donors also contend that independent analyses are important
because they allow a longer term view to be taken. Govern-
ments--particularly those facing crises--are more apt to take
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a short run view aimed at producing results as quickly as
possible. If donors accepted the issues analysis which flowed
from this approach, the result might serve the needs of the
Government's election campaign but not of the country.
From this donor perspective, the principle of CIDA setting
its own agenda and undertaking its own analysis of issues is
normal for a donor. While a gap may exist between the
philosophical approaches, the CIDA agenda of social reform is
no different than the World Bank agenda of trade
liberalization and financial reform. Both donors assess the
situation and apply their own framework for analysis which is
then imposed on the recipient country. Both are attempting to
promote change within the country. Both need independent
analyses to provide the rationale for that change.
Setting their own agenda also allows donors to fulfil a
number of other objectives which are more hidden. Using in-
house analysis allows an easier integration of the donor's
perspective or theory. The CIDA team attempted to combine the
ISS theoretical base with the new CIDA priorities and develop
an assessment which met both objectives. The overall policy
framework outlined in the previous section must be integrated
into the analysis.
objective analyses also allow donors to hide their political
agendas within a country. While every donor informally takes
political factors into account, donors are usually reluctant
to formally recognize political constraints facing a country's
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ability to implement donor recommendations. Cohen et al
(1985) attribute this unwillingness to factors such as the
donor using independent studies as a way to get around
negotiating political concerns and the inability of many staff
to truly understand the political implications of actions.
Political factors have been a large concern in many donor
programs in the Philippines, however. The concern of CIDA
that President Aquino may not be able to overcome many of the
obstacles which block implementation of a reform agenda is
central to the program rationale. They see her moving towards
the right and lessening the emphasis on some of the critical
programs needed to broaden the base of power within the
country. The World Bank has a different political concern.
While President Aquino has completed many of the reforms of
the various Bank SALs, some Bank staff members are afraid that
her policies are too far left, that the government may not be
truly committed to privatization and that the remaining trade
liberalization agenda may not be implemented.
b) Appropriate Roles for Donors
The notion that donors have a right to make independent
assessments and set their own agendas is part of a broader
discussion about the relations between the donor and develop-
ing country. The focus during the 1960s and 1970s on project
funding allowed a clear delineation of responsibilities
between donors and countries. Strachan (1978) describes these
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aid control systems as the recipient having ultimate
responsibility for selection of the development strategy,
choice of projects and programs to follow and the administr-
ation of the programs. The donor agencies then had
responsibility to select projects and the right to ensure that
monies were used in an appropriate manner.
These relations have begun to change, however, with the
change in funding instruments in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The shift toward fast disbursing, non-project funds
has meant that the project cycle no longer determines the
relations between the two groups. Both donors and recipient
countries are now taking on different roles.
The framework for the industrial programs by CIDA in the
Philippines shows clear shifts in relations between
country/donor. The use of funding mechanisms, Canadian
Executing Agencies (CEAs) and direct support to Philippine
institutions means that the traditional nature of "government
to government" support has changed. The mechanism programs
set out broad parameters for funding such as establishing a
line of credit or a technical assistance program. The CEA
assigned to the industrial mechanism basically administers the
flow of funds based on set criteria established by the
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Bilateral desk.9 The same type of approach is also seen in
the Netherlands industrial delivery, although here the focus
is more on non-governmental organizations.
While recipient government consent to the broad parameters
of the mechanism is sought by CIDA, the control of the program
is many times taken out of the purview of the government.
Since approximately 95% of CIDA funds are grants, government
guarantees are not needed as with many donor lending programs.
In terms of the industrial programs, a government institution
could be designated as the Philippine counterpart to help
administer the program which would increase the influence of
the government over the implementation. More likely, however,
the institutions will be outside of the government framework.
The use of the CEAs by CIDA in other countries has resulted
in a gradual decrease in the role of the recipient government
over time. Many times the CEAs shift from being merely
executing agents to providing CIDA Bilateral staff with more
integral parts of programming process. Many intermediaries
have developed links directly with the private sector in the
developing country. The CEAs identify and develop programs
which could be integrated into the CIDA Bilateral programming
framework. CIDA staff have become responsive to these
9 The CEAs for the industrial projects tend to be private
Canadian groups such as commercial banks, manufacturers
associations, chambers of commerce, provincial departments of
industrial development, private consulting firms and
occasionally non-governmental organizations.
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proposals and have begun to decrease their reliance on
recipient governments to identify and determine development
needs.
The donors who have moved toward policy lending as a vehicle
for impacting the industrial process have made substantial
changes in their relations with recipient countries as well.
Cassen and Associates (1986) in their aid review for the World
Bank Task Force on Concessional Flows stated that policy
dialogues between donors and recipients once considered
infringements on rights are now accepted as part of the new
international relations. According to this argument, the
resulting policy conditions--such as trade liberalization,
privatization of industries and financial reform--imposed as a
condition of program aid transfers, are accepted by both
parties.
According to Cassen and Associates, the success of the
dialogues depends on the availability of resources to sustain
the adjustment programs, the analytical and negotiating
capabilities of the recipient countries and the ability of
donors to comprehend the local situation. While these
variables are important, I think that other factors also come
into play including the quantity of aid going from a donor to
a particular country, the degree of dependence the recipient
country has on that donor, and whether the underlying policy
approach of the donor matches that of the recipient govern-
ment. If a donor has a monopoly position within a country,
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then the donor has leverage to force the acceptance of policy
reforms. If a country has other alternatives and can do
without the donor or can bargain from a stronger position,
then the donor's position is weakened.
This has been one of the problems faced by US AID's attempts
to support the private sector through both projects and policy
dialogues. The amounts of policy based aid have not been
sufficient to obtain the changes which AID feels are
appropriate within the recipient country's policy framework.
According to Sewell and Contee (1985), this has necessitated
the combining of the security related aid with the policy
dialogues to increase the leverage on the recipient country.
This approach has not always been successful either, however.
The ability to use the policy levers is inversely related to
the political significance of the country. Therefore, the
Philippines was less subject to ideological based US policy
dialogues than other countries of less strategic importance.
This shifting relations between donors and countries is
clearly seen in the Philippines with the relation between the
World Bank and the Philippine Government. When President
Aquino was elected in 1986, the government accepted Bank SAL
and agreed to meet the conditions. In fact, the implement-
ation rate to the end of 1988 was very high. The balance of
payments crisis and the need to obtain donor funds (most of
which were tied to the Bank program) basically gave the Bank a
large amount of leverage over the Government.
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By the end of 1988, the attitude of the Philippine Govern-
ment began to shift. As the balance of payments problems
eased with the rescheduling of debt and the economy became
more buoyant, the Government began expressing little interest
in the Bank loans being extended for various reforms. The
conditions were being questioned and the costs of servicing
the foreign debt were considered too high.
c) Coalition Building and Historical Relations
A problem facing the CIDA Industrial Services team in terms
of developing a program for the industrial sector in the
Philippines was the lack of coalitions in the private sector
within the Philippines. Given the structure of the programs,
the CIDA staff needed to build coalitions in the private
sector and in grass roots organizations. The fact that CIDA
did not have previous programs within the Philippines meant
that few private sector groups knew about it or cared.
The need for coalitions is evident throughout the donor
literature, however. Numerous studies have shown that donor
programs are more effective when the recipient country group
has been involved in program formulation. Without involvement
at early stages, the group within the country will undoubtedly
engage in what the Strachan (1978) calls subterfuge. This
subterfuge, as perceived by the donor, will mean that in the
implementation process, the program will be transformed from
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the one which the donor designed to the one which fits the
needs of the group.
As well, donors need the backing of a group who is committed
to its plans and projects and will assist in the approval and
acceptance process. To gain this support, staff in the field
many times must represent the interests of the coalition
within the donor organization. This means that the
assessments in the field must be tailored to the tradeoff
inherent in this relationship since the goals of both the
client and donor must be taken into account.
CIDA faces long term problems with its programs if
coalitions are not built. The end target groups for the CIDA
industrial program is micro and small scale enterprises. This
is more complicated, however, by the fact that the firms which
are supposed to be impacted by the program are those
enterprises who currently have little or no access to the
formal credit system, Government programs and technical
assistance.
To make any progress on this front, CIDA staff will have to
build relations with institutions which share their view of
how the system needs to be changed. It may be relatively
simple to appoint an institution to administer the program in
a mechanical fashion (disbursing funds, meeting deadlines,
etc.) but far more difficult to find one which also tries to
meet the ultimate objectives of the industrial program.
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Coalitions are important to many donors in the Philippines
in terms of trying to implement their programming. The
Germans have developed a strong program in Cebu to support the
manufacturing sector. Working with the Cebu Chamber of
Commerce (CCC), the Germans have been able to supply credit
and technical assistance to CCC members. They have also
placed a resource person in the Philippine Board of Investment
(BOI). The task is to help the BOI attract German investors,
technology or expertise to the industrial sectors designated
as a priority by the BOI. The fact that the Germans are
supporting the BOI in undertaking the BOI agenda--and have
been quite successful at it--has meant that the BOI is very
supportive of any programs put forward by the Germans.
Discussions at both the Cebu Chamber of Commerce and the BOI
indicate that coalitions have been built over time which have
helped the donor programs be implemented and successful.
The World Bank has taken a different approach to coalition
building focusing almost exclusively on the Government. The
policy changes flowing from the SALs and the industrial
programs of the Bank all rely on the Government for changes to
the environment within which industries operate. The basic
premise of the Bank approach to industrial development puts
the initial onus on the Government to change its ways.
Without the commitment of the Government to these changes, the
policy reform implementation rate will be low.
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Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Bank was very
successful at building coalitions within the Government. In
fact, by a number of accounts the Bank and Government policy
were basically synonymous. Bello et al (1982) contends that
the Bank has even placed its own appointees in top spots
within the country to ensure that the various Bank programs
are followed. With the change in Government in 1986, the Bank
has been forging new relationships within the Aquino
Government.
The task of building coalitions on the national government
level appears to be more difficult, however. Conflicts
erupted during 1988 between the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Bank regarding the continual emphasis
of the Bank on policy reforms. The DTI felt that continued
emphasis on trade liberalization at a time when many firms
were having a difficult time adjusting, was inappropriate. As
well, the constitutional reforms put in place by Aquino which
have established a legislative process meant that policy
implementation was now a more complex matter. The democratiz-
ation has increased the difficulty of implementing the Bank's
approach.
On the other hand, building coalitions with governments
involves less risk than dealing with the private sector--
particularly small scale enterprises. One of the main
obstacles faced by the CIDA Bilateral staff in implementing an
industrial program is trying to get the involvement of the
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Canadian private sector in the process. Canadians have always
been risk averse in their operations with developing countries
(Rahman and Grant 1987). While the Canadians may be interested
in providing services, supplying inputs or straight transfers
of technology to small and medium enterprises within the
Philippines, little interest exists in building long term
relations.
267
VII. CONCLUSIONS
As is true for many donors, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) has been continually called upon
over the last thirty years to reorient its programming--adopt
new objectives or tackle new development problems. These
calls have come from a wide variety of sources including
pressure groups within Canada, other portions of the Canadian
bureaucracy, other donor agencies, developing countries and
the developed country community. Many reviews of donor
activities predict that these pressures are the motivating
force behind bilateral program development.1
These pressures undoubtedly do have an influence on decision
making as CIDA programs continually evolve. As shown in
Chapter 2, commercial pressures clearly did push CIDA towards
industrial cooperation and mixed credit programs during the
late 1970s. The NIEO debates during the 1970s translated into
increased priority within CIDA for programs based on self-
reliance. The original aid programs in the 1950s and 1960s
were merely copies of the aid programs being followed by the
US and the World Bank.
While these conflicting demands did act to push and pull the
organization in various directions, they are not adequate to
1 A wide range of studies conclude that bilateral donor
programs are dictated by political and commercial motives
primarily. These same studies put forward a case for increased
aid to multilateral agencies as a way to circumvent these
problems. See for example, Development Committee (1986).
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explain many of the changes in orientation which have
occurred. For example, the move into bilateral industrial
programming in 1980 was not due to commercial pressure. Yet
the programs represented a break from the traditional approach
to industries which CIDA had pursued from its inception. Why
then was new programming undertaken? The answer lies only
partly in analyzing pressure groups. Of equal, or greater
importance, is the overall environment within which the
organization operated and how a variety of factors converged.
The preceding chapter presents a four stage model of change
based on the experience within CIDA. This model represents
cycles of decision making which have been triggered in donor
agencies as conditions in the donor environment change.
Donors have tended to enter periods of crisis at the same time
and sought to resolve these crises by reformulating the
emphasis of their programs. The turn toward industrial
programming in the late 1970s reflects one more phase in this
continuing evolution.
As with other periods, the decision to change the approach
of the organization toward industrial programs was triggered
by growing uncertainty. As stated in Chapter 6, this
uncertainty made the course and programs being followed no
longer sustainable. Donors needed to find a solution which
allowed the development of viable programming at the
developing country level. This quest for a solution to
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growing development problems represented an attempt to make
the environment of donors more stable.
Recent aid reviews have expressed a belief that solutions to
development problems are possible if the international
community and individual countries are willing to acknowledge
their existence and take whatever steps are necessary to
implement them. This was seen in the Brandt Commission Report
(1980) which indicated:
We are convinced that the world community will
have to be bold and imaginative in shaping that
new order and it will have to be realistic in
its endeavours. Change is inevitable. The
question is whether the world community will
take deliberate and decisive steps to bring it
about or whether change will be forced upon us
all through an unfolding of events over which
the international community has little control.
While less sweeping in its approach, the Task Force on
Concessional Flows (1985) also was solution oriented,
suggesting that correct mixtures of policies would provide
success at the recipient country level.
Inherent in these assessments was an assumption of
predictability in terms of future problems within developing
countries. Solutions could be found to development problems
if a rational approach was taken to analyzing issues and
formulating and implementing strategies for their resolution.
These aid reviews had faith in the ability of donors--
particularly multilaterals--to find appropriate development
strategies and contribute to their implementation. The CIDA
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policy formulation showed much the same faith in its ability
to find appropriate programs.
Yet, as Rondinelli (1983) indicates,
In reality, ... international institutions had
been attempting to promote social and economic
change in developing societies since the early
1940s with relatively little knowledge of the
conditions they were seeking to transform and
with little certainty that their theories,
policies, and projects would produce the
desired effects.
It is precisely this uncertainty which drives donors to find
new solutions or approaches to development. Donors portray
this process as iterative, learning from past experience and
developing rational solutions based on that experience. In
fact, it is a continuing quest to find the solution to
development which will make the development programs stable.
As noted in Chapter 4, since donors are working in an area
which affords little stability, the quest for new solutions to
development will continue to be an ongoing process. The
implication is that donor agencies are not repositories of
development answers but represent additional actors in the
development field looking for solutions.
CIDA's policy formulation reflects this process. The
decision to change the approach of its aid programs was
triggered by four variables: the global economic situation;
changing demands of developing countries; pressures from
groups both within and outside of Canada; and organizational
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pressures to change. These four variables converged and made
continuing on the previous programming path unsustainable.
As indicated in Chapter 2, many of these same pressures
impacted all donors bringing into question donor programs in
general. The fact that many donors have entered crisis
periods at the same time is not a coincidence. The donor
policy reviews which were undertaken in the early 1970s and
late 1970s/early 1980s were a reflection of the confluence of
these factors which made the existing donor programs
inappropriate for meeting the developing country needs.
The new policies to be put in place by CIDA were determined
by a two stage process. First an official policy resolution
was reached which took into account four factors: the demands
and pressures from the organization's constituencies; the
pressure from the donor community toward increased
complementarity of programs and a particular development
model; the opportunities at the developing country level; and
the acceptable theories of development. From this came the
official policy framework and a decision that industrial
programs would be part of the bilateral program package.
This framework was then adapted by the organization into an
operational "theory" of industrialization which would act as
the basis for developing programs in the field. Part of this
adaptation was ensuring that the approach to enterprise
support fit with the traditional theoretical approach of CIDA
as well as the internal structure and procedures within CIDA.
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The last stage then represented the application of CIDA's
approach to a country specific situation. Chapter 4 shows how
CIDA applied its approach to industrial programs in the
Philippines and how the resulting analysis differed from other
donors operating within the country.
The differences in approach between donors then are not
based merely on one donor being driven by political motives,
while another is driven by commercial interests. While these
variables may have greater or lesser importance at any
particular time for a particular donor, the programs which are
formulated are part of a complex process of decision making.
While many of the same factors may pressure for change, how
the donor resolves these pressures depends on how various
factors are weighted in the decision making process.
Developing Differences in Approach
As shown in Chapter 2, before the late 1970s, a certain
similarity was evident between donors vis a vis industrial
development. Most donors were reluctant to directly support
industrial enterprises. This reluctance was based on a number
of factors. Originally, the approach to industrial support
was very conservative. Donors, including Canada, adopted a
policy based on much of the capital constraints literature of
the 1950s.2 Capital was assumed to be the determinant of
2 See for example Rostow (1960), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)
and Nurske (1953).
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growth and the principal constraint within the economy. By
increasing physical capital through infusions of aid, they
could increase production within the developing country
economy. Canada along with most donors translated this into
programs which provided infrastructure and technical
assistance.
While the demand for donor funding of direct industrial
projects grew during the early 1960s, few donors moved in to
supply the funds. The reasons were based on the theory of
industrialization which they had adopted--specifically their
perceptions of appropriate roles for the private sector and
public sector within the industrialization process.
Many of the projects which sought donor funds were large
scale, public sector projects. The public ownership acted as
a deterrent for donors such as Canada who felt that industrial
development should rely on the private sector and private
capital markets. Canada also had another problem in terms of
domestic constituencies. The potential competition between
the donor country firms and the developing countries hindered
more active support.
During the 1970s, many donors were forced to shift their
programming away from infrastructure because of decreased
demand at the developing country level. This triggered shifts
in the overall policy framework of individual donors as they
tried to find a new niche for their aid programs. The
possibility of shifting into industrial projects at this point
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was limited, however. The demand for donor funding of
enterprises was low since many developing countries and firms
had access to private capital markets. These markets allowed a
more self-directed approach with few of the donor conditions.
Instead, donors like Canada and the World Bank moved into
funding more social programs.
Events at the end of the 1970s triggered changes within
developing countries in terms of how they approached
industrial development. Until the mid to late 1970s,
industrial policies dictated the fiscal, trade and monetary
policies which a country followed. A country decided the
route it wanted to take given factors such as resource level
and domestic market size, and set in place mechanisms to
achieve these goals. As indicated in Chapter 3, many times
the strategy included substantial roles for the public sector
in direct industrial provision, an emphasis on large scale
enterprises, and high domestic market protection. While not
always successful, the strategies were viewed as vehicles to
improved income levels, a modern production base, and self-
sustained development.
The shocks at the end of the 1970s, which ranged from
interest rate increases to increased protectionism within
developed countries, triggered balance of payments crises in
many developing countries. Large public deficits could no
longer be sustained, large-scale inefficient industries funded
or declining employment levels ignored. The balance of
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payments constraints began to dictate the industrial
strategies which were followed.
Shifts began to take place in the policy approach at the
developing country level. The need for foreign exchange forced
an increasing emphasis on export producing industries. The
decreased resources available to the government shifted the
burden for industrialization back to the private sector.
Small and medium scale enterprises became the focus for
overcoming many of the employment problems.
The shift in industrial strategy and the growing balance of
payments problems within developing countries caused many of
these previous obstacles to donor funding to become less
important. The increasing reliance on the private sector
meant that the theoretical biases against public sector
projects could be circumvented. The sudden increased demand
at the country level meant that opportunities opened again for
donor support to industries.
CIDA might not have moved to provide this support if another
critical factor had not made its focus on social programs
untenable. The global economic situation and changing needs
at the developing country level meant that the demand for
CIDA's current programs had decreased. The organization was
facing a crisis of not being able to disburse funds or
reorient its focus quickly enough to reflect the rapidity of
change within developing countries. The need to move away
from social programs meant that a programming niche had to be
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found. Pressures within Canada and inside the donor community
were being exerted to make programs more relevant to the
dramatic changes.
These variables impacted almost all donors forcing them into
a period of growing uncertainty. Donors were looking for new
ways to assist the adjustment process which would fit with
their organizational needs, be supported by constituencies
within the organization, generate sufficient demand from
developing countries, conform with the movement of other
donors, and be within the organization's acceptable theory of
development. While the importance of each of these variables
fluctuated between donors, they were all looking for a
solution or niche in the changing development landscape.
CIDA turned to direct support to micro, small and medium
scale enterprises as one route for programming. The decision
and the character of the interventions resulted from balancing
a number of factors. The increased emphasis within developing
countries on enterprises and the private sector for overcoming
balance of payments problems meant that a market existed for
donor funds which had not been evident throughout the 1970s.
Funds were needed to assist enterprises which were
particularly hard hit by economic shifts. The fact that
programs could be put in place which supported the private
sector meant that the theoretical obstacles regarding
public/private roles were lifted.
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As well, traditional objections of commercial groups within
Canada to industrial projects were no longer relevant since
small and medium enterprises posed little competitive threat
to Canadian firms. In fact, constituencies within Canada
especially grass roots groups were pressuring for support to
enterprises as a way to increase employment within the
recipient countries and lessen the burden of adjustment.
These factors converged to push CIDA towards direct support
of enterprises through provision of credit, training,
marketing, and other programs. The Bilateral desks began to
program industrial projects based on the specific needs of the
developing country.
As indicated in Chapter 6, a number of donors such as the
Netherlands and World Bank, moved in a similar direction
establishing programs for direct industrial support. The
dynamics within each organization produced a spectrum of
programs being offered to developing countries in support of
industrial programs. These included sectoral adjustment
loans, technical assistance for policy, credit programs,
cofinancing of joint ventures with the private sector,
training, and institution building.
For donors to undertake this new spectrum of interventions,
they had to move into areas which had traditionally not been
their focus. Policies towards industrial development had to
be reformulated--beyond simply the desire to have the private
sector be the motivator for development which remained the
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basic theoretical bias. A specific theory of industrial-
ization had to be developed which would guide the programs
within each agency. As described in Chapter 6, this theory
resulted from adaptations within the internal organization
(including the practical concerns of implementation) and the
traditional theoretical approach of the donor.
The World Bank, to successfully implement its Structural
Adjustment Lending, had to determine the framework which would
be used for conditions for the loans. For a number of
reasons, it turned increasingly toward one model for
development which was based on "outward orientation" and the
International Monetary Fund approach to development.
CIDA, on the other hand, needed to formulate its first
approach to industrial development. Since the need for
consistency in the Bilateral programs was not considered
important, CIDA handed the design of the actual programming
framework to the technical staff within the Industrial
Services Section (ISS). They became responsible for defining
how issues were to be addressed. The ISS developed a more
structuralist approach to industrial development which was
then translated into programming at the country level.
Translating These Differences To The Country Level
With the new policy frameworks in place and the resulting
theories of industrialization and administrative support
established, CIDA and other donors began to undertake
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industrial assessments within countries which differed
considerably in some cases. The assessment within the
Philippines of the issues facing the industrial sector as
outlined in Chapter 4 shows the resulting similarities and
differences between CIDA's approach and other donors.
Like most donors, CIDA's ISS team went into the field with
the assumption that it was going to undertake an independent
analysis of the issues facing the Philippines industrial
sector.3 While the Philippine Government program was
considered one input into the process, the ISS group felt that
it should not be restricted by the Government plans. After
three missions, and a lengthy interview process within the
Philippines, the ISS made assumptions about the industrial
structure within the Philippines which set the ultimate
objectives of the program--they were also quite different than
the conclusions reached by the World Bank.
The primary difference revolved around whether the
industrial sector was so dominated by a small group of firms,
that other groups were in effect excluded from access to
Government programs, credit and technology--whether "rent
seeking behaviour" still existed within the Philippines. As
described in Chapter 3, this situation was partly the result
of policies pursued in the 1970s by the Government of the
Philippines.
3 The need for undertaking independent assessments is
covered in Chapter 6.
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While both the World Bank and CIDA agreed this
characterization was true during the 1970s, a difference of
opinion was evident about whether or not the rent seeking
behaviour was still operating within the economy. The Bank
argued in its internal documents that the policy changes which
the Philippines had undertaken since 1980 in terms of tariff
reform, import restrictions, interest rates, exchange rates,
indirect tax systems and privatization of public enterprises
had resulted in a fundamental transformation of the policy
environment. This eliminated the biases within the system and
removed the possibility for continued rent seeking behaviour.
Unlike the Bank, the CIDA ISS team concluded that rent
seeking behaviour had not ended with the policy changes and
still acted as a critical obstacle to effective development.
While changes on the policy level had theoretically allowed
greater access to opportunities, the bifurcation of the
industrial sector and its overwhelming enclave nature meant
that old patterns were not fundamentally changed. The decision
that the industrial structure had not changed, and that CIDA
should as a result specifically target firms who were
currently outside the mainstream, became the foundation of the
programming.
Just as the Bank's assessment had conformed to its
theoretical foundation of "getting the prices right" so had
the CIDA analysis built on the more structuralist approach.
The theory underlying the Bank's approach said that once the
281
prices were changed within an economy, then all firms had an
equal chance for access to the system. CIDA's assumptions was
that while policy changes should allow better access to the
system, all firms were not automatically equal. All policy
shifts result in a change in the distribution of income and
impact different groups differently. Therefore, help should
be given to firms to assist in the adjustment process.4
Changing A Policy Framework
The impact which changes to the overall donor policy
framework can have on the sectoral programming is clearly
illustrated in Chapter 5. While CIDA's ISS group was
undertaking programming in the Philippines, the Government of
Canada and CIDA management were in the process of redefining
CIDA's priorities and programming. In essence, CIDA was going
through another cycle of policy formulation. The result of
the policy resolution was a new emphasis on providing support
in areas such as human resource development. While sectoral
programming would still take place in the industrial area, it
would now have to focus more clearly on this new overall
policy approach.
To translate the new policy framework to the sectoral level,
CIDA chose not to specifically formulate a new theory of
4 The theoretical assumptions underlying these two
approaches are covered extensively in Chapter 2.
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industrialization.5 Instead it chose to change the internal
relationships within the system to ensure that the new policy
guidelines became the parameters for all programming. These
changes in internal organization fundamentally changed the
programming possibilities of the ISS--forcing parts of the
analysis to be dropped while others to be taken up.
To understand the impact of the changes it is important to
review the way the ISS had operated since 1980. As a
professional service group, the ISS was able to undertake
independent issues analysis in countries with little
interference on the sectoral level from within CIDA. In a
sense, it operated outside of normal donor framework--with the
donor emphasis on disbursal of funds, administrative
imperatives, etc. In fact, the issues identification
undertaken within the Philippines was astonishingly free from
organizational pressures normally associated with a donor
programming stream. This allowed a different kind of analysis
which was not only open in its process but honest about the
problems facing the country.
Two relationships were changed with the CIDA policy review.
Whereas before, the ISS was free to undertake programming
based on its perception of sectoral needs, now the ISS staff
5 The reasons as outlined in Chapters 2 and 5 clearly
connect to the pressures which converged to drive the new
framework including the demands of internal constituencies, the
role which the donor community was pressing CIDA to take and the
need to undertake a less ad hoc approach to programming.
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had to conform to the new programming parameters. While it
could continue to use the same theory of industrialization, it
had to apply it through different programming. In essence,
the ISS was no longer in control of the programming process
but had to work within very strict parameters.
The other change revolved around the freedom of the
Bilateral desks to set their own agendas on a country level.
The Bilateral desks now had to conform to set criteria
established by the Branch within which it was located. In the
case of Asia Branch, the Branch put forward common objectives,
country program review frameworks and policy options for the
Bilateral desks to follow. These then had to become the
foundations for the ISS sectoral program as well.
These two organizational changes meant that the ultimate
goals of the ISS program for the Philippines were no longer
suitable within the organization. The focus on supporting
social and economic change within the industrial sector could
no longer be the driving force. The program had to focus
instead on the definition of needs as outlined by Asia Branch-
-specifically on building partnerships between Asian and
Canadian firms and strengthening institutions for better
program delivery.
The insistence by the Branch that the programs be based on
these principles raised problems in terms of implementation of
the industrial programs as well as negating any hope for
undertaking a more reform oriented agenda. The shifts within
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the policy framework and the resulting organizational changes
effectively narrowed the possibilities for industrial
programming.
Implications
Inherent in this analysis are a number of assumptions about
aid and relations between donors and recipients. The first
revolves around the purpose and demand for aid within
developing countries. Developing countries accept aid as a
resource flow when other options are limited. As indicated in
Chapter 6, the current constraints at the country level leave
few other choices for many countries. Either they accept aid
flows or are faced with even more severe adjustment problems.
From the recipient country perspective, the desirability of
aid as a resource transfer is lessened by the conditions
attached to the funds. The most desirable form of aid would
be balance of payments transfers with no conditions. This in
fact is what the Philippines requested when CIDA first entered
in 1986. To the donor, this is unacceptable, however. Donors
want to have control over their programs, selecting the issue
to be addressed and the vehicles for program implementation.
While other forms of aid such as famine relief or food aid
clearly can be rationalized and programs formulated on
humanitarian grounds, designing an enterprise development
programs is more subject to negotiation between donor and
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country. However, donors, in many cases, portray themselves
as having the corner on the intellectual development market.
As indicated in Chapter 5, CIDA's assumption in the
Philippines that it should develop its initial enterprise
program outside of the influence of the Philippine Government
was based on a belief that CIDA would be more capable of
implementing a reform agenda than the Government. This
assumption was naive since both must contend with the same set
of entrenched interests and problems facing implementation in
the field. As well, each has its own set of internal
blockages to reform. This "rational" approach to program
formulation ignored political and administrative obstacles
which have caused past donor programs aimed at change to fail.
To ensure effective implementation, donors must be willing
to be more honest about negotiating programs. The pressures
within the donor agency push it in the other direction,
however. It will undoubtedly be up to the governments to
ensure that the transfers are done in a negotiated
environment.
The second assumption flows from the first. Developing
countries continually criticize donors for attempting to
impose their perspective of development on the recipient
countries. Inherent in this criticism is the belief that
donors do not simply undertake objective assessments and
produce rational solutions which should then be implemented.
Each donor has a theory of development from which it works,
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which partly shapes past programs and influences the
parameters for undertaking new programs.
Underlying this document is the belief that donors do have a
theory which guides the way they undertake programming. This
theory is shaped by a wide variety of forces which interact
differently within different donor agencies. Policy
formulation then becomes a reflection of how cycles of
uncertainty and change are resolved within each agency.
Donors are not discovering a new solution to a development
problem. They are focusing on a solution which allows
effective programming given an ever changing environment. The
implications are that enterprise development programs are not
the solution to industrial problems, but one attempt at
dealing with the problems. A large difference exists between
these approaches.
The analysis presented here is aimed at making the donor
process more transparent to both recipient countries as well
as donor staff. Understanding the complex set of variables
which come together to impact programming is difficult both
inside and outside an organization. The benefits which can be
gained from this understanding, however, are substantial
particularly at the recipient country level.
Understanding the framework for how donor programs are
developed can increase a country's negotiating and bargaining
position. The type of analysis provided here allows insights
which are important for dealing with donors. Instead of
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assuming the process is haphazard or simply based on
preconceived notions, recipient countries can begin to
separate out the factors which are operating and pressuring a
donor in a particular direction.
This helps the negotiation process in three ways. Recipient
governments can begin to pinpoint and recognize changes in
policy directions or priorities within an organization
earlier. Governments are often taken by surprise by sudden
shifts in donor approach which appear from nowhere (as was the
case with the ISS industrial program process). Second, by
understanding the political and economic rationales behind a
donor's approach, a more effective strategy can be developed
for negotiating with the donor. Governments can pinpoint
areas of flexibility and inflexibility and adjust their
approach to take these into account.
Third, how issues are assessed within a donor agency and how
they are translated into programs impacts the implementation
process. The way a donor defines an issue has repercussions
not only on how the program can be formulated, but also on how
effective the implementation can be within a country context.
Governments are many times in a better position to identify
potential problems with implementation than the donor
agencies. On the other hand, Governments often must deal with
the problems caused by poor implementation.
The industrial programming which has been undertaken by
donors in the Philippines has ranged from macroeconomic policy
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interventions such as support to trade liberalization to
microeconomic programs aimed at providing support in areas
such as credit and technical assistance. Many of the programs
overlap, and their effectiveness has been questioned by a
number of recent reviews.6 Attempts by the Government to
coordinate donor activities have not been very successful,
however.
Part of the problem is internal to the Philippines. Little
coordination exists in terms of dealing with donors. The
Government has what appears to be fragmented lines of
responsibility and limited control over the negotiation
process. The emphasis tends to focus more on getting funds
than on trying to lever the donor system to have them directed
toward certain areas.
Some departments within the bureaucracy are trying to
decrease this fragmentation by taking a more controlled
approach to sectoral issues. The Department of Industry and
Trade during 1988 attempted to exercise more control over some
of the World Bank programs which they felt were too based on
policy reform not on overcoming problems faced by firms. The
process will be slow, however. The Government lacks detailed
knowledge about the operations of the donors which limits its
ability to intervene in the aid process.
6 See for example, Tecson et al. (1988).
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The negotiating strength of the Government within the
Philippines could be enhanced with a more detailed knowledge
of the strengths and weaknesses of different donors and the
policy frameworks within which they work. The positive
response to CIDA to date is based partly on the openness with
which CIDA has tried to operate to date.
It should be noted, however, that negotiations between
donors and recipients take place on two levels: between the
country and the specific donor; and between the country and
all the donors (through consultative groups, etc.). The
knowledge of how programming is formulated within a specific
donor agency is important for negotiating with that one donor.
However, the group dynamics is more difficult to assess. This
is particularly important for countries like the Philippines
where donor consultative groups have a large influence on what
funds the country gets and how those funds are disbursed.
Before a country can take more control of the donor process,
it has to be in a position of understanding the different
donors and of being able to match its needs with the donor
strengths. While the focus of this dissertation has been on
revealing CIDA's, and to a lesser extent the World Bank's,
patterns of decision making, many of these same variables
operate within other donor agencies. What this report can
hopefully provide is a guide to helping decipher some of the
pressures.
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The other side of the equation is equally important,
however. Donors need to be more open and flexible in their
programming process to allow a better understanding by the
recipient countries. CIDA's attempts in the Philippines to
undertake an interactive process are a step in the right
direction. Even these attempts are plagued by three problems,
however.
First, little incentive exists for donors, including CIDA,
to be more open. While relative openness is part of the "CIDA
approach" to aid, it operates within specific bounds which are
defined by organizational needs. The second problem with
being more open is the pressure between donors to conform.
The increased number of donors and the competition for
projects--particularly in areas such as industrial
programming--has triggered repeated calls for improved
coordination. As described in Chapter 6, this coordination
many times is simply a way to increase the control the donors
have as a group over the process.
Third, for CIDA line personnel, the changes to programming
which resulted from the CIDA policy shift were as much of a
surprise within the organization as they were outside of CIDA.
While the review process was going on, the staff assumed that
the impact on actual programs would be minimal. By not
understanding how the policy framework impacted the system,
there was little anticipation of how the changes would work
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their way through the system. As a result, few attempts were
made to minimize the impact on industrial programming.
Despite the fact, that CIDA occasionally does not stick to
the donor party line, it still remains aligned with the
developed countries and their donor agencies. While trying to
be open in the Philippines, it is also open to increased
pressure from the other donors to have all programming,
including its industrial components, conform. This pressure,
out of necessity, will work to a certain extent.
A more fundamental problem with making the system of donor
programming more transparent is breaking down some of the
inherent biases which exist in the current donor/country
relations. While CIDA's industrial assessment ended up
reinforcing many of the points which were underlying the
Aquino Government's "people powered" agenda, CIDA went into
the process assuming that it had a right to assess issues
independently.
The right to do an independent analysis was based not only
on the fact that this assessment was necessary to fulfil
CIDA's policy dictates (one of the findings of this
dissertation) but also on the fact that CIDA would be more
objective than Government analyses. This assumption of
objectivity, underlies most donor programs. In fact, much of
the debate within donor agencies regarding industrial issues
has revolved around the ability of certain donors to define
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what the correct industrial paths are for a country to follow-
-based on objective, rational, economic assessments.
A corollary to the assumption of objectivity is the need by
donors to ignore the political character of some variables
which impact a donor's policy framework. This is particularly
true in the multilateral setting. By accepting the fact that
issues within a donor organization are defined in response to
a range of pressures from outside, the ability of donors to
maintain the appearance of objectivity is lessened.
The acknowledgement that the donor's policy framework sets
the parameters for sectoral programming also acts as an
acknowledgement that donor organizations are not apolitical or
driven by developmental concerns. In fact, they are driven by
the need to stabilize their environment and deal with
uncertainty. The focus should be more on building increasing
adaptability into donor programs and less on finding the
"right" solution to development problems. It is precisely
this acknowledgement which is needed in order for donor
agencies to build the flexibility into their programming that
will enhance the appropriateness of aid.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY
The methodology used for this dissertation was a combination
of field work, interviews, publication reviews and informal
discussions. Some of the interviews which were undertaken
were done within the context of my work for the Canadian
International Development Agency; others were specifically
geared towards assembling the information needed to analyze
the process within CIDA, the Philippines and donor agencies in
general.
Since much of the interview process was undertaken in
confidence, the names of those interviewed will not be listed.
Instead, a list is provided of the organizations or types of
individuals who had input into the research.
As well, I had access to a wide variety of confidential
material within CIDA, the World Bank and US AID which has been
integrated into this work but can not be listed in the
bibliography. These materials included everything from trip
reports, to internal policy documents to evaluations and
provided invaluable insights into the rationales for programs
and the inner workings of different donors.
Interviews 1 or Key Meetings
1) November 17 - November 25, 1986 - Washington D.C. & New York
Purpose of the interviews was to establish the role which
various donors were taking in the industrial field including
types of programs being offered, success of the programs,
emphasis on program versus projects, current problems with
industries in developing countries, split of responsibility
between multilateral and bilateral programs, and potential
roles for CIDA in this process.
Interviews conducted at:
World Bank
Canadian Executive Director's office
East Asia and Pacific Region
Industrial Section
Note that in all cases a complete list of interviewed
organizations is not provided since some were confidential. As
well, within organizations usually more than one individual was
interviewed per section or group.
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International Finance Corporation
Operations Evaluation
US AID
Bureau for Private Enterprise
Program and Policy Division
Small Scale Enterprise Program
Latin American Regional Office
Trade and Development Program
InterAmerican Development Bank
Industrial Section
United Nations
UN Centre on Transnational Corporations
Industrial Investment Promotion Service
UNDP
Ford Foundation
2) November
Business
Evaluation Group
4, 1987 - December 10, 1987 - Manila, Cebu and
Negros - Philippines
Groups & Firms
European Chamber of Commerce
Makati Business Club
Philippine Chamber of Industry & Commerce
San Miguel Corporation
Confederation of Philippine Exporters
Cebu Chamber of Commerce
Negros Economic Development Forum
Negros Business Forum
Fish processing plant and sugar processing
Cross section of small scale producers and
exporters
Banks & Government Financial Institutions
Planters Bank of the Philippines
Philguarantee
Far East Bank and Trust Company
Development Bank of the Philippines
Bank of Nova Scotia
Government
Department of Trade & Industry
Subcontracting Program
Governor of Negros
Asset Privatization Trust
Central Bank
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National Economic & Development
Administration
Board of Investment
Organizations
Technology and Livelihood Resource Centre
Centre for Research & Communications
Asian Institute of Management
University of Philippines - Individual
professors & Institutes
Donors
World Bank
US AID
Asian Development Bank
Japan - JETRO
Germany
NGOs & Community programs
Negros Rehabilitation & Development Fund
In-Hand Foundation
Don Basco Technical School
Technical University in Negros
Community Groups in Cebu, Negros and Manila
NGOs in Cebur, Negros and Manila
Informal Discussions with policy analysts, bankers, firms,
academics, and individuals.
3) February 17, 1988 - Ottawa
All day meeting regarding the country program review and
update process. Discussion with all Philippine CIDA staff
about their underlying assumptions about the program,
directions in which it should go, and organizational
requirements.
4) April 19, 1988 - April 22, 1988 - Washington D.C.
Discussions with economists and program people regarding the
Philippines and industrial lending in general.
World Bank
Cofinancing Section
Philippines Desk
Philippines, Industry Section
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IFC
Program Section
MIGA2
Inter-American Development Bank
Industry Section
Co-financing section
Desk officers
5) September 17 - October 6, 1988 - Manila, Philippines
The purpose of this trip was to assist the program group and
the modern sector group within the Philippines to integrate
the new CIDA directives into the country program review.
Numerous discussions were held within CIDA about the
interpretation of the priorities, how the process was
changing, implications of these changes, and what the program
officers wanted to accomplish. It was my responsibility to
devise a way of shifting from an issue driven program (which
was based on the previous work) to one which conformed with
the Asia Branch directives.
6) October 17 - November 10, 1988 - Manila, Philippines
Purpose of this trip was to attend the Country Program
Review meetings being held between the Ottawa based and Manila
based officers within CIDA including representatives of Asia
Branch, the Ottawa Desk, and the Manila Post. These twenty
people met as a group over a five day period. Meetings were
then held with Government representatives. Numerous
discussions were held with CIDA staff which included
representatives of Asia Branch, desk officers, individuals
working in the field and the field support unit.
7) November - December 1988 - Manila, Cebu Philippines
During my visits in October and November I met with a number
of industry associations, firms, academics, individuals and
policy analysts to obtain inputs on a questionnaire which I
designed which was being administered to 96 small and medium
scale enterprises within the Philippines from November to
December 1988. The interviews were undertaken by a group in
the Philippines under my supervision. The aim of the 3 hour
interview was to obtain information on the needs of firms in
2 This was just being established and the interview focused
on how MIGA might be used in conjunction with donor programs in the
Philippines.
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terms of technology, skills, credit, production process, etc.
8) July 17-19, 1989 - Washington D.C.
The purpose of this trip was to test my assumptions about
the behaviour of donors in the industrial field and the
reasons for differing views and programs.
World Bank
Policy Group
Executive Director's offices
Philippine desk officers
Economic Development Institute
US AID
Chief Economist Office
Policy Analyst
Bureau of Enterprise Development
InterAmerican Development Bank
Industry Section
Executive Directors' offices
Cofinancing section
9) Between 1986 and 1989 - Ottawa
I have held numerous discussions with CIDA staff in Ottawa
over the two and a half year period to not only understand the
CIDA decision making process but also the impact of the
Parliamentary review process, changes in organizational
relations and relations with other donors. Some of these
interviews have been formal, others informal. The sections
within CIDA covered have been: Policy Branch; Multilateral
Institutions Branch; Industrial Services Branch; Asia desks;
and the Industrial Cooperation program. My work as a
consultant to each of these groups has given me unprecedented
access and many candid opinions.
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APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMMING WITHIN CIDA
The first step in understanding CIDA involves untangling the
various players who are involved in industrial programming.
An organizational chart is included which provides a formal
outline of the divisions within CIDA. For my purposes, three
sections are important: Industrial Cooperation Program (INC)
within the Business Cooperation Branch; the Philippines
Bilateral Desk within Asia Branch; and the Industrial Services
Section (ISS) in the Natural Resources Division within the
Professional Services Branch. My involvement with the
Philippines program to date has included consulting work with
each of these three sections.
Begun in 1977, the Industrial Cooperation Program serves the
needs of Canadian firms interested in projects in developing
countries. INC's mandate is to provide support and assistance
to the Canadian private sector. Firms initiate projects and
submit proposals to INC for funding of prefeasibility studies,
trade missions and training. The proposals are assessed
based on a number of criteria including the appropriateness
of the project within the country, the availability of a
joint venture partner within the host country, the
development impact, and the long term viability of the
Canadian firm. While each INC project receives input from
the bilateral staff, Post staff, Industrial Services, Export
Development Corporation and Ministry of External Affairs, the
final assessment of the project is based on the likely
profitability of the venture and INC's perception of its
developmental impact.
Since the INC program is based on reacting to Canadian
private sector initiatives, the market within Canada dictates
the programs and interventions which are undertaken. In
essence, it operates outside of a formal program context. No
requirements exist that bind INC to the formal CIDA Bilateral
objectives for a country. In fact, INC projects sometimes
operate in direct conflict with the Bilateral programming.
Commercial criteria take precedence.
The INC program has not been very active in the Philippines
to date. Part of the reason lies in the reluctance of
Canadian firms to enter the Philippine market which they view
as both politically and economically risky. Mining and
petrochemicals are the principal areas where Canadians have
had involvement in the past. Few investors have considered
manufacturing sectors.
I undertook a project for INC during 1988 and 1989 which
aimed at reversing this trend. I had a team of Philippine
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researchers interviewing 100 Philippine firms in seven
subsectors of interest to Canada. The intention was to gain
an understanding in areas such as the technology used by the
firms, obstacles to expansion, market potential, assessment
of risk and areas of potential collaboration between Canadian
and Philippine firms. The INC staff hopes that this base of
knowledge will encourage Canadians to become more interested
in the Philippines for joint ventures, investment, technology
transfers or even trade.
The Philippines Bilateral Desk within Asia Branch focuses on
meeting the demands and needs of the Philippines. Bilateral
programs are "government to government" programs which
traditionally have provided everything from food aid to
infrastructure to technical assistance. Taking a proactive
approach to development, the Bilateral group is charged with
formulating the overall program for each country. Documents
such as the Country Program Review (CPR) dictate what CIDA
hopes to accomplish in a specific country, how it plans to
accomplish these objectives and the mechanisms for delivery.
The Philippines Bilateral Desk has been in existence since
1986 (when the Philippines program was started) and finalized
its CPR in April 1989. The work which I have done directly for
the Bilateral group has been in helping to formulate the
group's interim strategy and CPR.
Enterprise development is one component of the overall
Philippine Bilateral delivery strategy. Along with other
programs such as commodity aid, assistance to non-government
organizations, technical assistance to government and a
telecommunications project, the industrial program will be
implemented in the Philippines between 1989 and 1993. The
specifics of the industrial program are being provided by the
ISS.
The Philippine program has been decentralized to the field
as one of the first decentralized posts. There are 15 staff
members working on the Bilateral side in Manila, with only 1-2
support people in Ottawa. From 1986 to Fall 1987, all of the
programming was handled through the Ottawa headquarters.
After this, the program was slowly transferred to the field.
The Industrial Services Section acts as an in-house
consulting team in the enterprise development area. Unlike
the staff members in INC and Bilateral who are generalists,
the staff in ISS are specialists many coming from engineering
backgrounds. Their role is to provide the technical expertise
needed to identify needs, and select and design programs in
the industrial area.
The purpose of a professional services group is two fold:
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to ensure that technical standards are followed within the
organization; and to provide a certain consistency of
approach to sectoral issues. In this latter capacity the ISS
was asked by CIDA's President's Committee to prepare a
position paper outlining the approach it thought CIDA should
be taking to industrial issues. As part of this process, I
prepared a background paper for ISS on the experience of
medium and large scale enterprises and where CIDA might
better focus its programming.
The primary purpose of ISS, however, is to provide
technical assistance to Bilateral and INC. The ISS is
supposed to assist both the Bilateral group and INC. ISS
must be asked to participate in programming, however, and the
funds flow from Bilateral or INC to ISS to pay for that
technical assistance. My participation in modern sector
missions and preparation of position papers on the modern
sector in the Philippines has been as a subconsultant to the
Industrial Services group.
While the lines between INC, Bilateral and Industrial
Services may appear to be clear, the industrial programming
which results from this arrangement is ad hoc. Although
theoretically the Industrial Services group is supposed to be
assisting both INC and Bilateral, ensuring that the technical
and programming basis for projects in both programs are sound,
the reality is that Industrial Services basically relates to
the Bilateral group. INC, while formally asking for advise,
rarely involves Industrial Services beyond this.
In addition, since 1981 the Bilateral program has
increasingly used the Canadian private sector to help deliver
its programming. Canadian companies have been increasing
their roles in formulating strategies as well as in helping to
implement them. The result is an increasing competition
between the INC program and Bilateral program. They both
tend to target the same limited number of private sector
groups to help deliver the industrial components of their
programming, and even compete for projects within countries.
The focus in this thesis is primarily on the industrial
programs formulated by the Bilateral and ISS staff. The
issues identification activities and program in the
Philippines only marginally involved INC. It is important,
however, to understand the relationship between INC and
Bilateral in order to understand the changes which have
occurred within CIDA since 1980.
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